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Abstract 
 
The Arabian/Persian Gulf (“the Gulf”) is a small semi-enclosed sea surrounded by 
eight States, namely Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates and Oman. The Gulf has long been an area of strategic and economic 
importance, rich in subsea hydrocarbon resources. Following a general introduction 
to the international law of the sea, this study analyses two forms of Gulf State 
practice; firstly, national legislation to date dealing with maritime limits and 
delimitation and secondly, the bilateral continental shelf agreements between the 
Gulf States, the majority of which delimit the continental shelf boundary between 
them. This analysis then assesses such state practice in the light of international law, 
with a particular focus on continental shelf delimitation. In so doing, this study places 
Gulf State practice in the context of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
1958, the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1958 and 
the Law of the Sea Convention 1982, as well as customary international law and 
international case law.  
This study reaches a number of conclusions in respect of delimitation in the 
Gulf more generally, but mainly in respect of continental shelf boundary delimitation 
in the Gulf, and how this compares with the international law of the sea. It notes the 
early references in Gulf legislation to delimitation on the basis of equitable principles, 
which were gradually superseded by references to the equidistance line. The reliance 
on equidistance as a method of delimitation, albeit often heavily modified, in the 
bilateral maritime boundary agreements is examined. The conclusions then seek to 
present such features of Gulf State practice in the context of the international law of 
the sea, noting innovative aspects of delimitation in the Gulf, as well as the relevance 
of international law to a small but extremely significant region of the world.  
  
 
 
4 
 
 
 
To my Mother Nadia Iskander and my Father Nabil Helmi Iskander 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………… p. 13 
Abbreviations……………………………………………………………. p. 14 
Table of Cases…………………………………………………………… p. 15 
Table of National Legislation by State……………………….………… p. 17 
List of Figures…………………………………………………………… p. 20 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction……………………………………………… p. 22 
Research questions………………………..……………………………….p. 22 
Data to be analysed………………………………………………………..p. 22 
Background to the nomenclature of the Gulf……………………………..p. 24 
Geographical background…………………………………………………p. 26 
Historical background……………………………………………………..p. 29 
              The significance of this study…………………………………...................p. 32 
 
Chapter 2. The Sources of International Law, Maritime Limits and  
Delimitation………………………………………………………………p. 38 
Introduction……………………………………………………………….p. 38 
The sources of international law…………………………………  ………p. 39 
i.    Treaties…………………………………………………… p. 40 
ii.   Customary international law ………………………………p. 40   
a.  State practice………………………………………...p. 41 
b.  Opinio iuris sive necessitates………………………p. 41 
c.  The responses of states……………………………...p. 42 
d.   The persistent objector………………………………p. 43  
e. Regional customary law………………………………. p. 43 
 
 
6 
iii.   The Relationship between treaties and customary law…… p. 44 
 
iv.   Judicial decisions and their significance as a source of law,  
in particular as a source of customary international law of  
the sea……………………………………………………… p. 46 
 
Maritime zones in international law………………………………………p. 48 
i.   Introduction to the international law of the sea…………… p. 48 
ii.   Introduction to baselines ………………….. ……………. p. 51 
a. The general rule…………………………………… p. 52 
b. Reefs………………………………………………...p. 52 
c. Harbour works……………………............................p. 53 
d. Low-tide elevations…………………………………p. 53 
e. Islands……………………………………………….p. 53 
f. Departure from the general rule……………………..p. 54 
 
i.   The territorial sea……………………………………………p. 59 
ii.   The contiguous zone……………………………………...…p. 61 
iii.   The continental shelf………………………………………..p. 62 
 
a. The CSC 1958………………………………………p. 64 
b. The LOSC 1982…………………………………….p. 65 
 
iv.   The exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”)…………………… p. 68 
 
 Islands ……………………………………………………………... p. 69 
 Delimitation……………………………………………………….. p. 70 
i.   The territorial sea…………………………………………. p. 70 
ii.   The contiguous zone……………………………………… p. 71 
iii.             The continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone (‘EEZ’)  
 
 
7 
 
 
(or exclusive fishery zone, ‘EFZ’), and the single maritime  
 boundary...............................................................................p. 71 
 
Chapter 3. Case Law on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the 
 International Law of the Sea…………………………………………...p. 75 
Introduction………………………………………………………………..p. 75 
The main methods of delimitation………………………………………....p. 76 
i.    The equidistance line……………………………………......p. 76 
ii.    Parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude…………….p. 82 
iii.    The method of enclaving islands……………………………p. 82 
iv.    Perpendicular lines…………………………………………..p. 83 
 
Partial effect given to geographical features, usually islands……………...p. 84 
Bisection of angles representing the coastal fronts of two parties…………p. 86 
Case law 1969 – 1992……………………………………………………...p. 87 
Case law 1993 – 2007………………………………………………………p. 90 
Case law 2009 – present……………………………………………………p. 93 
Equitable principles……………………………………………………… ..p. 97 
Relevant circumstances referred to in the case law………………………...p. 100 
 
i.    The land boundary between adjacent states………………….p. 100 
ii.   Previous conduct of the parties in relation to purported  
maritime limits……………………………………………….p. 101  
iii.    Geographical factors…………………………………………p. 102 
 
a. A change in the direction of the relevant coastline…..p. 102 
b. A concave coastline………………………………….p.102 
c. Islands, uninhabited rocks, and low-tide elevations ...p. 103 
d. A quasi-enclosed sea…………………………………p. 106 
e. A marked difference in the lengths of the relevant coastlines  
and the concept of proportionality…………………...p. 107  
 
 
 
8 
    
iv.    Mineral deposits……………………………………………p. 111 
v.    General economic considerations, fisheries, landmass,  
security and navigation ……………………………………p. 114 
Delimitation of the EEZ/EFZ……………………………………………p. 119 
Conclusions in respect of the case law…………………………………..p. 120 
 
Chapter 4. Law of the Sea in the Gulf: National Legislation on  
Baselines, the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (the  
1930s to the present)……………………………………………………… p. 122 
 
Introduction………………………………………………………………. p. 122 
Saudi Arabia………………………………………………………………. p. 124 
a. Baselines and the territorial 
sea……………………………………………………….p.133 
b. The contiguous 
zone……………………………………………………...p.133 
Observations on the legislation of Saudi Arabia and the degree of its conformity  
with international law……………………………………………………...p. 134 
Iran………………………………………………………………………....p. 136 
a. Baselines and the territorial 
sea……………………………………………………………p.138 
b. The contiguous 
zone………………………………………………….............p.139 
Observations on the legislation of Iran and the degree of its conformity  
with international law………………………………………………………p. 142 
Kuwait……………………………………………………………………. p. 144 
a.  Baselines and the territorial 
sea………………………………………………………..p. 146 
b. Internal waters…………………………………………...p. 146 
c. The territorial 
sea……………………………………………………….p. 146 
 
 
9 
d. The contiguous 
zone……………………………………………………...p. 147 
Observations on the legislation of Kuwait and the degree of its conformity  
with international law…………………………………………………….p. 147 
United Arab Emirates…………………………………………………….p. 148 
a. Internal waters…………………………………………...p. 149 
b. Baselines and the territorial 
sea……………………………………………………….p. 150 
c. The contiguous 
zone……………………………………………………..p. 152 
d. Delimitation of the territorial sea and contiguous 
zone……………………………………………………...p. 152 
Sharjah……………………………………………………………………p. 153 
Observations on the legislation of the UAE and the degree of its conformity  
with international law…………………………………………………….p. 154 
Oman……………………………………………………………………..p. 155 
Observations on the legislation of Oman and the degree of its conformity 
with international law…………………………………………………….p. 161  
Bahrain, Qatar and Iraq…………………………………………………..p. 161 
i.   Bahrain……………………………………………………..p.161 
ii.   Qatar………………………………………………………..p. 162 
iii.   Iraq…………………………………………………………p. 163 
Observations on the legislation of Bahrain, Qatar and Iraq and the degree  
of their conformity with international law……………………………….p. 164 
Observations on the claims to straight baselines in the region…………...p. 164 
General concluding remarks on the degree of conformity of the Gulf  
states with international law of the sea…………………………………...p. 165 
 
 
 
10 
 
Chapter 5. Law of the Sea in the Gulf: National Legislation 
on the Continental Shelf and the EEZ (the 1940s to the present)......... p. 168 
Introduction………………………………………………………………. p. 168 
Saudi Arabia ………………………………………………………………p. 170 
Observations on the legislation of Saudi Arabia and the degree of its conformity 
with international law……………………………………………………..p. 173 
Iran………………………………………………………………………...p. 174 
Observations on the legislation of Iran and the degree of its conformity with 
international law…………………………………………………………..p. 179 
Kuwait…………………………………………………………………….p. 180 
Observations on the legislation of Kuwait and the degree of its conformity with 
international law…………………………………………………………..p. 181 
The UAE, Oman and Bahrain…………………………………………….p. 182 
i.   The UAE…………………………………………………...p. 182 
ii.   Oman……………………………………………………….p. 186 
iii.   Bahrain……………………………………………………..p. 189 
Observations on the legislation of the UAE, Oman and Bahrain, and the  
degree of their conformity with international law………………………..p. 190 
Qatar and Iraq…………………………………………………………….p. 191 
i. Qatar………………………………………………………..p. 191  
ii. Iraq…………………………………………………………p. 193 
Observations on the legislation of Qatar and Iraq, and the degree of their  
conformity with international law………………………………………...p. 194 
General concluding remarks on the degree of conformity of the Gulf states  
with the international law of the sea………………………………………p. 195 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
Chapter 6. The Delimitation of the Maritime Boundaries of the Gulf States   
……………………………………………………………………………..p.197 
Introduction……………………………………………………………… p. 197 
1. 1958 Bahrain – Saudi Arabia………………………………………….. p. 199 
2. 1964 Sharjah – Umm al Qaywayn………………………………………p. 202 
3. 1965 Kuwait - Saudi Arabia (Partition of Neutral Zone)……………… p. 203 
4. 1965 Saudi Arabia - Qatar…………………………………………… p. 204 
5. 1968 Abu Dhabi – Dubai………………………………………………. p. 205 
6. 1968 Saudi Arabia – Iran………………………………………………. p. 207 
7. 1969 Qatar – Abu Dhabi………………………………………………. p. 211 
8. 1969 Iran – Qatar…………………………………………………………… p. 214 
9. 1971 Bahrain – Iran……………………………………………………..p. 215 
10. 1974 Iran – Oman…………………………………………………… p. 217 
11. 1974 Saudi Arabia – UAE…………………………………………….p. 219 
12. 1974 Iran – UAE (Dubai)……………………………………………..p. 221 
13. 1981 Dubai – Sharjah…………………………………………………p. 222 
14. 2000 Saudi Arabia – Kuwait………………………………………….p. 224 
15. 2001 Qatar – Bahrain…………………………………………………p. 226 
a. The southern sector………………………………...p. 228 
b. The northern sector………………………………...p. 231 
16. 2008 Saudi Arabia – Qatar……………………………………………p. 233 
General observations on the delimitation of maritime boundaries in 
 the Gulf…………………………………………………………….. ……p. 234 
i.   Equidistance ……………………………………………… .p. 234 
ii.   Islands as relevant circumstances………………………… .p. 235 
 
 
12 
a. The existence of oil and gas fields in the continental shelf as  
relevant circumstances………………………………p.236 
b. Navigation as a relevant circumstance………………p.239 
 
Chapter 7. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf:  
Gulf State Practice in the context of International Law……………….p. 240 
The Gulf as a region……………………………………………………….p. 240 
Declarations of the right to exploit the continental shelf………………….p. 241 
 The safeguarding of navigation and security in the contiguous zone and EEZ 
 …………………………………………………………………………….p. 243 
Delimitation of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone……………….p. 244 
Delimitation of the continental shelf in the Gulf………………………….p. 245 
i.   Baselines……………………………………………………p. 245 
 ii. Equitable principles and equidistance………………………p. 246 
The single maritime boundary in the Gulf…………………………………p. 253 
Relevant circumstances……………………………………………………p. 254 
i.   Islands………………………………………………………p. 255 
 
a. Half-effect………………………………………………………p. 255 
b. Islands which are granted territorial seas by way of a  
semi-enclave……………………………………………………p. 257 
 
c. Islands which are ignored as base points from which to draw  
the boundary and therefore given no effect………………….....p. 258 
 
ii. The existence of oil and gas fields in the continental shelf………..p. 259 
iii. Navigation……………………………………………………….....p. 261 
 
Chapter 8. Conclusions…………………………………………………..p. 262 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………… p. 266 
Index to Appendix……………………………………………………… p. 283 
Appendix…………………………………………………………………. p. 288 
 
 
 
13 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I am extremely grateful to my supervisor, Mr Ian Edge, for his continued guidance 
and support, his constant encouragement, and extremely practical and helpful advice 
throughout my time as his student. Despite his busy professional schedule, he was 
always able to guide me with unfailing good humour and an invaluable sense that 
nothing was impossible. I am also grateful to my secondary supervisor, Professor 
Matthew Craven, who read and commented on my work at short notice.  
 I would like to thank my friend and colleague, Russell Wilcox for his helpful 
suggestions.  
 I also wish to express my immense gratitude to my wonderful parents who 
have always inspired and encouraged me, and to my wonderful brother Ashraf for 
his constant support over the years. I also acknowledge the patience of my little son 
Yaseen, whose claim on my time was usurped by the demands of this thesis.  It would 
not have been possible to complete this thesis without my family’s patience and 
support.   
  
 
 
Hala Helmi 
London 
12 July 2016 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
14 
Abbreviations 
 
 
CSC 1958  Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958 
EEZ    Exclusive Economic Zone 
EFZ    Exclusive Fishing Zone 
ILC    International Law Commission 
ITLOS   International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
LOSB   Law of the Sea Bulletin 
LOSC 1982  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982 
TSCZ 1958  Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone 1958 
UAE    United Arab Emirates 
UN    United Nations 
US    United States of America 
UNCLOS I  The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea 
UNCLOS II  The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea 
UNCLOS III  The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea   
U.N. Leg. Ser.  United Nations Legislative Series 
 
  
 
 
15 
 
Table of Cases 
 
Anglo-French Arbitration (1977) 18 ILM 397 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, Judgment, [1951] ICJ Rep 116 
Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) [1950] ICJ Rep 266. 
Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration (2007) 27 RIAA 147 
Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Delimitation (Bangladesh/India) Arbitration 
(2014) PCA Case 2010-16 
Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) (Merits) 
[1960] ICJ Rep 6 
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 
[1985] ICJ Rep 13 
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 
Judgment, [1982] ICJ Rep 18 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), 
Judgment, (2012) ITLOS Case No. 16 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, [1984] 
ICJ Rep 246 
Dubai/Sharjah Border Arbitration (1981) 91 ILR 543 
Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, Second Phase, (Maritime Delimitation) (1999), (2001) 
22 RIAA 333 
Franco-Canadian Maritime Boundary Arbitration (St. Pierre and Miquelon) (1992) 
31 ILM 1145 
Greenland/Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation (Denmark v Norway), Judgment, 
[1993] ICJ Rep 38 
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Maritime Boundary Arbitration (1985) 35 ILM 251 
Guyana/Suriname Arbitration (2013) 30 RIAA 1 
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: 
Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Judgment, [2002] ICJ Rep 303 
Lotus case P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, 1927 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar 
v Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, [2001] ICJ Rep 40 
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine), Judgment, [2009] ICJ 
Rep 61 
Maritime Dispute (Peru v Chile), Judgment, ICJ General List No. 137 
 
 
16 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States (Merits)) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 
Petroleum Development Ltd v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras), Judgment, [2007] ICJ Rep 659 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Judgment, [2012] ICJ 
Rep 624  
North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment [1969] ICJ Rep 3 
  
 
 
17 
Table of National Legislation by State 
 
BAHRAIN 
Proclamation regarding subsoil and seabed area 5 June 1949 
Decree No. 8 of 1993 with respect to the territorial sea and contiguous zone of the 
State of Bahrain on 20 April 1993 
 
IRAN 
Act of 15 July 1934 on the Territorial Waters and the Contiguous Zone of Iran 
Act of 18 June 1955 on the Exploration and Exploitation of the Natural Resources of 
the Continental Shelf of Iran 
Act of 12 April 1959 amending the Act of 15 July 1934 on the Territorial Waters and 
the Contiguous Zone of Iran 
Decree No. 2/250-67 of 1973 
Proclamation of 30 October 1973 
Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the 
Oman Sea 1993 
 
IRAQ 
Official Proclamation of 23 November 1957 
Proclamation of 10 April 1958 
Republican Ordinance No. 435 of 15 November 1958 
Law No. 71 of 1958 
Law of 16 March 2011 confirming straight baselines claimed 
 
KUWAIT 
Proclamation regarding subsoil and seabed area of 12 June 1949 
Decree Regarding the Delimitation of the Breadth of the Territorial Sea of the State 
of Kuwait on 17 December 1967 
Decree No. (317) Concerning the Delimitation of the Marine Areas Pertaining to the 
State of Kuwait, as amended, 29 October 2014 
 
 
 
18 
OMAN 
Royal Decree of 17 July 1972 concerning the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf and 
Exclusive Fishing Zones of the Sultanate of Oman 
Royal Decree No. 44 of 15 June 1977 
Royal Decree concerning the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf and Exclusive 
Economic Zone of 10 February 1981 
Notice relating to the application of the straight baselines system for the demarcation 
of baselines for the territorial sea, the internal waters and the enclosed waters of 1 
June 1982 
 
QATAR 
Proclamation regarding subsoil and seabed area of 8 June 1949 
Declaration by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 2 June 1974 
Decree No.40 of 1992 defining the Breadth of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone of the State of Qatar of 16 April 1992 
 
SAUDI ARABIA 
Customs Law of 29 June 1930 
Decree No. 6/4/5/3711 of 28 May 1949 
Royal Proclamation of 28 May 1949 
Royal Decree concerning the Territorial Waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(Royal Decree No.33) of 16 February 1958 
Declaration concerning the Limits of the Exclusive Fishing Zones of Saudi Arabia in 
the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf 1974 
Council of Ministers’ Resolution No. (15) of 25 January 2010 
Statute of Maritime Delimitation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of 13 December 
2012 
 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and its delimitation of 25 July 1980 
 
Federal Law No. 19 of 1993 on Determination of the off-shore territories of the 
United Arab Emirates 
 
 
19 
Council of Ministers’ Decision No. (5) 2009 in respect of the Application of the 
Straight Baselines System to a Part of the Coast of the United Arab Emirates of 14 
January 2009 
 
 
 
 ABU DHABI 
Proclamation regarding subsoil and seabed area of 10 June 1949 
 
 AJMAN 
Proclamation regarding subsoil and seabed area of 20 June 1949 
 
 DUBAI 
Proclamation regarding subsoil and seabed area of 14 June 1949 
 
 FUJAIRAH 
Proclamation regarding subsoil and seabed area 
 
 RAS AL KHAIMAH 
Proclamation regarding subsoil and seabed area of 17 June 1949 
 
 SHARJAH 
Proclamation regarding subsoil and seabed area of 16 June 1949 
Decree concerning the Territorial Waters of Sharjah Emirate and its 
Dependencies and Islands of 10 September 1969 
Supplementary Decree concerning the Territorial Sea of the Emirate of Sharjah 
and its Dependencies of 5 April 1970 
   
  UMM AL QAYWAYN 
  Proclamation regarding subsoil and seabed area of 20 June 1949 
  
 
 
20 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1 Map of the Gulf, from Lloyd’s Maritime Atlas of World Ports and 
Shipping Places (18th ed., Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd., Essex, 1995), 
p 37. 
          p. 28 
  
Figure 2 The maritime zones, from R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of 
the Sea (3rd ed., Juris Publishing, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1999), p. 30.     
p. 58 
 
Figure 3 Equidistance between opposite coasts, from V. Prescott and C. 
Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (2nd ed., 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005), p.577, fig.10.1. 
         p. 78 
 
Figure 4 Equidistance between adjacent coasts, from V. Prescott and C. 
Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (2nd ed., 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005), p.578, fig.10.2. 
         p. 78   
           
Figure 5 Diagram from North Sea Continental Shelf cases [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at 
p. 16 showing the effect of concave coasts on an equidistance line. 
         
        p. 80 
         
Figure 6 A relationship of both oppositeness and adjacency between two states, 
from V. Prescott and C. Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries 
of the World (2nd ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005), 
p.590, fig.10.14.   
p. 82  
 
 
 
 
21 
Figure 7 Half-effect as applied in the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977) 18 ILM 
397, from H.W. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in International 
Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990), p. 358. 
  
p. 85 
 
Figure 8 Half effect used in respect of Kharg Island in the Saudi Arabia-Iran 
1968 agreement, from H.W. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990), p. 
356.  
         p. 86 
 
Figure 9 Table of years in which Gulf States issued national legislation 
on maritime zone limits and delimitation, including some 
official announcements on legislation. 
   
p. 123 
 
Figure 10:  Hypothetical application of Oman’s 1972 Decree to the Musandam 
peninsula, from Jaywardene, H.W., The Regime of Islands in 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht; London, 1990), p. 66, 
reflecting map in Limits in the Seas, No. 61, ‘Straight Baselines: Oman 
(Hypothetical)’ (International Boundary Study Series, published by 
Office of the Geographer, US, June 4, 1975. 
          p. 158 
 
Figure 11 Table showing a list of bilateral agreements which have delimited 
maritime boundaries in the Gulf.     
        p. 198 
  
 
 
22 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Research questions 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the law and state practice of delimitation of 
maritime boundaries in the Arabian/Persian Gulf (“the Gulf”) within the context of 
public international law (henceforth referred to as “international law”) with a 
particular focus upon delimitation of the continental shelf.1 Following a systematic 
examination of the national legislation of Gulf States, their agreed maritime 
boundaries, and the basis upon which solutions to delimitation problems have been 
reached, this thesis will consider whether the particularly unique geographical 
features of the Gulf region, including its wealth of natural resources, have influenced 
or dictated developments in the law and state practice in the region. In addition, this 
thesis will examine whether trends in Gulf state practice may be identified and if so, 
whether they are consistent with international law, or whether there are aspects 
showing innovation when compared with international law.  
 
Data to be analysed 
 
The primary sources of the data to be examined are the sources of the international 
law of the sea, and specifically state practice in the Gulf regarding continental shelf 
boundaries. The main international law sources are contained in Treaties, such as the 
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (“the TSCZ 1958”), 
                                                             
1 The particular considerations surrounding the nomenclature of the geographical area which is the 
subject of this study are briefly dealt with later in this chapter. However, in this study the term “Gulf” 
is used to refer to the area in question. The terms “Persian Gulf” and “Arabian Gulf” will not be used 
unless quoting directly from a source which uses those terms. 
 
 
23 
the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958 (“the CSC 1958”) and the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (“the LOSC 1982”), in 
customary law, and in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), 
as well as the case law of other international arbitral tribunals.2   
With regard to state practice in the Gulf, the main sources to be examined will 
be national laws, bilateral state agreements on maritime boundary delimitation, the 
adjudicated boundaries in the Gulf, and state pronouncements on law and policy. 
Both Gulf legislation and bilateral delimitation agreements constitute state practice, 
in the sense that they are the acts, both legislative and compromissory, of Gulf States. 
Such acts may potentially be relevant for the purpose of establishing whether a 
particular rule of customary international law exists, providing that the necessary 
criteria for establishing a customary international law rule are met.3 Bilateral 
agreements will feature heavily in this study. They are a key source of law applicable 
between the state parties in question, and their significance also rests upon their 
capacity for applying international law norms. Moreover, they may, if particular 
criteria are met, contribute to the formation of customary international law. However, 
it is also significant that they are negotiated compromises, and are directed at 
individual delimitation issues governing two particular states.  
It should also be mentioned that excluded from the ambit of this thesis is the 
topic of the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.4 This is on the basis 
that it is strictly outside the confines of the field of maritime boundary delimitation. 
However, as a topic, it has particular significance for the Gulf States, in a number of 
ways, for example, and quite significantly,  in relation to passage through the Strait 
of Hormuz which is mostly comprised of the territorial seas of Iran and Oman. 5 
                                                             
2 The First United Nations Conference culminated in four Geneva Conventions and a Protocol of 1958. 
Two of these have already been referred to, namely the TSCZ 1958 and the CSC 1958. The others, 
which are not of direct relevance to this study, are the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention 
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and the Optional Protocol of 
Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. 
3 The elements of customary international law, namely state practice and opinio juris, are dealt with 
in Chapter 2. 
4 What constitutes innocent passage was contained in Article 14(4) and (5) TSCZ 1958, and is 
contained in Article 19 LOSC 1982.  
5 While is not the intention of this thesis to examine the right of innocent passage, this issue has 
exercised the Gulf States. Concerns about it in light of perceived threats from Israel were the main 
reasons why Iran and Saudi Arabia did not ratify TSCZ 1958, and, for example, Iran’s declaration of 
understanding on signing LOSC 1982 expressed concerns regarding the meaning of innocent passage 
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Although the focus of this thesis is the delimitation of the continental shelf in 
the Gulf, and the relationship between it and international law, this thesis will also 
examine Gulf State practice in respect of the delimitation of other maritime zones, 
with the aim that a wider examination of the relationship with international law will 
shed more light on the examination of Gulf continental shelf delimitation in the 
context of international law. 
 
Background to the nomenclature of the Gulf 
 
The issue of the nomenclature of the Gulf region has been heavily characterised by 
debate and controversy. Historically, the name attributed to it has depended on 
whether Arab or Persian interests prevailed in the trade routes in the region, so that, 
for example, during the Baghdad-based Abbasid era during the eighth to the 
thirteenth centuries, it was known as the Arabian Gulf.6 However, when Persian 
interests dominated, it was called the Persian Gulf, such as during the Sassanian era 
227-627 AD, or when the British Political Resident in the Gulf took Bushire on the 
Iranian coast as a base for operations in the region, due to the strong relationship 
between Persia and Britain, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.7  
While historically, traditionally, and internationally, the term “Persian Gulf” has 
been used to apply to the region, it is highly arguable that the most lasting and 
dominating influence on the Gulf has been Arab. In relatively recent years, 
essentially since the 1960s, Arab States have used the term “Arabian Gulf” with 
increased emphasis.8 In addition, many Arab States have passed laws stipulating that 
                                                             
in LOSC 1982. By way of further example of the issues created by the concept of innocent passage, 
objections have been made by the US and Germany on behalf of the EU, to Articles 5-9 of Iran’s Act 
on the Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea 1993 in 
respect of curtailments of innocent passage. The US’s protest of 11 January 1994 and Germany’s 
démarche of 14 December 1994 are at 25 LOSB (1994), pp. 101-3 and 30 LOSB (1996), p. 60 
respectively. Iran replied on to the US protest on 24 May 1994, at 26 LOSB (1994), pp. 35-8. Gulf 
States have also protested against the provisions of Iran’s 1993 Act, which they have viewed as 
restricting the right of innocent passage, see Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE at 32 LOSB (1996) 89-
91. For a discussion of Iran’s 1993 Act, see Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.  
6 A. Anani and K. Whittingham, The Early History of the Gulf Arabs (Longman, Essex, 1986), 8-9. 
7 Ibid., p. 9. 
8 H.M. Al-Baharna, who published the second edition of his work The Arabian Gulf States. Their 
Legal and Political Status and their International Problems in 1975, stated that in the decade or so 
prior to that publication there had begun an identifiable trend among Arab States towards the term 
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it is compulsory to use the term “Arabian Gulf” when communicating on an 
international level.9 The alternative of “Islamic Gulf” received limited support in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, but was never viewed as a real alternative among Arab 
States.10  
This study does not propose to deal with the controversies in any detail.11 
However, it does proceed on the premise that, while the term “Persian Gulf” is one 
which is intrinsically bound up with history, in the light of more modern 
developments, it no longer reflects the widespread usage by the Arab Gulf States, as 
well as by other Arab States in the Middle East. Therefore, this study proposes to use 
the term “Gulf” to refer to the geographical area which is the subject of the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
“Arabian Gulf”, a trend opposed by Iran, (2nd ed., Librairie Du Liban, Beirut, 1975, reprinted 1978), 
p. 1, n. 1. 
9 Ibid., p.1, n.1. 
10 The name “Islamic Gulf” is first attributed to Sadiq Khalkhali, who was Iranian Chief Justice of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Courts in 1979-81, and a Member of the Iranian Parliament in 1981-88, during 
a visit to the UAE in 1979. It has since been used by a number of Iranian Revolutionaries. Libya’s 
Colonel M. Gaddafi also expressed support for such a name in an Arab Summit in Benghazie on 18 
September 1981 as an alternative to “Arabian Gulf” or “Persian Gulf”. See S.H. Amin, Legal System 
of Kuwait (Royston Publishers, Glasgow, 1991), Appdx 1, p. 283. 
11 The controversy, which remains entrenched amongst the Gulf States, continues until present times. 
For example, in a communication dated 22 December 2010 from the Permanent Representative of 
Iran to the Secretary-General of the U.N., Iran objected against the use of “Arabian Gulf” in legislation 
regarding straight baselines promulgated by Saudi Arabia in January 2010. Iran noted “with regret the 
use of a fake name for the Persian Gulf, inventing or using any name other than the Persian Gulf 
which is the only and true geographical designation, as historically established and universally 
recognized, for the sea area between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula would only create confusion and 
misunderstanding, and is therefore rejected and void of any legal significance.” For Iran’s 
communication see (2011) 75 LOSB 33. The Saudi Arabian legislation is question was the Council of 
Ministers Resolution No. 15 of 25 January 2010 and Royal Decree No. M/4 of 26 January 2010 at 
(2010) 72 LOSB 81-5 and is referred to in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
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Geographical background 
 
Figure 1 shows a map of the Gulf, which is a semi-enclosed sea.12 In categorising the 
Gulf as a semi-enclosed sea, Alexander has suggested that the criteria for such a 
categorisation are an area of at least 50,000 square nautical miles.13 He also suggests 
that the sea should be a “primary” sea rather than merely: 
 
 an arm of a larger semi-enclosed water body. At least 50 percent of its 
circumference should be occupied by land and the width of the connector 
between the sea and the open ocean must not represent more than 20 percent of 
the sea’s total circumference.14  
 
Alexander also confirms that the Gulf’s area is 70,000 square nautical miles and 97 
percent of the periphery is occupied by land.15  
The Gulf Sea is encompassed by the eight States of Oman, the United Arab 
Emirates (“the UAE”), Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran, which 
this study will collectively refer to as “the Gulf States”. A major significance lies in 
the fact that relatively speaking, a large number of States surround a very small area 
of sea. The entrance to the Gulf from the Indian Ocean is through only one route, 
namely the Strait of Hormuz, which, as a result, has a particular strategic and 
economic importance. In the Strait of Hormuz, the deeper waters are located in 
Oman’s territorial sea, which therefore is the location of all the heavy maritime Gulf 
                                                             
12 It falls within the definition of such in Article 122 Law of the Sea Convention (“LOSC”) 1982 
which provides that an “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea” is “a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or 
more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or 
primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.” 
13 An important point to note is the unit used to measure nautical distance. LOSC 1982 expresses such 
measurement in nautical miles (referred to in this study as “nm”). According to Kapoor, D.C., and 
Kerr, A.J., A Guide to Maritime Boundary Delimitation (Carswell, Toronto, 1986), while the 1982 
Convention does not define what constitutes a nautical mile, ‘[t]he value of 1,852 metres was approved 
for the “international nautical mile” by the International Hydrographic Conference of 1929. This 
standard has since been adopted by most maritime States as well as by the International Bureau of 
Weights and Measures’ (p. 21).  By way of comparison, the statute mile, the unit of measurement 
known, for example, in the UK, is 1,609.344 metres.  
14 See L.M. Alexander, “Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: The Case of Semi-enclosed Seas” (1974) 
2 ODIL 151, at p. 155.  
15 Alexander (1974), Table 1, p. 158. As this study will highlight in due course, due to dimensions of 
the Gulf, the Gulf States are unable to claim a continental shelf or an Exclusive Economic Zone 
(“EEZ”) to a distance of 200nm from the baselines as stipulated in provisions in LOSC 1982. 
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traffic, including that which involves the transport of most of the oil produced in the 
Gulf States. 
The length of the Gulf, including the Strait of Hormuz, is approximately 
430nm.16 Iran has the longest coastline along the Gulf, while at 10nm, Iraq has the 
shortest.17 The maximum width of the Gulf is approximately 160nm between Iran 
and the UAE18 Oman’s Musandam Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz is less than 50 
miles from the coast of Iran.19 The Gulf Sea is extremely shallow, with depths rarely 
exceeding 100 metres.21 There are two crucially important characteristics of the 
geography of the Gulf relevant to this study. Firstly, there is a proliferation of islands, 
and given the important political and legal consequences attached to their ownership, 
a number of them are subject to disputes as to which Gulf State has sovereignty over 
them. Secondly, there are a number of offshore oil and gas deposits scattered 
throughout the Gulf Sea which again have political and legal consequences attached 
to their ownership. Such characteristics, and their significance within the wider 
context of this study’s hypothetical and research questions, will be a focus of this 
research. 
 
 
 
                                                             
16 R. Young , “The Law of the Sea in the Persian Gulf: Problems and Progress’, in R. Churchill, K.R. 
Simmonds and J. Welch (eds.), New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol III, (Oceana Publications 
Inc, New York, 1973) 231, at p. 231. 
17 A. Razavi, Continental Shelf Delimitation and Related Maritime Issues in the Persian Gulf 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1997), p.6. 
18 Ibid., p. 6. 
19 E.R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council (Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1988), p.8 
where he refers to “miles” rather than “nautical miles”. 
21 G. Blake, Maritime Aspects of Arabian Geopolitics (Arab Research Centre, Research Paper Series, 
Arab Papers, No.11, September 1982), p.6. 
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Figure 1: Map of the Gulf, from Lloyd’s Maritime Atlas of World 
Ports and Shipping Places (18th ed., Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd., 
Essex, 1995), p. 37. 
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Historical background 
 
The Gulf has a rich history of seafaring prowess with the Arabs of the Gulf formerly 
gaining power and influence as a result of maritime trading activity. Arabs dominated 
trade in the Indian Ocean when the Greeks first began maritime activity around the 
Arabian Peninsula and East Africa, following Alexander the Great’s conquests at the 
end of the fourth century B.C.22  The Arabian tradition of seafaring continued until 
Islamic times and was strengthened during the expanding Islamic Empire, assisted 
by Arab advancement in the sciences of navigation and astronomy.23  
Arab maritime power began to decline with the gradual rise of the Ottoman 
Empire in the fourteenth century. Not only did the growing Ottoman Empire thus 
affect the balance of power in the region, but so did the development of European 
maritime power and consequent colonial expansion, beginning in the sixteenth 
century. The Gulf first gained the attention of Europe as a result of Portuguese 
attempts in the sixteenth century to control trade between Asia and Europe by 
supplanting the Arabs as middle-men in that trade.24 During the Portuguese struggle 
with the Ottoman Empire, Portuguese power increased, and in 1515 they had taken 
control of Hormuz and in 1588 had built a fortress at Muscat. In 1600 the Portuguese 
were still the only Europeans present in the Gulf, with fortified stations on the islands 
of Hormuz (which was the site of their administrative centre), Bahrain, Qishm, 
Muscat and probably other places in Oman.25 However, the British appeared in the 
Gulf in the early seventeenth century, and together with the Persians, had expelled 
the Portuguese from Hormuz by 1622.26  Other European powers which pursued their 
own territorial claims in the region included the Dutch, Spanish and French. Such 
activity confirmed how strategically important it was to control the Gulf for the 
purpose of protection of trade routes between Europe and Asia.   
                                                             
22 R. Price, Maritime Laws of the Arabian Gulf Cooperation States Vol. II (Graham and Trotman, 
London, 1986), p. 7. 
23 See S. Kay, Seafarers of the Gulf (Motivate Publishing, Dubai, 1992), pp. 22-27; More generally, 
see A.M. Fahmy, Muslim Sea-Power in the Eastern Mediterranean From the Seventh to the Tenth 
Century A.D. (1st ed., National Publication & Printing House, Cairo, 1966). 
24 J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Vols. 1-4 and Appendix 
(Official Publication of the Government of India, Calcutta, 1908-1915), Vol. 1, p.1. 
25 Ibid., p. 9. 
26 Ibid., pp. 21-25. 
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The British influence in the Gulf region strengthened in the eighteenth century, 
primarily as a result of the need to control the trade route between Europe and India.27 
However, the region was beset by the piracy of Arab tribes. British desire to maintain 
maritime order led to the “General Treaty with the Arab Shaikhs for the Cessation of 
Plunder and Piracy by Land and by Sea” in 1820 between Britain and Arab tribes in 
the Gulf, including the Sheikhs of Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm al Qaywayn, 
Ajman and Fujairah. Bahrain also became a party to the treaty in due course.28  
However, the Arabs continued to engage in maritime warfare, and the need for 
security led to a proliferation of truces between Britain and individual Gulf Arab 
Sheikhs as a result of the former’s desire to control the region. In 1853 the Perpetual 
Maritime Truce was signed, giving rise to the term “Trucial States” to describe those 
who had signed.29  
With the designs of the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Germany upon the Gulf 
as a pervasive threat, “protection’ was offered by Britain in return for it obtaining the 
agreement of Sheikhs to abstain from maritime aggression, and this strengthened its 
ties in the region.30 While the Shaikh of Bahrain had signed the General Treaty of 
Peace in 1821, Bahrain did not formally become part of the “Trucial system” until 
1861, when it undertook to cease all maritime aggression in return for Britain’s 
protection from any maritime attack.31 The 1861 agreement was re-negotiated in 
1880, to include Bahrain’s agreement not to negotiate or sign a treaty with any nation 
or entity other than Britain.32 Similar treaties were signed with the Trucial States 
(1887) and Oman (1891).33 In 1892, the agreements with Bahrain and the Trucial 
States were re-negotiated to increase Britain’s influence.34 The agreement with the 
                                                             
27 British control in the region from the eighteenth century onwards is comprehensively dealt with by 
J.B. Kelly Britain and the Persian Gulf (1795-1880) (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968) and B.C. Busch, 
Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914 (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1967). 
28 See Kelly (1968) pp. 155-165; R.S., Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States. Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman (Ithaca Press, Reading, 1998), p. 14.  
29 J. Bulloch, The Gulf. A Portrait of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE (Century Publishing, 
London, 1984), p. 180; Zahlan (1998), p. 14. The Trucial States came to include a number of 
sheikhdoms in the Gulf, including the Emirates which now constitute the UAE 
30 The following brief survey does not attempt to discuss the legal status of the Gulf States or their 
characteristics as protectorates in any legal or detailed sense.  
31 Zahlan (1998), p. 15. 
32 E.R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council (Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1988), p. 
17; Zahlan (1998), p. 15. 
33 Peterson (1988), p.17. 
34 Ibid., p. 17. 
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Trucial States ensured that the sheikhs would not dispose of any territory except to 
Britain, and would not enter into relations with any other foreign government without 
Britain’s consent. This agreement was similar to other treaties between Britain and 
other Gulf States. In 1899 a similar treaty was signed between Britain and Kuwait, 
recognizing the latter as an independent State under British protection, and providing 
that Kuwait would not in any way dispose of its territory to any nation other than 
Britain, or enter into any foreign relations with any nation other than Britain without 
the latter’s consent. A Treaty was signed with Qatar in 1916, so that it also joined the 
system of treaties with Britain.35 Thus Britain controlled these states’ foreign and 
defence policies. Saudi Arabia was never part of these arrangements, with modern 
Saudi Arabia being established as a Kingdom in 1932.  
Iraq had a somewhat different history. It was part of the Ottoman Empire, 
became controlled by Arabs, and then fell under the control of Britain. It became 
subject to a British Mandate in 1920, until a treaty between Britain and Iraq of 30 
June 1930 conferred independence on Iraq, although pursuant to that treaty Iraq was 
compelled to consult Britain in all matter of foreign policy. Under British 
sponsorship, Iraq became a member of the League of Nations on 3 October 1932 
when it gained full independence. Persia never became subject to the protection of 
any European state. Its official name changed to Iran on 21 March 1936. 
Clearly a major feature of the Gulf’s history is the influence of foreign power, 
in particular British power, so that by the end of the First World War “the Gulf had 
become, to all intents and purposes, a British lake”.36 Gulf States obtained 
independence after the wind of change following the Suez crisis in 1956 and the 
current of nationalism in the Middle East associated with it.37 Kuwait terminated its 
special relationship with Britain in 1961.38 It became a member of the Arab League 
in that year, and a member of the United Nations in 1963. Britain’s protective 
relationship with Oman ceased in 1970, when it officially became the Sultanate of 
Oman. In August 1971, Bahrain became a sovereign state, thus also ending its 
relationship with Britain which had involved the latter’s control over Bahrain’s 
                                                             
35 Zahlan (1998), p. 16; Al-Baharna (1975), p. 4. 
36 Zahlan (1998), p. 19. 
37 For a general treatment of the subject, see K. Kyle, Suez. Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle 
East (I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2003). 
38 Zahlan (1998), p.47. 
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foreign affairs. In September 1971, Qatar also ended its relationship with Britain 
which had existed pursuant to treaty, becoming an independent state. Britain’s 
official control of the Gulf ceased on the formation of the UAE on 2 December 1971, 
with Ras al Khaimah joining the UAE on 11 February 1972.   
A crucial factor in the region was the discovery of oil and gas in the early 
twentieth century. Oil was discovered in Bahrain as early as 1932.39  The relatively 
fast-growing need to delimit territorial and maritime boundaries in the region arose 
as a result of these discoveries and need to exploit these resources.40 Additionally, in 
a number of areas in the Gulf, oil companies were granted concessions before there 
was any agreement as to the location of maritime boundaries. This obviously created 
a number of problems once a dispute arose between states or oil companies as to 
which fields they were entitled to exploit in the Gulf Sea. There was a continuing 
overriding need to establish with certainty which state’s continental shelf was the 
location of known or potential oil or gas fields. This need for certainty had a 
fundamental impact on the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries in the region.  
 
 
The significance of this study 
 
In order to understand the state practice on maritime delimitation of the continental 
shelf in the Gulf, it is crucial to place it within the broader context of international 
law in general, and the development of the latter is a necessary background to 
understanding the international law of the sea in general as it has emerged in modern 
times. The early eighteenth century may be taken as a starting point for the creation 
of the modern international law of the sea, a period which, while recognising in 
principle state sovereignty over the narrow coastal seas pertaining to littoral states, 
                                                             
39 J.C. Wilkinson, Arabia’s Frontiers: The Story of Britain’s Boundary Drawing in the Desert, (I.B. 
Tauris & Co Ltd, London, 1991, reprinted New York, 1993), p. xx. Price (1986) Vol. II at p.1 states 
that “the first lifting of crude oil took place from Bahrain. The export of crude from Saudi Arabia 
commenced in 1936 and the remaining States of Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Oman followed in 1946, 
1949, 1962 and 1967 respectively”. 
40 One example of such a territorial boundary problem, is the Buraimi Oasis dispute, which is 
continuing between Saudi Arabia and the UAE For an analysis of this particular dispute, see M.Q. 
Morton, Buraimi. The Struggle for Power, Influence and Oil in Arabia (I.B. Tauris, London and New 
York, 2013). The territorial boundary problems of the Gulf region are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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conceived of the rest of the world’s seas as high seas over which the European 
maritime powers exercised domination through freedom of navigation, trade and 
fishing. The nature of this starting point is one which has implications for the way 
that international law has developed. The effect that colonialism has had upon the 
development of the international legal order, for example, has been a seminal and 
continuing one.41  
The rise to prominence of new states, including the Gulf States, in the period 
following the Second World War which was notable for many new states being 
created or obtaining independence from colonial masters, resulted in their increasing 
presence on the international level, which in turn influenced the development of 
international law. Such developments were coupled with advances in technology and 
ever-increasing demands for sea resources, which led to increasing forces for change 
to the international law of the sea as it then existed, and this in turn led to attempts at 
codification in various United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) in the second half of the twentieth century, as has been seen. It is the 
interaction between these developments which is a basis of this study. 
There have been a number of texts, which have examined the law of the sea in 
the Gulf but which are now somewhat dated.42 It is submitted that this thesis goes 
beyond these works not only in the fact that it is more up to date and therefore more 
comprehensive in examining the Gulf law and state practice which is the subject of 
this study.  
  El-Hakim published a scholarly overview of the law of the sea of the Middle 
Eastern States as a whole in 1979.43 While of great value in its comprehensiveness, 
his work does little in terms of presenting a final conclusion or framework of analysis, 
                                                             
41 A. Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law”, (1999) 40 Harvard ILJ 1, at p.75.  
42 See A.A. El-Hakim, The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1979); S.H. Amin, International Legal Problems of the Gulf (Middle East and 
North African Studies Press Ltd., London, 1981); C.G. MacDonald, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Law 
of the Sea (London, Greenwood Press, 1980). Blake, G., (ed.), Maritime Boundaries and Ocean 
Resources (Croom Helm, London, 1987) and R. Schofield (ed.), Territorial foundations of the Gulf 
States (UCL Press, London, 1994) deal with maritime boundaries in the Gulf from the viewpoint of 
political geography. A. Razavi, Continental Shelf Delimitation and Related Maritime Issues in the 
Persian Gulf (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1997) is the most recent work known to the 
author in the English language which deals exclusively with the law of the sea in the Gulf. 
43 El-Hakim (1979). 
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and this can be explained by the point in time in which he was writing. In his short 
final chapter entitled “General Conclusions”, El-Hakim briefly sets out some 
fundamental propositions.44 They merit some detailed consideration here.  
Firstly, he states that in relation to the past practice of Middle Eastern states, 
in the light of “their ‘recentness’ in terms of the existence of Statehood, not much 
useful analysis can be gained from [their] previous conduct and legislation”. In an 
attempt to elaborate this suggestion he states that they “‘accepted’ subconsciously 
so-called customary international law”.45  
Secondly, he refers to a subsequent period which he names “the transition from 
the past to the present” which he does not define further, during which, he states, the 
Middle Eastern States were affected by a number of problems as follows: 
 
Firstly, there was a great lack of international law personnel. Secondly, there was 
reticence. The Middle Eastern States never really considered themselves as being 
affected by the esoteric details of the law of the sea. They thought only in terms 
of their small geographical environment. Thirdly, since their independence most 
of the States concerned have been engaged in constant, though sporadic, conflict. 
Lastly, they were economically weak. All these factors militated against the 
formulation of any concrete and common policies on the law of the sea. 
 
Thirdly, El-Hakim then refers to the “present attitudes of the Middle Eastern 
states”.46 These, he suggests, are motivated by “international affairs and diplomacy 
but also…the economic importance of the upsurge in the price of oil”. He then refers 
to the Middle Eastern states identifying with the aspirations of other Third World 
countries, and refers to their sympathy with the developing doctrine of the 200nm 
Exclusive Economic Zone.47 
These are stark and relatively simplistic conclusions. They are not wholly 
borne out by the findings of this thesis in respect of all of the Gulf States. This thesis 
will in due course show that there was a strong contribution by Iran and Saudi Arabia 
                                                             
44 See ibid., pp. 189-192 for his concluding chapter. 
45 Ibid., p. 190. 
46 Ibid., p 192, the “present” being the late 1970s. 
47 This maritime zone, which is to be discussed more fully in due course in this thesis, was advocated 
mostly by developing countries who saw it as a means of combating the desire for freedom of the seas 
sought by maritime Powers. 
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in the 1940s and 1950s to the development of the international law of the sea, and an 
awareness and desire to engage with international law and that subsequently, on 
achieving independence, the other Gulf states also engaged with international law in 
various ways in which identifiable patterns emerged in relation to the more recent 
state practice. El-Hakim went on to write of the Middle Eastern states and the law of 
the sea, that “[i]n so far as the future is concerned, one can only speculate or make 
tentative forecasts…” .48 It is suggested that this thesis is, at this present time, able to 
present findings which go beyond the tentative, having had the advantage of 
surveying developments in the Gulf law of the sea and relevant state practice to the 
present date.   
In his seminal work of 1980 it may be said that MacDonald presented a more 
cohesive argument albeit one which focused upon only two states, namely Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. In analysing the relationship of Iran and Saudi Arabia with the 
international law of the sea, MacDonald came to a number of interesting conclusions. 
He found that Iran and Saudi Arabia, being states which were not “protected” by the 
British unlike the other Gulf States, were the first to engage with international law 
through their national legislation, and also through the kinds of agreements which 
they entered into in order to delimit their continental shelf. Indeed, according to 
MacDonald, they influenced the other Gulf States in terms of their state practice and 
relationship with the international law of the sea. One of the aims of this study is to 
examine this contention.49  
MacDonald also draws another conclusion, namely that Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
by the time of the 1970s had not only used the international law of the sea as an 
“instrument”, but viewed it as having the effect of a “restraint” on their actions, and 
engaged within its limits in terms of their discourse, for example, at the UNCLOS 
conferences, in which they contributed to the developing international law of the 
sea.50 In fact, MacDonald went as far as to state that: 
 
Although some disputes remain and despite the fact that none of the Persian 
Gulf states have acceded to any of the 1958 Geneva conventions on the law of 
                                                             
48 El Hakim (1979), p. 191. 
49 See MacDonald (1980), for example, pp. 198, 201. 
50 Ibid., p. 201-205 
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the sea, a sophisticated international law of the sea has been established in the 
Persian Gulf. 51 
 
In considering this suggestion, it is worth noting El-Hakim’s conclusion at around 
the same time that “one cannot discern an exclusively Middle Eastern approach to 
sea law”.52 Both suggestions are not necessarily contradictory of each other. 
Nevertheless they raise a number of questions of whether it may be said that there is 
a coherent, identifiable law in the region, and this thesis sets out to examine such 
issues. It should also be remembered that MacDonald, an American, was writing 
during the Cold War, and seems at pains to emphasise the willingness of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia to engage in a symbiotic relationship with international law. This thesis 
has the advantage of surveying more widely the practice of other Gulf States, in order 
to analyse their relationship with international law so as to discover whether they 
have viewed it as a legitimate restraint on their actions or not. 
 Razavi’s text on continental shelf delimitation in the Gulf is another 
comprehensive work. Published in 1997, he conducted a wide survey of Gulf State 
practice and his concluding chapter makes some important observations upon the 
relationship between Gulf state practice on continental shelf delimitation and the 
wider international law context. However, due to the period in which he published 
his work, the conclusions did not have the advantage of recent state practice and he 
was not able to place it in the context of more recent international law case law.  
 This thesis contributes to this field in a number of ways. Firstly, it seeks to set 
Gulf State practice in the context of the most up to date international case law at the 
time of writing. Secondly, it refers to all the relevant Gulf legislation as far as is 
known to the writer in the English language. The legislation of Gulf States is 
notoriously difficult to access, whether in English or in the original Arabic, due to 
the lack of centralised sources of legislation officially maintained by the Gulf States. 
Therefore, the attempt by this thesis to refer to all relevant national legislation to date, 
is, it is suggested, of empirical use. Thirdly, this thesis seeks to identify trends in Gulf 
                                                             
51 Ibid., p. 201. 
52 El-Hakim, (1979), p. 191. At another point in the text, namely at p. 130, El Hakim asserts that it 
may be suggested that “a regional customary law” has arisen in the Gulf with regard to delimitation 
of the continental shelf in accordance with the rule contained in Article 6 CSC 1958. Such a suggestion 
is difficult to sustain, as discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis.  
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state practice.  Fourthly, it is the aim of this thesis to analyse Gulf State practice in 
the context of international law to assess the relationship between them, and 
determine the degree to which Gulf State practice is consistent with international law 
and the ways in which it is not.  
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 looks at the sources 
of international law in general, and surveys the international treaty provisions 
governing the maritime zones, focusing mainly on their basic nature, their uses, and 
their outer limits. International treaty provisions governing delimitation of maritime 
boundaries are also dealt with in the same chapter. Chapter 3 examines case law of 
the ICJ and arbitral tribunals on maritime delimitation, with particular reference to 
the delimitation of continental shelf and EFZ/EEZ boundaries. Chapter 4 deals with 
Gulf national legislation on baselines, the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, and 
Chapter 5 considers Gulf national legislation on the continental shelf and the 
EFZ/EEZ. Chapter 6 considers the bilateral maritime boundary delimitation 
agreements between the Gulf States. Chapter 7 presents an analysis of the 
relationship between Gulf State practice and international law on the basis of the 
research conducted, and Chapter 8 presents the final conclusions.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The Sources of International Law, Maritime Limits and 
Delimitation  
 
 
 
Introduction 
This Chapter initially provides a short introduction to the sources of international law. 
This is not intended to be an exhaustive exercise, nor is it carried out with the aim of 
performing a critical analysis of the theory of sources. Its purpose is to shed light upon 
the significance of treaties, which, in bilateral form, are of great significance in Gulf 
law and state practice on delimitation of the continental shelf. Further, this section on 
sources also provides a context for international case law on delimitation and the 
importance it has had in the development of customary law on delimitation. Such case 
law’s significance for Gulf law and state practice will also be examined in due course.  
It is further intended that this Chapter, in briefly surveying the international 
law on maritime limits and delimitation in general, will provide a useful context to the 
substantive consideration of Gulf law and state practice in the chapters that follow. In 
particular, this Chapter will aid in the consideration of the relationship between such 
Gulf law and state practice and the general rules of international law and assist in the 
analysis as to whether Gulf States have conformed with international law.  
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 The sources of international law 53 
 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“the ICJ”) 1945 
states as follows: 
 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, 
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case 
ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto. 54 
 
Although this Article is framed as a statement of what the ICJ considers in deciding 
disputes, and although nowhere is there reference to the fact that the Article 
enunciates the sources of international law, the Article has traditionally been seen as 
a general statement of the sources of public international law. Whether it is a 
comprehensive one and whether it can be taken to be in order of priority is a matter 
of some debate.55 The most important and relevant sources of law to this study are 
                                                             
53 For a detailed explanation of the sources of international law see, for example, B. Cheng, “United 
Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” Customary Law?” (1965) 5 Indian J Int L 23; M. 
Akehurst, “Custom as a Source of International Law”, (1974-5) 47 BYIL 53; M. Akehurst, “Equity 
and General Principles of Law”, (1976) 25 ICLQ 801; W. Czaplinski, “Sources of Law in the 
Nicaragua Case”, (1989) 81 AJIL 93; O. Schacter, “The Twilight Existence of Non-binding 
International Agreements”, (1977) 71 AJIL 296; P. Weil, “Towards Relative Normativity in 
International Law”, (1983) 77 AJIL 413; R. Charney, “Universal International Law”, (1993) 87 AJIL 
529; M. Mendelson, “The Subjective Element in Customary International Law”, (1995) 66 BYIL 177; 
D. Shelton, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law” , (2006) 100 AJIL 291; D.J. Bederman, 
Custom as  Source of Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010); H.W.A. Thirlway, The 
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2013); M.P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental 
Change. Recognizing Grotian Moments (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013). 
54 The Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945. Article 59 states that “[t]he decision of the 
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”   
55 See J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed., Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012), pp. 22-3 (henceforth Brownlie’s Principles (2012)). 
 
 
40 
those referred to in Article 38(1)(a), (b) and (d), namely treaties, international 
customary law, and judicial decisions respectively.  
 
i. Treaties 
 
The explicitly agreed rights and obligations in treaties naturally have primacy in the 
hierarchy.56 These can be multilateral, such as the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 1982,57 or they may be bilateral, such as the bilateral agreements on 
maritime boundaries between the Gulf States.58 Certain treaties may be described as 
“law-making”, and as such they create general rules governing future state 
behaviour.59 Their relationship with customary international law is interesting and 
relevant to this study and is dealt with briefly below. 
 
ii. Customary international law 
 
Article 38(1)(b) refers to international custom “as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law”. The range of possible sources of custom is broad. Brownlie’s 
Principles suggests several  “material sources”, including, for example, diplomatic 
correspondence, statements of policy, press releases, the opinions of official legal 
advisers, comments by governments on drafts produced by the International Law 
                                                             
56 However, as made clear in Brownlie’s Principles (2012), pp. 22-23 such a status of primacy may 
not be the case in every situation, for example, a treaty obligation may be subsequently supplanted by 
a rule of customary international law. 
57 The international law of the sea has been characterised by a number of multilateral conventions. 
The four Geneva Conventions of 1958 are comprised of: the Convention on the High Seas 1958, in 
force on 30 September 1962; the Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, in force on 10 June 1964; 
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958, in force on 10 September 1964; 
the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 1958, in force 
on 20 March 1966. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, which came into force on 16 
November 1994, was intended to revise the four Geneva Conventions of 1958 and to be a new and 
comprehensive “Constitution for the Oceans”, taking into account new developments in the use of the 
sea and new technology. None of the Gulf States were ever party to any of the 1958 Conventions. 
Apart from Iran and UAE which have signed but not ratified the 1982 Convention, the remaining Gulf 
States are Parties to the 1982 Convention.  However, certain provisions of the 1982 Convention would 
be binding on Iran and UAE as a result of having become customary law.  
58 See Chapter 6 for an evaluation of these bilateral agreements. 
59 See Brownlie’s Principles (2012), pp. 30-32. 
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Commission, national legislation, international and national judicial decisions, 
recitals in treaties, and a pattern of treaties with repeated content.60  Brownlie’s 
Principles also makes the important point that the value of such sources varies, with 
the specific circumstances of each requiring to be taken into account.61 Customary 
law is made up of two main elements, firstly state practice, and secondly, opinio juris 
sive necessitatis.  
 
a. State practice 
 
The “general practice” referred to by Article 38(1)(b) needs to be consistent, general 
and uniform, although substantial rather than complete uniformity is required, and a 
specific duration of such practice is not necessary.62 For example, the ICJ in the 
Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru) (1950) stated that what was required was “a constant 
and uniform usage practised by the States in question”.63 The practice needs to be 
general amongst states, but need not be universal.64 
 
b. Opinio iuris sive necessitates 65 
 
Article 38(1)(b) refers to the need for state practice to be “accepted as law”. In the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969) the ICJ stated that: 
 
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must 
also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that 
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 
The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit 
in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned 
must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal 
                                                             
60 Brownlie’s Principles (2012), p.24. 
61 Ibid., p. 24. 
62 Ibid., p.24.. 
63 [1950] ICJ Rep 266, at 276. 
64 Brownlie’s Principles (2012), p. 25. 
65 Brownlie’s Principles (2012) states at page 26, n. 31 that the literal meaning of this phrase is “an 
opinion of law or necessity”. It is often shortened to “opinio juris”. 
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obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself 
enough.66  
 
c. The responses of states  
 
The responses of states to the practice of other states, whether in the form of protest, 
acquiescence or consent, are an important consideration in identifying customary 
international law or the lack of it. Responses may be expressed in a number of ways, 
for example by diplomatic correspondence, governmental policy statement, or by 
means of national legislation. A protest may indicate that the state practice being 
protested against is contrary to customary law, and may even go to show that the 
practice which the protest promotes or is based upon is instead part of established 
customary law. State responses may additionally be crucial as part of the formation 
of customary law over the course of time. Thus a response may influence a state’s 
practice or a state’s view on what its right or obligation is. Such a state may as a result 
change or be confirmed in its view, and therefore, eventually, over the course of time, 
although a long passage of time is not necessary, state practice may crystallise into 
customary law.  
 
d. The persistent objector 
 
During the formation of customary law, a state may show that it does not wish to be 
bound by the rule developing into customary law. There is a presumption of 
acceptance which may be rebutted by clear evidence of objection.67 In this regard, it 
is useful to consider the Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru).68 After an unsuccessful 
military rebellion in Peru in 1948, Colombia granted asylum to a Peruvian leader in 
the rebellion, Haya de la Torre, in its Peruvian Embassy in Lima. Colombia sought 
                                                             
66 ICJ Reports (1969), 3, para 77. Para 78 refers to and follows the approach in the Lotus case P.C.I.J., 
Series A, No. 10, 1927, at p. 28 which required states to be conscious of a legal duty for opinio juris 
to exist. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States 
(Merits)) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, at para. 207, the ICJ referred to the above paragraph of the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases (1969). Its approach followed that of the earlier case. 
67 Brownlie’s Principles (2012), p.28. 
68 [1950] ICJ Rep 266. 
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from Peru safe conduct for him, but Peru refused. Colombia sought to argue that it 
had the competence to “qualify” (i.e. “characterise”) the offence as a political one or 
non-political one for the purposes of granting such asylum, and sought to rely on 
inter alia, “regional or local custom” regarding the law of political asylum existing 
among Latin American states.69 The ICJ failed to find the existence of such a custom, 
and went on to state in its Judgment that: 
 
But even if it could be supposed that such a custom existed between certain 
Latin-American States only, it could not be invoked against Peru which, far 
from having by its attitude adhered to it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it by 
refraining from ratifying the Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939, which 
were the first to include a rule concerning the qualification of the offence in 
matters of diplomatic asylum.70 
 
Similarly, in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (1951), the UK contended that the 
drawing of a closing line of a bay, which forms a baseline for determining the breadth 
of the territorial sea, was limited to where the closing line was no more than 10 miles 
long. However, the ICJ, in stating that state practice on this was not consistent, 
confirmed that “the ten mile rule has not acquired the authority of a general rule of 
international law”.71 Moreover, Norway had objected to this. The ICJ stated that ‘[i]n 
any event the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway 
inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian 
coast.’72 
 
e. Regional customary law 
 
The rules for the establishment of customary international law, which apply to all 
states in general, may be adapted to apply to a smaller group of states. In the Asylum 
Case (Colombia v Peru) (1950) the ICJ stated: 
                                                             
69 Ibid., p.276. 
70 Ibid., pp. 277-278. 
71 [1951] ICJ Rep 116, at p.131. 
72 Ibid., p.131. 
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The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is 
established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party. The 
Colombian Government must prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance 
with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that 
this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum 
and a duty incumbent on the territorial State. This follows from Article 38 of 
the Statute of the Court, which refers to international custom "as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law.”73 
 
The ICJ concluded that Colombia had failed to establish the existence of such a 
custom. 
A regional custom may be established by only two states. In a Case concerning 
Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) (Merits), Portugal argued 
that it benefitted from a local custom established between it and India enabling it to 
exercise certain rights of passage between its territory of Damão and its enclaved 
territories of Dadrá and Nagar-Aveli, and in between each of the latter.74 India 
contended that a local customary law could not be established between only two 
states. However, the ICJ saw no reason why a long continued practice between two 
states accepted by them as regulating their relations could not constitute local 
customary law.75 
  
iii. The relationship between treaties and customary law 
 
Where treaties create general norms governing the future actions of those states party 
to them, they may be described as “law-making” treaties.76  Although they are 
theoretically only binding on the parties, the legal rules contained within them may 
in fact go towards developing customary law and indeed become customary law, 
where there is consent to them by non-parties.77 This is particularly true of 
                                                             
73 [1950] ICJ Rep 266, at pp. 276-277.  
74[1960] ICJ Rep 6 at p. 9. 
75 Ibid., p.39. 
76 Brownlie’s Principles, pp. 30-32. 
77 Ibid., pp. 31-2.   
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multilateral conventions, but bilateral treaties may also be a source of the 
development of customary law. It is also important to note that even where treaty 
norms become customary law, customary law rules continue to have their own 
separate applicability, even where the content of both are the same, so that the 
operation of both exists alongside each other.78 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1960), the ICJ examined the issue of 
whether the rule on delimitation of the continental shelf in Article 6 of the CSC 1958 
had become customary law. In relation to the process whereby a rule in a treaty, such 
as the relevant rule in Article 6, may have passed into customary law, and become 
binding on non-parties to the treaty, the ICJ stated: 
 
There is no doubt that this process is a perfectly possible one and does from 
time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by which 
new rules of customary international law may be formed. At the same time this 
result is not lightly to be regarded having been attained.79  
 
The ICJ went on to state that firstly, the treaty norm “should, at all events potentially, 
be of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming 
the basis of a general rule of law.”80 The ICJ proceeded to examine “the other 
elements usually regarded as necessary before a conventional rule can be considered 
to have become a general rule of international law”, and stated that: 
 
even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread 
and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, 
provided it included that of States whose interests were specially affected.81 
 
The ICJ then referred to the element of duration, stating that while a short period of 
time 
                                                             
78 See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2008), pp. 13-14 
79  [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para. 71. 
80 Ibid., para. 72. 
81 Ibid., para. 73. 
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is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary 
international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, 
an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, short 
though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are 
specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the 
sense of the provision invoked;- and should moreover have occurred in such a 
way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is 
involved.82 
 
 
iv. Judicial decisions and their significance as a source of law, in particular 
as a source of customary international law of the sea 
 
Judicial decisions are described as a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
of law” in Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ.  As such, they are not formally 
a source but are evidence of the law.83 In principle, not only decisions of the ICJ but 
also those of international arbitral tribunals should be included in this category. The 
reference to judicial decisions as subsidiary means for the determination of the law 
in Article 38(1)(d) is expressed to be subject to the provisions of Article 59. The latter 
provision states that “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between 
the parties and in respect of that particular case”. Therefore this would seem to rule 
out a system of law-making by means of precedent, and in fact there is no formal 
system of precedent to be identified in the decisions of the ICJ. However, the ICJ as 
well as arbitral tribunals have exhibited a trend towards an attempt at consistency in 
their decisions, very often referring to previous decisions and to the decisions of each 
other, attempting to show a line of development. The decisions on maritime 
delimitation are a good example of this.  
Furthermore it is without doubt that certain international case law has 
contributed to and strongly influenced the law. A number of commentators have 
observed that case law has in fact developed and indeed created customary 
international law on delimitation of the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic 
                                                             
82 Ibid., para. 74. 
83 Brownlie’s Principles (2012), p. 37. 
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Zone (“EEZ”).84 Thus international case law has actively developed such law rather 
than simply applied existing law.  It is worth considering the reasons for this at this 
juncture. As will be seen in the remaining sections of this Chapter, the treaty 
provisions governing delimitation are characterised by flexibility and indeed 
vagueness. For example, this is the case in respect of the application of Article 6 CSC 
1958 on delimitation of the continental shelf, and Articles 83(1) and 74(1) LOSC 
1982 on delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ respectively say very little 
other than referring to “international law” and an “equitable solution”. When the 
infinitely diverse geographic scenarios of individual boundary delimitation issues are 
added to the equation, it may easily be appreciated that bilateral treaties deal with 
individual maritime boundary questions directly linked to the individual diverse 
circumstances particular to the geographical areas in question, and are unlikely to 
have wider significance as sources of customary international law.85 This is despite 
the fact that bilateral treaties are likely to be the most important element of state 
practice governing delimitation.   
                                                             
84 For example, see R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed., Juris Publishing, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999) at p. 192 who state that “[c]ustomary international 
law relating to the delimitation of the EEZ and/or fishing zone between neighbouring States has been 
developed by the International Court and arbitral tribunals in much the same way as they have done 
for continental shelf delimitation.” P. Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation – Reflections (Grotius 
Publications Ltd, Cambridge, 1989) states at p. 7 that “[i]nternational tribunals, and in particular the 
International Court of Justice, in half-a-dozen causes célèbres, have made a capitis deminutio of the 
treaty source and themselves undertaken the direct definition of the law of maritime delimitation, 
giving it the appearance and name of general or customary international law. There is probably no 
other chapter of international law which has been written so exclusively and rapidly by the 
international courts.” 
85 In this regard, P. Weil (1989) states at p. 7 that multilateral and bilateral treaties have played a 
minimal role in the law of maritime delimitation; in relation to multilateral treaties, he cites the 
“limited” importance the courts have given the CSC 1958 provision on delimitation of the continental 
shelf, as well as the lack of “precise normative content” in Articles 74(1) and 83(1) LOSC 1982 on 
delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf respectively; bilateral agreements have also had a limited 
significance in that they have not “developed into a practice generating customary law”. Y. Tanaka, 
The International Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) (2012) makes 
similar observations, referring at p. 226 to the “significant role of judicial creativity” which can be 
explained by at least two reasons. Firstly, in order “to achieve equitable results, there is a need to take 
various geographical and non-geographical factors into account”, and because there cannot be 
“specific rules regarding each and every factor to be considered”, the ICJ and tribunals “often face 
potential lacunae in the law”, and therefore “need to develop rules with regard to the effect to be 
attributed to those factors in the framework of equitable principles”. Secondly, in bilateral maritime 
boundary agreements, parties “seldom explain why and to what extent a certain relevant circumstance 
has been taken into account when drawing a maritime boundary”. As such, “it is difficult to find 
evidence of opinio juris in State practice. Here there is an inherent difficulty in identifying customary 
rules in the field of maritime delimitation. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that international courts 
and tribunals have to rely mainly on judge-made law”.  
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Not only is there a need for flexibility in relation to the law governing maritime 
delimitation, but also a need to guard against vagueness in the law. International case 
law has a special significance in the law of maritime delimitation of the continental 
shelf and EEZ in that it has performed the function of filling in the gaps created by 
the unclear language of provisions of the Conventions. Case law has a further 
significance in that it has become a means for the ICJ and arbitral tribunals to declare 
customary law, without seeking a pattern of state practice and opinio juris. In this 
way, case law has contributed significantly to customary law, and may be said to be 
the most important source of the international law of the sea.86 This is seen, famously, 
in the first ICJ Judgment considered below, namely that of the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases (1969).87 International case law is the subject of Chapter 3. 
 
 
Maritime zones in international law  
 
i. Introduction to the international law of the sea 
 
In what follows there is firstly a brief examination of the international law rules 
relating to the basic nature of the different maritime zones and the law governing the 
extent of the maximum limit which a state is entitled to claim. This area of enquiry 
may be referred to as the maritime limits of a state.88 The concept of maritime limits 
is wholly distinct from that of delimitation, the latter which refers to the demarcation 
of the boundary line between the overlapping maritime zones between states.89 The 
general law governing delimitation will be looked at in the next section of this 
chapter. With regard to both maritime zones and their delimitation, this chapter 
                                                             
86 See Weil (1989) at p. 7 who states that “nowadays, the law of maritime delimitation usually means 
the customary law.” 
87 [1969] ICJ Rep 3. This case declared what customary law was. See Chapter 3 for further elaboration. 
88 For discussion of the terms “maritime limit” and “maritime space”, which may be used 
interchangeably, see Y. Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation 
(Hart, Oxford, 2006), pp. 7-8. 
90 See Ibid., pp. 7-11 for a useful treatment of the distinction between maritime limits and maritime 
delimitation. 
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examines the law as set out in the relevant multilateral Conventions, as well as in the 
customary law, and since the focus of this thesis is delimitation of the continental 
shelf, more space is dedicated to the law governing that topic. Additionally, it is for 
this reason that this study does not examine the nature of the rights within each zone 
in great detail or the history of the development of the zones, although these are 
touched upon in passing where this assists in understanding the nature of the Gulf 
law on delimitation and its relationship with international law.   
The importance of the consideration of customary international law for this 
particular study results from four main factors which it is useful to refer to at this 
juncture. Firstly, none of the Gulf States were parties to the 1958 Geneva 
Conventions. Secondly, the Gulf States ratified the LOSC 1982 at different times, 
and therefore were subject to customary international law at various differing times. 
Thirdly, the LOSC 1982 did not come into force until 16 November 1994, and 
therefore those Gulf States which ratified it before this date continued to be subject 
to customary international law. Fourthly, as at 31 March 2016, neither Iran nor the 
UAE have ratified LOSC 1982, and therefore they are governed by customary 
international law.90  
While prior to the twentieth century, the development of the law of the sea had 
been sporadic and relatively slow paced, for the first time in the twentieth century, 
international law saw serious and sustained attempts to develop and codify the law 
of the sea, and a number of multilateral Conventions came into force. As well as the 
League of Nations Hague Conference of 1930, there were three United Nations 
Conferences on the Law of the Sea. The first, to be referred to as UNCLOS I in this 
work, took place in 1958 in Geneva.  As a result of this Conference, four Geneva 
Conventions of 1958 came into existence. These were the Convention on the High 
Seas 1958, which came into force on 30 September 1962, the Convention on the 
                                                             
90 The LOSC 1982 opened for signature on 10 December 1982. The other Gulf States have signed 
and ratified the LOSC 1982 as follows: Bahrain signed 10 December 1982 and ratified 30 May 
1985; Iraq signed 10 December 1982 and ratified 30 July 1985; Kuwait signed 10 December 1982 
and ratified 2 May 1986; Oman signed 1 July 1983 and ratified 17 August 1989; Qatar signed 27 
November 1984 and ratified 9 December 2002; Saudi Arabia signed 7 December 1984 and ratified 
24 April 1996. Iran and the UAE both signed on 10 December 1982. Up to date information as to 
the ratification of the LOSC 1982 by states is available from the online database of multilateral 
treaties deposited with the Secretary General at: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-
6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (accessed 4 July 2016). 
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Continental Shelf 1958 (henceforth “CSC 1958), which came into force on 10 June 
1964, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958 
(henceforth “TSCZ 1958”), which came into force on 10 September 1964, and the 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 
1958, which came in force on 20 March 1966. The second United Nations 
Conference, to be referred to hereinafter as UNCLOS II took place in 1960 in 
Geneva, and was convened in order to decide on a limit for the breadth of the 
territorial sea and exclusive fisheries zone (“EFZ”) but no agreement was reached, 
and therefore the Conference did not result in a Convention. The third United Nations 
Conference, to be referred to as UNCLOS III, was convened between 1973 and 1982, 
as a result of which the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
(henceforth “LOSC 1982”) emerged, which only came into force on 16 November 
1994. Article 311(1) of the LOSC 1982 states that it supersedes the 1958 
Conventions.   
In order to understand the development of the law of the sea in the twentieth 
century, it is imperative initially to examine the historical background. The 
seventeenth century was characterised by fundamental jurisprudential debates in this 
area of law. In 1608, Grotius (1583-1645), the Dutch international law scholar, was 
asked by the Dutch East India Company to publish a work promoting the Dutch right 
to exercise free navigation and trade in the East Indies, despite Portugal’s claims to 
ownership of expanses of sea in the area. As a result, he published his work Mare 
Liberum in 1609.91 Essentially, the basic premise of the book is that the open sea is 
free to all, and cannot be brought under the sovereignty of any state. Such a position 
was inevitably to be assumed by strong maritime powers in an era of maritime 
exploration and trade and it was met by opposition by those such as the English writer 
Selden who wrote his treatise Mare Clausum in 1618, which was published in 1635.92 
The promotion of the “closed sea” in Selden’s text was very much in line with 
contemporary British claims to control of the seas around the British Isles. Out of the 
                                                             
91 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Juris Publishing, Manchester University Press, 
1999), p. 4. The full title of Grotius’ text is Mare liberum sive de iure quod Batavis competit ad 
Indicana commercia dissertatio, translated as ‘The Free Sea or a Dissertation on the Right which the 
Dutch Have to Carry on Indian Trade’. See Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum, original Latin text (facsimile 
of the first edition, 1609) and modern English translation, edited and annotated by Robert Feenstra 
(Brill, Leiden, 2009). 
92 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 4.  
 
 
51 
debates between proponents of freedom of the seas, and supporters of “closed seas”, 
emerged the distinction between the freedom of the seas, and a state’s rights over the 
seas close to its shore, those seas being known historically as the territorial waters, 
or, in modern terminology, the territorial sea. In fact, these two different ideas 
complimented each other in furthering the aims of the maritime powers, whose 
interests were to be served by territorial sovereignty exercised in the territorial sea, 
as well as the freedom to navigate and fish in the seas beyond this limit. In the 
centuries since the development of these arguments, and in particular in the twentieth 
century, there has been a proliferation of other different claims to uses of the sea 
which have resulted in a number of legally recognizable maritime zones. These will 
be surveyed in due course in this chapter. 
 
ii. Introduction to baselines  
 
Baselines are crucial in the law of the sea for three fundamental reasons.93 Firstly, 
they are the lines from which the outer limits of the territorial sea and other maritime 
zones of states are established. They are therefore fundamental to the method by 
which the breadth of various maritime zones are measured. The LOSC 1982 provides 
a scheme whereby the outer limit of such maritime zones are at certain distances from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.94 Secondly, 
the baseline of the territorial sea is also normally the boundary line which lies 
between a state’s internal waters and its territorial sea, so that the area of sea in 
between the land and the baseline consists of internal waters.95 Thirdly, baselines 
may play a part in the delimitation of maritime boundaries between states, for 
example an equidistance line between two states may be measured wholly or partly 
from the baselines of each state.   
 
                                                             
93 The three reasons which follow are set out in Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 31. 
94 For references to the baselines in relation to each maritime zone, see Articles 3-4 (territorial sea), 
33(2) (contiguous zone), 57 (EEZ), and 76 (continental shelf), of LOSC 1982. 
95 Article 8(1) of LOSC 1982. 
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a. The general rule 
 
The general rule is that contained in Article 5 of the LOSC 1982, which states that:  
 
Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast 
as marked on large-scale charts officially recognised by the coastal State.96 
 
The use of the low-water line or mark is an old-established usage. The ICJ in the 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (1951) stated that it: 
 
has no difficulty in finding that, for the purpose of measuring the breadth of the 
territorial sea, it is the low-water mark as opposed to the high-water mark, or the 
mean between the two tides, which has generally been adopted in the practice of 
States.97   
 
Therefore, such use is based on customary international law, and evidenced by state 
practice. There are other notable provisions which supplement the general rule as 
follows. 
 
b. Reefs 
 
In the case of islands situated on atolls or islands having fringing reefs, the baseline 
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the seaward low-water line of the 
reef, as shown by the appropriate symbol on charts officially recognised by the 
coastal state (Article 6, 1982 LOSC). 
 
 
                                                             
96 This is a reiteration of Article 3 TSCZ 1958.  
97 [1951] ICJ Rep. 116 at 128. 
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c. Harbour works 
 
The outermost permanent harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour 
system are to be regarded as forming part of the coast and therefore may be used as 
the baseline, but off-shore installations and artificial islands shall not be considered 
as permanent harbour works (Article 11, LOSC 1982).  
 
d. Low-tide elevations 
 
Article 13(1) of the LOSC 1982 defines a low-tide elevation as a naturally formed 
area of land which is surrounded by water and which is above water at low tide but 
is submerged at high tide.  
Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not 
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-
water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of 
the territorial sea. However, if a low-tide elevation is situated wholly at a distance 
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it does not 
have its own territorial sea (Art 13, LOSC 1982). 
 
 
e. Islands  
 
The LOSC 1982 defines an island as a naturally formed area of land which is 
surrounded by water, and which is above water at high tide (Art 121(1), LOSC 1982). 
Islands are entitled to their own territorial sea. The territorial sea of an island is 
measured according to the general rules on baselines (Art 121(2), LOSC 1982). The 
attribution of a territorial sea to islands seems to have been a part of customary law 
prior to 1958.98 Moreover, all islands can provide baselines for all a state’s maritime 
zones, namely the territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf (Art 
121(2), LOSC 1982), but rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic 
                                                             
98 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 49. 
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life of their own can only provide the baseline for the territorial sea and the 
contiguous zone (Art 121(3) LOSC 1982). The words “rock”, “human habitation” 
and “economic life” are notoriously vague and difficult to define. 99 
 
 
f. Departure from the general rule 
 
Under various geographical conditions, the general rule may be departed from, and 
instead of using the low-water line as the usual baseline, other baselines are provided 
for in the LOSC 1982. It is easy to see how the general rule is most appropriate where 
the coastline is relatively un-indented. In contrast, straight baselines are a method to 
overcome problems presented by irregular and indented coastlines or those which are 
characterised by an island fringe. The relevant rules on straight baselines were 
initially enunciated in the Judgment of the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
case (1951).100 In that Judgment, the ICJ held that the straight baselines applied by 
Norway, joining the outer limits of islands and rocks which constitute its very 
indented and irregular coastline, were in accordance with customary international 
law.101 The customary law of straight baselines had evolved in the context of claims 
by Norway prior to the resolution of the issues in that Judgment.102 Because much of 
its coast is made up of the skjaergaard, constituted by islands, reefs, rocks, islands 
and fjords, from the mid-nineteenth century, Norway had used a system of straight 
lines connecting the outermost points on the skjaergaard as baselines.103 Norway 
promulgated a decree of 1935 which formally established its straight baselines.104  
The ICJ took heavy account of the geographical circumstances in the case 
while setting out its guidance for the drawing of straight baselines.  
The Judgment is based on the following principles. Firstly, where a coast is 
deeply indented, the baseline becomes independent of the low-water mark and can 
                                                             
99 See, for example, R. O'Keefe, “Palm-fringed benefits: island dependencies in the new law of the 
sea” (1996) 45 ICLQ 408, at pp. 411-413. 
100 [1951] ICJ Rep 116. 
101 Ibid., p. 139. 
102 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 33. 
103 Ibid., p.34. 
104 Ibid., p.34 
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only be established by geometric construction.105 As a result, the baselines are 
straight lines drawn between fixed points on the coast, providing a geometric base 
from which to establish a maritime zone. Secondly, the drawing of the baselines must 
“not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast”.106 
Thirdly, the baselines must be drawn in such a way that the “sea areas lying within 
these lines are sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the 
regime of internal waters”107. Fourthly, it is possible to take into account “certain 
economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of which are 
clearly evidenced by a long usage”.108 The fundamental economic interest at stake in 
the case taken into consideration by the ICJ, was fishing. Of interest is the fact that 
the ICJ’s approach was to take judicial notice of customary international rules which 
it considered to be relevant to the case, “with no attempt to offer independent 
proof”.109  
Article 4 of the TSCZ 1958 incorporated the effect of the ICJ’s Judgment in 
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (1951), and Article 7 of LOSC 1982 follows the 
previous Convention with certain new provisions introduced. Straight baselines 
“may” be used “in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if 
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity” (Article 7(1), 
LOSC 1982).  This use is however subject to a number of controls. Firstly, reflecting 
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (1951), straight baselines “must not depart to 
any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast” (Article 7(3) LOSC 
1982). Secondly, also reflecting the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, “the sea areas 
lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be 
subject to the regime of internal waters” (Article 7(3) LOSC 1982). Thirdly, no 
straight baselines may be drawn to or from low-tide elevations unless either 
lighthouses or similar installations permanently above sea-level have been built upon 
                                                             
105 Ibid., p.129. 
106 Ibid., p.1 33. 
107 Ibid., p. 133 
108 Ibid., p. 133. 
109 A.A. D’Amato, A.A., ‘The Concept of Special Custom in International Law’, (1969) 63 AJIL 
211, at p. 220. The tendency of the ICJ and arbitral tribunals to forego the search for the formal 
components of customary international law in deciding what constitutes it, has already been touched 
upon in this chapter. 
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them, or the drawing of baselines to and from such low-tide elevations “has received 
general international recognition” (Article 7(4) LOSC 1982). Fourthly, straight 
baselines may not be drawn so as to cut off another state’s territorial sea from the 
high seas (Article 7(6) LOSC 1982) or so as to cut off an Exclusive Economic Zone 
from the high seas (Article 7(6) LOSC 1982). Fifthly, if a state utilises straight 
baselines, they must be indicated on charts of a scale or scales adequate for 
ascertaining their position. Alternatively, there may be a list of geographical co-
ordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum. Such charts or lists of geographic 
co-ordinates are to be given “due publicity” (Article 16 LOSC 1982). The Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries case is also reflected in the provision that it is possible to take 
into account “economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the 
importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage” (Article 7(5) LOSC 
1982).110   
Two geographical features which fall to be considered in the context of 
departure from the general rule on baselines, are bays and river mouths. 
Firstly dealing with bays, prior to the TSCZ 1958, it was a principle of 
customary international law that a straight baseline could be drawn across the mouth 
of a bay, enclosing the waters thus contained as internal waters of a state. However, 
there were no clear criteria governing precisely how and in what circumstances this 
was to be done.111 Article 7 of the TSCZ 1958 introduced important principles 
regarding this issue which are repeated almost exactly in the LOSC 1982.112 The first 
question is whether a coastal feature is in fact a bay. A bay is described as “a well-
marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth 
so as to contain land-locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the 
coast”. However, such an indentation is not a bay unless its area is at least as large as 
the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation 
(Article 10(2) LOSC 1982). In accordance with this principle, the area of indentation 
to be measured is the area lying between the low-water mark around the shore of the 
                                                             
110 Art 7(2) LOSC 1982 added new provisions on the straight baselines to be drawn in situations where 
there is a delta or other natural conditions rendering the coastline highly unstable. 
111 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 41. 
112 It is important to note that they do not apply to bays which have coasts belonging to more than one 
state (Article 10(1) LOSC 1982), or “historic” bays or situations where straight baselines are used 
(Article 10(6) LOSC 1982). 
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indentation and a line joining the low-water mark of its natural entrance points. 
Where, due to the presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the 
semi-circle shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines 
across the different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they 
were part of the water area of the indentation (Article 10(3) LOSC 1982). 
Once an indentation meets the measurement requirements of a bay, the baseline 
to be drawn depends on the distance in nautical miles between the low-water marks 
of the natural entrance points of the bay. Where the length does not exceed 24nm, a 
closing line (the baseline) may be drawn between these low-water marks, with the 
waters enclosed thus being considered internal waters (Article 10(4) LOSC 1982). 
Where the length exceeds 24nm, a straight baseline of 24nm is drawn within the bay 
in such a way as to enclose the maximum area of water possible with a line of that 
length (Article 10(5) LOSC 1982). With regard to the parts of the bay which remain 
unenclosed by any line, the baseline is the low-water mark unless an exception to the 
status quo exists. 
With regard to river mouths, the LOSC 1982 provides that where a river flows 
directly into the sea, the baseline shall be a straight line across the mouth of the river 
between points on the low-water line of its banks (Art 9, LOSC 1982). 
International law governing the drawing of straight baselines is beset by a 
degree of ambiguity. For instance, it is far from clear what the criteria are for deciding 
that a coastline is sufficiently deeply indented and cut into for the provisions 
governing straight baselines to apply. Additionally, it is unclear what criteria are to 
be applied for determining that in a particular locality, there is a fringe of islands 
along the coast in its immediate vicinity. The manner in which the Gulf States have 
dealt with the issue of baselines will be examined in Chapter 4.113  
 
 
                                                             
113 See Limits in the Seas, No. 106, “Developing Standard Guidelines for Evaluating Straight 
Baselines”, (Office of Ocean Law and Policy, US, August 31, 1987) for an attempt to provide 
guidelines for dealing with various circumstances when straight baselines may be claimed, and to aid 
in the assessment of their validity according to international law. 
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Figure 2: The maritime zones, from R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The 
Law of the Sea (3rd ed., Juris Publishing, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1999), p. 30. 
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i. The territorial sea 
 
Historically, there was much controversy surrounding the breadth of the territorial 
sea, which is a belt of sea adjacent to the coast and extending beyond a state’s internal 
waters. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, vague criteria were applied, such 
as the limits of visibility.114 However, state practice began to show evidence of a 
more standardised method, namely the point to which cannon shot could reach from 
the shore. This was a practice promoted by writers such as Grotius, and became 
known as the “cannon-shot” rule. The original aim of this rule was probably not to 
establish a uniform belt of territorial sea, but rather to reflect parts of the coast that 
were subject to state control due to actual cannons placed along those parts of the 
coast, in accordance with Dutch and Mediterranean state practice.115  Another 
approach was that of the Scandinavian states which claimed sovereignty over fixed 
distances along the whole coastline, regardless of the presence of cannons on 
particular points on the coast.116  
In 1782, Galiani promoted a three mile limit along the whole of the coast, rather 
than link control to the presence of cannons at particular locations on the coast. The 
reference to three miles was for the sake of simplicity, as cannon at the time had a 
range of under three miles.117 From the end of the eighteenth century there were 
indications that a three mile limit was gaining acceptance by western maritime 
powers. Great Britain and the US accepted and propounded it, for the shorter it was, 
the more it supported their desire for free access to the high seas, which suited their 
maritime ambitions. Despite its existence during the nineteenth century and beyond, 
not all states accepted the three mile limit, with various states claiming a wider 
breadth. For instance, very shortly prior to the First World War, France, Italy, Russia, 
Spain and the Ottoman Empire all claimed greater distances from the shore which 
facilitated “the control of specific activities such as fishing or smuggling, within the 
overall limit of the actual range of coastal artillery”.118  
                                                             
114 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 77. 
115 Ibid., p.77. 
116 Ibid., p.77-78. 
117 Ibid., p. 78. 
118 Ibid., p. 78. 
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Attempts were made between states to reach an international agreement as to the 
breadth of the territorial sea at the 1930 Hague Conference, as well as at UNCLOS I 
and II of 1958 and 1960 respectively. However, all these attempts failed. It is 
interesting that at UNCLOS II, a proposal for a 6nm limit failed to be adopted by 
only a single vote.119 However, it is easy to see that opinions changed quickly, and 
while in 1960 the majority of states claimed less than 12 nm, towards the end of 
UNCLOS III, the majority claimed at least 12nm.120  By the close of UNCLOS III, 
the consensus in support of a 12nm territorial sea was clear.121 It is interesting that 
the newly independent states’ promotion of 12 nm reflected their desire to bring more 
of an area under their sovereignty and to counteract the freedoms of the maritime 
powers. Such a trend was explicable in the light of technological advances which 
increased the types of vessels available to the maritime powers, as well as their uses 
of the sea, going beyond the traditional freedoms of navigation and fishing.  
The LOSC 1982 finally and conclusively addressed the breadth of the 
territorial sea. Articles 3 and 4 deal with the breadth and outer limit of the territorial 
sea, and state that the breadth of the territorial sea is set at a limit not exceeding 12nm, 
measured from the baselines determined in accordance with the Convention, and that 
the outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance 
from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea. 
Whether or not a 12nm territorial sea is a matter of customary international law is a 
question which may be answered in the affirmative, on the basis of the widespread 
acceptance of the limit amongst states. Churchill and Lowe conclude that the 12nm 
limit “is now firmly established in international law, and the practice, if not always 
the legislation, of all States is converging upon acceptance of that limit”.122 As will 
                                                             
119 Ibid., p. 79 
120 Ibid., p. 79. 
121 Ibid., p. 79. 
122 Ibid., p, 80, where the authors state, in considering the customary law status of the 12nm limit, that 
for parties to the LOSC 1982 and all other states recognising the legality of “territorial sea claims up 
to at least twelve miles, the twelve-mile limit will prevail. Wider claims (of which around fifteen still 
exist: see Appendix) will not be recognised, except as between States making or otherwise recognising 
such claims…In fact, several of the States that had previously claimed territorial seas in excess of 
twelve miles have pulled back their claims and adopted the twelve-mile limit.” The examples of 
Argentina, Brazil, Ghana and Senegal are given. The authors then state that “[i]n theory, the few non-
LOSC States making territorial sea claims narrower than twelve miles would not be bound even by 
the twelve-mile claims in so far as they have persistently objected to them. However, since the United 
States announced in 1983 that it would respect claims of up to twelve miles which accord to other 
States their rights and freedoms under international law – chiefly rights of passage – it seems highly 
unlikely that there is any State in the position of a persistent objector in this matter.” The reference to 
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be seen in Chapter 4, a number of Gulf States legislated for a 12 nm territorial sea 
prior to the 1970s with the remainder of the Gulf States following them later in time. 
Sovereignty over the seabed and subsoil in the territorial sea was accepted at 
the Hague Conference 1930, and reiterated in Article 2, TSCZ 1958. Article 2(1), 
LOSC 1982 confirms a state’s sovereignty over a belt of sea adjacent to its coast 
known as the territorial sea, and Article 2(2) confirms that this sovereignty extends 
to the air space above, as well as the sea- bed and subsoil below it.123 
Article 13(1) LOSC 1982 states that where a low-tide elevation is situated 
wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the 
mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the 
baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. According to Article 13(2), 
where such an elevation is wholly outside the territorial sea of the mainland or of an 
island, it has no territorial sea of its own. 
 
ii. The contiguous zone 
 
The contiguous zone is a zone contiguous to the territorial sea in which states have a 
limited range of powers to enforce certain national laws such as those pertaining to 
immigration, customs, and fiscal matters. Under both TSCZ 1958 and LOSC 1982, 
a state does not automatically become entitled to the jurisdiction conferred by the 
contiguous zone, but must proactively choose to claim it. 
The contiguous zone has its origins in legislation such as Great Britain’s 
“Hovering Acts” which were enacted to deal with foreign smuggling ships hovering 
within eight leagues (twenty four miles) from the domestic shore. 124 The notion of a 
contiguous zone which would allow for the exercise of jurisdiction over matters such 
as customs and sanitation gained interest amongst states, although no such zone was 
agreed upon in the 1930 Hague Conference. The contiguous zone was agreed upon 
                                                             
the US’s announcement in 1983 is stated by the authors to be the Presidential Proclamation of 10 
March 1983, 22 ILM 461 (1983) in their note 16. The reference to the US by Churchill and Lowe is 
of interest in this discussion of customary law, as it has declined to sign the LOSC 1982, and therefore 
adds to the evidence that the 12nm limit has indeed moved into customary law.  
123 An exception to such sovereignty is the right of foreign ships to innocent passage through a state’s 
territorial sea (see Article 17, LOSC 1982).  
124 See Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 132.  
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at the 1958 Geneva conference, and provision for it was made in Article 24 TSCZ 
1958. In essence, Article 33(1) LOSC 1982 repeats Article 24, and states that in a 
zone contiguous to its territorial sea, a state may exercise the control necessary to: 
 
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws 
and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; 
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within 
its territory or territorial sea. 
 
With regard to the breadth of the contiguous zone, initially, under Article 24(2) TSCZ 
1958, the zone could not extend more than 12nm from the baselines, or, under Article 
24(3), unless there was agreement to the contrary between states, farther than the 
median line equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines where two states 
were either adjacent or opposite to each other. As stated earlier, the breadth of the 
territorial sea was not agreed upon at the 1958 conference, and this meant that in the 
years afterwards, states would claim various territorial sea and contiguous zone limits 
up to a long stop limit of 12nm. However, once the 12nm territorial sea limit was 
agreed upon, UNCLOS III extended the breadth of the contiguous zone, and so 
Article 33(2) 1982 LOSC states that it may not extend beyond 24nm from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This allows a 
12nm zone beyond the 12nm territorial sea. 
 
iii. The continental shelf 
 
In geological terms, the continental shelf is part of the seabed adjacent to the coast. 
In legal terms, it begins where the territorial sea ends. It is part of a state’s entitlement 
without a need to expressly claim it. As seen in Figure 2, there are three sections, one 
of which is the continental shelf, which constitute the continental margin. The 
continental margin is separate from the deep ocean floor. The first section nearest the 
coastline is the continental shelf itself, which is commonly characterised by a 
relatively gentle slope extending from the coastline. This can be rich in oil and gas 
deposits. The second section, extending from the shelf, is the continental slope which 
is characterised by a steeper slope. Thirdly, it is common to find an area known as 
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the continental rise which slopes more gradually and is comprised mainly of 
sediments. Beyond the continental rise is the ocean floor.  
The legal, as opposed to the geological, concept of the continental shelf 
originates in the Truman Proclamation of 1945.125 In that pronouncement, the US 
referred to the continental shelf as “an extension of the land mass of the coastal State 
and thus naturally appurtenant to it”, and claimed “the natural resources of the subsoil 
and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts 
of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction 
and control”. It was also made clear that “the character as high seas of the waters of 
the continental shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no 
way thus affected”.  
The Truman Proclamation was a natural consequence of the fact that in 
geological terms, the US has a true geological continental shelf. Nevertheless, the 
Proclamation’s definition of the legal concept of the continental shelf had a 
fundamental and wide-ranging influence on other states, regardless of their own 
geological position, in developing their own jurisprudence on the continental shelf, 
displaying a relatively quick acceptance of the notion and its effects as a general rule 
of international law. However, the claims to the continental shelf varied and early 
state practice could not be said to be consistent. For example, Lord Asquith, acting 
as arbitral umpire in Petroleum Development Ltd v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951), on 
reviewing the doctrine of the continental shelf  since the publication of the Truman 
Proclamation 1945, noted, inter alia the Proclamations of the Gulf states which 
broadly conformed with the wording of the Truman Proclamation 1945, as well as 
the “more ambitious” claims of Latin and Central American countries which were 
claims to actual sovereignty over the continental shelf, such as Argentina in 1944, 
Mexico in 1945 and Chile in 1947. He further noted some claims, such as those of 
Chile, El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica were not even limited to the continental 
shelf but extended to a zone 200nm from the mainland.126  He found state practice to 
be so inconsistent by 1951, that he concluded that “in no form can the doctrine [of 
the continental shelf] claim as yet to have assumed hitherto the hard lineaments or 
                                                             
125 Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the 
Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 28 September 1945, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (2 October 
1945).  
126 (1951) 18 ILR 144, pp. 153-4. 
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the definitive status of an established rule of International Law.”127 However, by the 
time of the 1958 Geneva Conference, the doctrine of the continental shelf was 
established in customary international law.128 Thus it is an example of how 
international law can adjust quickly and effectively to new ideas and changing 
circumstances. The wording of the Truman Proclamation had been closely 
collaborated upon by the US and British governments, with the aim that the Gulf 
States would follow its lead when they issued their own legislation on the matter of 
the continental shelf.129 Other states, including the Gulf States, followed with similar 
claims in order to benefit from the exploitation of oil, gas and mineral resources in 
the continental shelf.130  
 
a. The CSC 1958 
 
This was an important milestone in the development of the continental shelf, because 
it was the first multilateral treaty to deal with the continental shelf as a legal concept. 
Its importance for this study lies in the fact that, despite none of the Gulf States 
having ratified the CSC 1958, it embodied the international law on the topic of the 
continental shelf at the time when several of the bilateral agreements on the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between Gulf States were entered into, and which 
still exist today. 
Article 1 sets out a legal definition of the continental shelf as comprising:  
                                                             
127 Ibid., p. 155. However, in contrast to this view, some commentators have expressed the view that 
the claim to the continental shelf in the Truman Proclamation quickly moved into customary law, the 
law relating to a state’s claims in the continental shelf took the form of what has been referred to as 
“instant” customary law; see for example H. Lauterpacht, “Sovereignty over Submarine Areas”, 
(1950) 27 BYIL 377, and M.P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change. 
Recognizing Grotian Moments (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013), Chapter 5 entitled 
“The Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf” at pp. 107-122. 
128 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 145.  
129 J.C., Wilkinson, Arabia’s Frontiers: The Story of Britain’s Boundary Drawing in the Desert, (I.B. 
Tauris & Co Ltd, London, 1991, reprinted New York, 1993), p. 238. 
130 Following the Truman Proclamation of 1945, Gulf States issued legislation regarding the resources 
of the sea bed and subsoil contiguous to their coasts. Saudi Arabia was the first State to issue such 
legislation in the form of the Royal Pronouncement of 28 May 1949. The following States also issued 
proclamations declaring rights to contiguous subsoil and seabed areas in 1949 as follows: Bahrain on 
5 June, Qatar on 8 June, Abu Dhabi on 10 June, Kuwait on 12 June, Dubai on 14 June, Sharjah on 16 
June, Ras al-Khaimah on 17 June, Ajman on 20 June, and Umm al-Qaywayn in June, it being unclear 
on what date. Iran issued similar legislation on 19 June 1955. The Gulf legislation on the continental 
shelf following the Truman Proclamation 1945 is examined in Chapter 5. 
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the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the 
area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where 
the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural 
resources of the said areas…[and] the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine 
areas adjacent to  the coasts of islands. 
 
Clearly, there is a limit dependent upon depth or, in the alternative, exploitability. 
This meant that the legal conception was not limited exclusively to the geographical 
conception of the continental shelf, and therefore could allow for continental shelves 
to exist in shallow basins such as the Gulf. Article 1 was a statement of customary 
law.131 This explains why, as will be seen in Chapter 5, a number of the Gulf States 
adopted this definition in their national legislation despite not being parties to the 
CSC 1958.  
Article 2 makes clear that the state exercises “sovereign rights for the purpose 
of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources” over the continental shelf. In other 
words, a state’s rights over the shelf vest in it ipso jure, without the need to declare 
them. 
Article 1, CSC 1958 left the breadth of the continental shelf effectively 
dependent on the ability of states to extract resources from the continental shelf. 
However, technology soon advanced to the stage that there was little or no limit to 
such capability on the part of states, leaving the limit of the continental shelf 
potentially open-ended. 
 
 
b. The LOSC 1982 
 
In contrast, LOSC 1982 establishes a new definition designed to set a definite limit to 
the breadth of the continental shelf. Article 76(1), LOSC 1982 establishes a legal 
definition of a state’s continental shelf, namely: 
                                                             
131 See North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969), Sep. Op. Judge Ammoun, pp. 103-6, paras. 4-7 who 
referred to the Gulf States’ Proclamations on the continental shelf as well as the legislation of other 
states, at p. 104, para. 5 as support for his view that Article 1 CSC 1958 was part of customary 
international law. 
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the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the 
continental margin does not extend up to that distance. 
 
Thus, instead of the depth being the crucial factor in Article 1, CSC 1958, here there 
is a limit set according to breadth. 
The continental shelf as defined legally in Article 76(1) extends over a greater 
area than the geological continental shelf, which itself is only one of three elements 
which make up the geological continental margin, the other two being the continental 
slope and continental rise. The continental margin is defined in Article 76(3) as 
comprising the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, and 
consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not 
include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof. Again, like 
Article 1, CSC 1958, the legal definition of the continental shelf is not limited to the 
geological definition. 
 Article 76(2) states that the continental shelf of a coastal State shall not extend 
beyond the limits provided for in Article 76(4) – (6), although pursuant to Article 
76(10), the provisions of this article are without prejudice to the question of 
delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. 
Article 76(4) sets the outer limit of the legal continental margin where the 200 
nautical mile limit does not apply, in either of two ways. It states as follows: 
   
(a)…  
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the 
outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedementary rocks is at 
least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental 
slope; or 
 
(ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed 
points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope. 
 
(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope 
shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base. 
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It is apparent that the application of Article 76(4) depends on locating the foot of the 
slope. 
  Article 76(5) defines the absolute limits of the legal continental shelf as 
established under Article 76(4)(a)(i) and (ii). In most scenarios to be encountered, 
there will be a choice between a limit of 350 nautical miles from the baselines, or 
100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line connecting the depth 
of 2,500 metres. However, as seen in Article 76(6), there is no choice in the case of 
submarine ridges. Article 76(6) states as follows: 
  
 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on submarine ridges, the outer limit 
of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This paragraph does not apply 
to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin, such 
as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs. 
 
Article 76(7) provides that where a state’s continental shelf extends beyond 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured, it shall delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf by straight lines 
not exceeding 60 nautical miles in length, connecting fixed points, defined by co-
ordinates of latitude and longitude. It is apparent that a state has some degree of 
choice as to the location of the fixed points according to the wording of the Article, 
in order to maximise the favourability of the result.  
Article 77(1) states that a state has “sovereign rights” over the continental shelf 
“for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources”. Article 77(3) 
makes clear that such rights are inherent in a state, as they ‘do not depend on 
occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation’. It is notable that 
those rights do not affect the superjacent waters.  
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iv. The exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) 
 
The EEZ is a sea zone within which a state may claim a body of rights relating to the 
exploitation of natural resources, as well as associated rights of jurisdiction. Third 
states also have certain freedoms within a state’s EEZ. This zone is measured at 200nm 
from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. Therefore, the 
continental shelf extends at least as far as the EEZ. 
The EEZ made its first appearance in conventional form in the LOSC 1982. 
However, historically, a number of states claimed exclusive fishing rights in areas 
which came to be known as Exclusive Fishing Zones (EFZs) in areas beyond their 
territorial sea.132  This provided the basis and impetus for what was to become known 
as the EEZ. The great majority of states which currently claim an EEZ did so well 
before the 1982 Convention came into force, many of them in the late 1970s when 
UNCLOS III was still proceeding and in fact it is generally recognised that the EEZ 
became a part of customary international law before the 1982 Convention came into 
force. For example, in the Tunisia/Libya case (1982), the ICJ observed that the EEZ 
had become accepted as customary international law.133 Therefore one of the 
purposes of the LOSC 1982 was to deal with and regularize increasing claims by 
states to EFZs and EEZs. 
An interesting feature of claims to the EFZ/EEZ is that its roots lie in the desire 
of developing states to increase their control over resources in the waters near their 
coasts, in particular fish, in the face of exploitation by long-distance fishing fleets of 
the maritime powers. This desire was the basis of claims of Latin American and 
African states to very broad territorial seas, sometimes extending to 200nm, and 
fishing zones. These claims created a momentum which gradually received 
increasing support from other developing countries. By the time UNCLOS III had 
begun, most developing states had pledged their support for the concept of the 
                                                             
132 Most of the Latin American States promoted the idea of a 200nm EEZ, particularly in the 1970s. 
A number of developed States such as Germany, Japan, Canada and the US claimed a 200nm EFZ in 
the late 1970; these claims were subsequently changed to claims to an EEZ following the existence of 
the 1982 Convention. See Churchill and Lowe (1999), pp. 160-1. 
133 [1982] ICJ Rep 18, para. 100. Additionally in Libya v Malta [1985] ICJ Rep 13 at para.34, the 
ICJ stated that the EEZ is shown by state practice to have become part of customary law 
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EEZ.134  As will be seen in Chapter 5 of this study, Gulf States also followed these 
developments, and issued national legislation claiming EFZs/EEZs. 
Part V of LOSC 1982 sets out the regime appertaining to the EEZ. Article 55 
states that the EEZ is an area adjacent to and beyond the territorial sea, and Article 
57 confirms its breadth as a maximum of 200nm from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Amongst other provisions in Part V, Article 
56, inter alia, refers to the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal state in the 
EEZ. Article 56(1)(a) states that in the EEZ the coastal state has sovereign rights for 
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources, living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and its 
subsoil, and also in relation to other activities for the economic exploitation and 
exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents 
and winds. Article 56(1)(b) states that the state also has jurisdiction as provided 
elsewhere in the Convention in relation to (i) the establishment and use of artificial 
islands, installations and structures; (b) marine scientific research, and (iii) protection 
and preservation of the marine environment. Article 58 refers to the rights and duties 
of other states in the EEZ, such as freedom of navigation, overflight, and the laying 
of submarine cables and pipelines. 
 
Islands 
 
Having touched upon maritime zones by way of a brief overview, it is useful at this 
point to refer to the question of the maritime zones generated by islands, which 
feature prominently in the Gulf Sea. Islands are entitled to their own territorial sea, 
contiguous zone, continental shelf, and EEZ.  
Article 10(2), TSCZ 1958 states that the territorial sea of an island is measured 
in accordance with the articles of that Convention. Article 1(b), CSC 1958 provides 
that islands are entitled to their own continental shelf. Nowhere is an island defined 
in that Convention. However, there is such a definition in Article 10(1) of TSCZ 
                                                             
134 See Churchill and Lowe (1999), pp. 160-1. The concept of the EEZ was proposed for the first time 
by Kenya’s representative to the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee in January 1971 and 
to the U.N. Sea Bed Committee in 1972. See Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 160.   
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1958, namely “a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide”. This definition is reflected in LOSC 1982, and so it is highly 
arguable that a different definition was not intended to operate in CSC 1958.  
Article 121(2), LOSC 1982 states that the territorial sea, contiguous zone, 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in 
accordance with the provisions of the LOSC 1982 applicable to other land territory. 
An exception to this is given in Article 121(3), LOSC 1982 which states that rocks 
which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 135  
 
Delimitation 
 
Delimitation is the process of establishing the boundary between the maritime zones 
of two or more states. Delimitation of a boundary is needed where neither state is 
able to claim the full area of the zone which it would ordinarily be entitled to, because 
it is impinged upon by the maritime zone of another state or states.  
 
i. The territorial sea 
 
Article 15 LOSC 1982, which in essence repeats what was contained in Article 12 
TSCZ 1958, states the general rule, that where the coasts of two states are opposite 
or adjacent to each other, failing agreement between them to the contrary, neither 
state is entitled to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of 
which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth 
of the territorial seas of each of the two states is measured. However, this is said not 
to apply where it is necessary, by reason of historic title or other special 
circumstances, to delimit both states’ territorial seas in a way at variance therewith.  
136  
                                                             
135 As referred to earlier in this chapter, this provision is characterized by vagueness. 
136 The corresponding delimitation provision in CSC 1958 influenced Article 12 TSCZ 1958.  
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 It is apparent that the rules contained in Article 12, TSCZ 1958, which evolved 
into Article 15, LOSC 1982, reflect customary international law in respect of both 
opposite and adjacent states.137 In this regard, it is useful to note, for the purposes of 
this study, the Dubai/Sharjah Border Arbitration (1981), which, in delimiting the 
territorial sea boundary between both Emirates which are adjacent to each other, the 
tribunal, applying customary international law, drew “a lateral equidistance line from 
the coastal terminus which divides the two territorial seas according to the principles 
laid down in” Article 12 TSCZ 1958, considering the line drawn to be “equitable”. 
138 
 
ii. The contiguous zone 
 
Article 24(3), TSCZ 1958 states that where the coasts of two states are opposite or 
adjacent to each other, neither of the two states is entitled, failing agreement between 
them to the contrary, to extend its contiguous zone beyond the median line every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea of the two States is measured. However, Article 33, 
LOSC 1982, which deals with the contiguous zone, makes no provision for 
delimitation of the contiguous zone as between adjacent or opposite states. The 
provision for an EEZ in the LOSC 1982 means that the contiguous zone is a part of 
the EEZ, and therefore Article 74 , LOSC 1982  governing delimitation of the EEZ 
would also apply, whether or not, it seems, an EEZ is actually claimed.  
 
iii. The continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone (‘EEZ’) (or exclusive 
fishery zone, ‘EFZ’), and the single maritime boundary 
 
With regard to the continental shelf, as early as 1945, the Truman Proclamation had 
referred to delimitation of the continental shelf, stating that where the US continental 
shelf extends to the shores of another state, or is adjacent with another state, the 
                                                             
137 P. Weil, for example, has stated that the rule contained in these provisions “is generally regarded 
as having become part of customary law for the purposes of territorial sea delimitation”, see The Law 
of Maritime Delimitation–Reflections (Grotius Publications Ltd, Cambridge, 1989), p. 136. See also 
Churchill and Lowe (1999), pp. 182-183.  
138 91 ILR 543 at 663. Churchill and Lowe (1999) state at p.183 that this shows that the tribunal “would 
seem thereby to have equated the customary and the conventional rules”.  
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boundary “shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in 
accordance with equitable principles”. 
Article 6 (1) and (2), CSC 1958 confirm that where the same continental shelf 
is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are either opposite or 
adjacent to each other, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by 
agreement between them. However, in the absence of agreement, and unless another 
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the equidistance 
line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.139 The wording of 
the provision may therefore suggest that agreement is given priority as a means of 
resolution. In other words, only if there is an absence of agreement can a boundary 
be delimited by the equidistance line, with the special circumstances provision 
operating where appropriate. A crucial aspect to note is that special circumstances 
are nowhere defined in the CSC, and neither is any indication given of what 
alternative boundary might be appropriate should special circumstances be found to 
exist.   
With regard to delimitation of the continental shelf, proposals at UNCLOS III 
were mainly divided into two opposing approaches amongst participating states: 
firstly, those advocating equidistance (with an exception for special circumstances) 
and secondly, the application of equitable principles. The resulting provision, Article 
83(1), LOSC 1982, was a compromise following difficult negotiations, and is 
generally considered as having little practical effect in that it leaves a great deal open 
and undefined. It reads as follows: 
 
The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to 
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an 
equitable solution. 
 
                                                             
139 Article 6(1) refers to the median line in relation to states with coasts opposite to each other, while 
Article 6(2) refers to the line being drawn according to the principle of equidistance in relation to 
states with coasts adjacent to each other. There is no substantive difference between a median and 
equidistance line as confirmed by the ICJ in Romania v Ukraine [2009] ICJ Rep 62, where it 
confirmed at para. 116 that “[n]o legal consequences flow from the use of the terms "median line" 
and "equidistance line" since the method of delimitation is the same for both.” 
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Article 74(1) LOSC 1982 in respect of the delimitation of the EEZ is in identical 
terms. Neither Article makes reference to any principles or methods of delimitation 
to be applied. Rather, in somewhat vague terms, it is provided that in seeking an 
agreement, international law is to be applied, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice 1945.140 However, “an equitable solution”, being 
the goal of delimitation, is a concept which has arisen in the case law, and which is 
of assistance when applying Articles 74(1) and 83(1).141  
As has already been seen, the continental shelf and EEZ cover the same 200nm 
area. Article 74(1) LOSC 1982 utilises the same wording as Article 83(1) in respect 
of delimitation of the EEZ, and the above observations in respect of their vagueness 
also apply. At UNCLOS III, there was a recognition that it would be appropriate for 
continental shelf and EEZ boundaries to coincide, which explains the same wording 
in Article 74(1) and Article 83(1). Further, in the case law, the single maritime 
boundary developed, which is essentially a boundary between two or more maritime 
zones of states, for example a single boundary line delimiting both the continental 
shelf and the EEZ between states.  It is a convenient method for solving delimitation 
issues. 
As has been made clear, however, in the case law, which is examined below, 
the fact that these two LOSC 1982 provisions are the same, may create difficulties, 
in that the factors appropriate to take into account when delimiting the continental 
shelf may not be equally appropriate when delimiting the EEZ and vice versa. This 
was clear for example in the Gulf of Maine case (1984) which for the first time drew 
a single maritime boundary between the continental shelf and 200nm exclusive 
fishery zones (EFZs) of the US and Canada. The Chamber of the ICJ decided that the 
CSC 1958, to which both States were Parties, was not relevant to the drawing of a 
single maritime boundary, as it did not govern the delimitation of the water column 
(the EFZ) above the continental shelf.142 The Chamber emphasised the need to be 
aware of factors which, while relevant to the delimitation of the continental shelf, for 
                                                             
140 This provision has been referred to at the start of this chapter. 
141 It should be noted that Articles 74(1) and 83(4) LOSC 1982 clarify that where there is an agreement 
in force between the states concerned, questions relating to the delimitation of the EEZ and continental 
shelf respectively shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement. 
142 [1984] ICJ Rep 246, at para. 121.  
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example geological factors, are difficult to regard as relevant to the superjacent 
waters of EEZ or EFZ, and conversely ecological factors are difficult to consider 
relevant to the delimitation of the continental shelf. Criteria relevant to delimitation 
of only one of these zones should be ignored.143 The Chamber stated that 
geographical factors were most likely to be relevant to the delimitation a single 
maritime boundary between the continual shelves and fishing zones of both states. 
It has already been observed that customary international law on delimitation 
of the continental shelf and the EEZ has been actively developed by case law of the 
ICJ and arbitral tribunals and it is to the case law that this thesis now turns in the next 
chapter. 
  
                                                             
143 Paras. 192-5 
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Chapter 3 
Case Law on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the International 
Law of the Sea 
Introduction 
Case law on the issue of the delimitation of maritime boundaries has been an 
important feature of the work of the ICJ and arbitral tribunals, demonstrating prolific 
activity in this field of decision-making. The significance of such decisions for the 
delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ has been referred to in the previous 
chapter, where it was shown that it may be said that case law reflects or indeed 
constitutes customary international law on the maritime delimitation.  
This chapter attempts to give a broad overview of the development of the case 
law on delimitation with particular reference to the continental shelf and also the 
EEZ, with a consideration of the general principles which currently could be said to 
be applicable to delimitation. The field of maritime boundary delimitation is a 
longstanding arena for extensive and interesting theoretical debate, and therefore it 
is important to make clear that due to limitations of space this current chapter cannot 
be an exhaustive critical analysis of the case law nor an attempt to present a 
theoretical approach to understanding the case law.  Rather, it is an attempt to present 
an extremely practical examination of the fundamental aspects of the case law for the 
purpose of effecting the aims of this study. As a result, it focuses on the methods of 
delimitation and the most important relevant factors which influence delimitation. It 
is clear that Gulf maritime boundary delimitation cannot be understood without such 
an examination.  
 However, before beginning a discussion of the cases, it is helpful to explain a 
number of the basic concepts which feature in maritime boundary delimitation, and 
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in particular in the case law to be discussed in this chapter, and this prior explanation 
will assist in a greater understanding of the delimitation decisions in the case law.144 
 
The main methods of delimitation 
 
As well as the equidistance line, there are a number of other possible delimitation 
lines. The starting point is to look at the geographical context in which the 
delimitation is to be effected, in particular the relevant geographical area.145 This 
includes the relevant coastlines. While geographical factors are important, it is the 
application of rules of international law and equitable principles which determine the 
relevance and weight of geographical features.146 
 
i. The equidistance line 
 
The principle of equidistance and basic legal principles governing baselines have 
already been referred to in Chapter 3. As has already been seen, Article 12 TSCZ 
1958, and Article 6 CSC 1958 which deal with delimitation of the territorial sea and 
the continental shelf respectively, both define equidistance as the line every point of 
which is equidistant from the coastlines from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
of each of the two states is measured.147  In general, by way of general definition, an 
equidistance line, otherwise known as a median line, is “[a] line composed of 
relatively short segments connecting points that are equidistant from the normal 
baselines, or from claimed (or assumed) baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured.”148 It may be said that there are three forms of equidistance 
                                                             
144 As will become clear in due course, many of these basic concepts of delimitation also feature in 
delimitation in the Gulf in various ways, as will be clear from Chapters 6 and 7.  
145 St. Pierre and Miquelon Arbitration (1992) 31 ILM 1145, para. 25. 
146 Ibid., para. 24. 
147 It will be noted that Article 6 CSC 1958 refers to a “median line” in respect of delimitation of the 
continental shelf between opposite states, and a line determined by the application of the “principle of 
equidistance” in relation to delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent states. There is no 
distinction between a median line and an equidistance line.  
148 This definition is taken from the glossary of terms in J.I. Charney and L.M. Alexander (eds.), 
International Maritime Boundaries Vol. I (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993), p. xix. 
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line: a strict, a simplified and a modified equidistance line. 149 These are dealt with 
below.  
A line which is strictly equidistant between two points is the perpendicular 
bisector of the line joining the two points, and therefore a true equidistance line is “a 
series of segments of perpendicular bisectors of straight lines joining the nearest 
points on the coasts of the parties”.150 Therefore, the line follows a course which 
reflects the continual change in the relationship between the nearest points on each 
parties’ coastlines.151 For a boundary to be a true equidistance line, each point along 
the whole boundary must be equidistant from two points comprising one point on 
each coast, while the turning points (those points which are not the terminal points) 
must be equidistant from three points (two points on one coast, and one point on the 
other coast).152 A good illustration of this is Figure 3 which shows an equidistance 
line between the opposite coasts of two states following a number of turning points 
along the line. Figure 4 demonstrates an equidistance line between adjacent states. It 
can be seen that a strict equidistance line may be complicated with numerous short 
straight line segments which reflect coastal features. 
 
                                                             
149 This categorisation appears in L. Legault and B. Hankey, “Method, Oppositeness and Adjacency, 
and Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation”, in Charney and Alexander, Vol. I (1993), p. 
203, at pp. 206-208 and also in V. Prescott and C. Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of 
the World (2nd ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005), pp. 224-227. 
150 Legault and Hankey (1993), p. 207 
151 Ibid.,p. 207. 
152 See P.B. Beazley, Maritime Limits and Baselines. A Guide to their Delineation, 3rd ed., 
(Hydrographic Society, Dagenham, 1987), p. 38, and Limits in the Seas, No. 67, “Continental Shelf 
Boundary: Iran-Oman” (Office of the Geographer, US, January 1, 1976), p. 5. 
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Figure 3:  Equidistance between opposite coasts, from V. Prescott and C. 
Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (2nd ed., 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005), p. 577, fig.10.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Equidistance between adjacent coasts, from V. Prescott and C. 
Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (2nd ed., Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005), p.578, fig.10.2. 
 
 
A simplified equidistance line is one which seeks to militate against the complexity 
of the strict equidistance line. The simplified version reduces the number of turning 
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points, and therefore decreases the number of straight line segments, at the same time 
increasing their length. A common feature of this kind of line is that both states often 
exchange equal areas, in keeping with the intention to keep matters simplified.153 
  A modified equidistance line is made up of straight line segments connecting 
points which are not strictly equidistant from the baselines of the territorial sea, 
because particular coastal features, such as islands, have not been utilised, or have 
been given a reduced effect.154  Therefore, this line departs more from strict 
equidistance than does the simplified equidistance line. It may result in a line which 
in fact has little resemblance to equidistance, and instead of exchanging equal areas 
between the parties, which is a feature of simplified equidistance, it generally 
allocates a maritime area to one party without any such exchange.155 
 It is useful at this point to refer to the features of equidistance when used in the 
case of opposite states, and how this can differ when it is used between adjacent 
states. As identified by the ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969), while 
stating that an equidistance line generally produced an equitable result in the case of 
opposite states, it stated that this was often not the case between adjacent states. This 
is because a feature on the coast of one or the other of the coasts, such as concavity, 
convexity or a protrusion, has an effect on an equidistance line which is amplified as 
the boundary extends seaward, thus having a disproportionate effect.156 In that case 
in particular, it was noted that if an equidistance line was used between Germany and 
other states, this would lead to inequity. This is because the concave coastline of 
Germany, in combination with the convex coastlines of the other states on either side 
of it, would create a situation where the lateral converging equidistant boundaries of 
the states on either side would cause Germany to become “shelf-locked”.  This effect 
can be seen from Figure 5, a diagram from the ICJ’s Judgment which explains the 
inequitable effect. A cut-off effect is created, effectively causing an equidistance line 
to swings out across the coast of one of the parties, cutting off that state from the 
continental shelf lying in front of its coasts. Case law makes clear that a cut-off effect 
                                                             
153 Legault and Hankey (1993), p.207. 
154 Ibid., p.208. A discussion of which factors may operate to modify a strict equidistance line will 
follow later in this chapter in relation to case law, and also in Chapters 6 and 7 in respect of 
delimitation in the Gulf.  
155 Ibid., p. 208. 
156 [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, para. 89.  
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is to be avoided. The ICJ stated that an equidistance line between opposite states was 
less likely to create inequity.157  This observation was cited with approval in 
subsequent case law.158 
 
 
  Figure 5: Diagram from North Sea Continental Shelf cases  
 [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at p. 16 showing the effect of concave coasts on an 
  equidistance line. 
 
 
The different effects between adjacent and opposite coasts was explained by the ICJ 
in Libya/Malta (1985), where it was stated that in relation to the former, “any 
                                                             
157 Paras. 57, 59. 
158 For example, see Anglo-French Arbitration (1977)18 ILM 39, para. 95. 
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distorting effect of a salient feature might well extend and increase through the entire 
course of the boundary”, while in respect of the latter: 
 
the influence of one feature is normally quickly succeeded and corrected by the 
influence of another, as the course of the line proceeds between more or less 
parallel coasts.159 
  
Another example of the recognition of this distinction is the case of Guinea/Guinea 
Bissau (1985), where the Arbitral Tribunal decided against options based on an 
equidistance line between the adjacent coasts of the Parties, in a situation where taken 
together the coasts of both were concave, due to the exaggerated importance such a 
line would give to certain insignificant features of the coastline and which would 
produce a cut-off effect causing the states to lose maritime areas opposite and near 
to their coasts.160 However, it should also be noted that the equidistance line has, in 
more recent case law, become established as the provisional starting point for 
delimitation of the continental shelf or the EEZ or in the case of a single maritime 
boundary in cases of states with both opposite and adjacent coasts. This will be dealt 
with later in this chapter. 
It should also be noted that in any given delimitation situation, two states can 
be opposite to each other in parts of their geographical relationship, but also adjacent 
to each other in other parts. For a diagrammatic illustration of this phenomenon sees 
Figure 6. As will be seen later in this chapter, an example of this situation featured 
in Gulf of Maine (1984) where the relationship between the US and Canada in the 
geographical area in question, was partly one of oppositeness, and partly one of 
adjacency. As a result, there were different considerations applicable in respect of 
these different parts.  
 
                                                             
159 [1985] ICJ Rep 13, para. 70. 
160 (1985) 35 ILM 251, para. 103.b 
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Figure 6: A relationship of both oppositeness and adjacency between two 
states from V. Prescott and C. Schofield, The Maritime Political 
Boundaries of the World (2nd ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
2005), p.590, fig.10.14.  
  
 
ii. Parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude 
 
This is a method which, between adjacent states, can take the form of a parallel or 
meridian drawn from the point where the land boundary joins the sea. This method 
assists in avoiding the cut-off effect mentioned above in cases of concave or convex 
coastlines or in the presence of islands.161 
 
iii. The method of enclaving islands 
 
This can be used in conjunction with other methods of delimitation, and is essentially 
a way in which to deal with an island by affording a belt of maritime zone to that 
island. This is achieved by way of “a boundary consisting of arcs of circles drawn 
from headlands”.162 This method usually results in less maritime area obtained by a 
                                                             
161 Legault and Hankey (1993), p. 211.  
162 Ibid., p. 212.  
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state whose island is enclaved, in comparison to what that state would have gained if 
the island had instead been used as a basepoint for drawing an equidistance line.163 
There can be either a “full enclave” where the maritime belt attributed to the island 
is entirely separated from that mainland coast of the state to which the island belongs, 
or there can be a “semi-enclave” where the maritime belt granted to the island feeds 
into the rest of the maritime area granted to the state to which the island belongs.164 
The semi-enclave occurs when the island is situated on or near an equidistance 
line.165 
 
iv. Perpendicular lines 
 
This is a line “perpendicular to the general direction of the coast” although lines 
perpendicular “to the closing lines of coastal indentations” have also featured.166 This 
method entails a simplified form of equidistance, although it is limited in its use in 
that it relies on the coasts of both states being a straight line, which is geographically 
uncommon. 167 As stated in the Gulf of Maine (1984) case, decided by the Chamber 
of the ICJ, for a line perpendicular to the coast to be appropriate, “it is an almost 
essential condition” that the starting point of such a line lies between two adjacent 
states whose coastlines “lie successively along a more or less rectilinear coast, for a 
certain distance at least”, so that when the line is drawn, it would ideally leave an 
angle of 90 degrees on either side of it.168 In that case, the third segment of the 
boundary was a line perpendicular to the closing line of the Gulf. This was used 
instead of an equidistance line because the Chamber did not wish the line in this area 
to begin from the midpoint of the Gulf closing line, which would have been “the 
approximate result” if equidistance had been used.169 Thus the Chamber gave itself 
the flexibility to adjust the starting point of this segment of the boundary.170 In 
Guinea/Guinea Bissau (1985), the Tribunal delimited most of the boundary by way 
                                                             
163 Ibid., p. 212.  
164 Ibid., p.212. 
165 Ibid., p. 212.  
166 Ibid., p. 213.  
167 Ibid., p. 213.  
168 [1984] ICJ Rep 246, para. 176. 
169 Legault and Hankey (1993), p. 213. 
170 Ibid., p. 213.  
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of a line perpendicular to the general direction of the continental seaboard using a 
macro-geographical approach.  
The Tribunal established this general direction by drawing a line between 
relevant points on the coasts of Senegal and Sierra Leone.171 In employing this 
method, the Tribunal took into account the potential effect of claims of third states 
which were not parties to the case, located on the coast of West Africa to the north 
and south of the Parties.172  
  
Partial effect given to geographical features, usually islands 
 
This is a significant and relatively common method of modifying an equidistance line 
due to the presence of a particular geographical feature, usually an island. Without 
any modification, if an equidistance line was drawn strictly taking full account of an 
island, this may have a disproportionate effect on the line. In contrast, where an 
equidistance line is not drawn strictly, but rather is modified, this can be achieved by 
tempering the effect which an island may have on an otherwise strict equidistance 
line. It is important to remember that this approach can also be used in delimitations 
where a method other than an equidistance line is being used.  
 There are two main methods for achieving partial effect. The first is the 
bisector method, which was employed in the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977) to 
give half effect to the Scilly Isles.173 It is appropriate for use between adjacent coasts, 
and coasts combining both adjacency and oppositeness. Using this method, the 
features to be considered are “reduced…to a single representative basepoint”, and a 
first equidistance line is constructed using that basepoint and “a single representative 
basepoint on the coast of the other party”.174 A second equidistance line is also 
constructed, this time “from a single representative basepoint on the coast of each 
party, without reference to the feature is question.”175 The angle between the two 
                                                             
171 Ibid., p. 214.  
172 Ibid., p. 214.  
173 Ibid., pp.208-9. See Anglo-French Arbitration (1977)18 ILM 397. 
174 Ibid., pp.208-9. 
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lines is then bisected, equally dividing the area between the two equidistance lines.176 
See Figure 7 for an illustration.  
 
 
Figure 7: Half-effect as applied in the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977) 
18 ILM 397, from H.W. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990), p. 
358. 
 
 
The second method, which is appropriate between opposite coasts, is where two 
equidistance lines are constructed, the first utilising the feature, and the second 
ignoring it, and then drawing a third line which is equidistant from the first and 
second lines, or which divides the space between them equally or indeed in some 
other proportion, for example by giving three-quarters effect. This method was used 
to give half-effect to the Iranian Island of Kharg in the Saudi Arabia-Iran 1968 
agreement.177 See Figure 8 for an illustration.  
                                                             
176 Legault and Hankey (1993), p. 209. 
177 As stated by Legault and Hankey (1993), p. 209, and H.W. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990), pp.356-7. See Chapter 6 of thesis 
for further explanation. For a discussion of the utilisation of this method in that agreement in the 
context of international law, see Chapter 7.  
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Figure 8: Half effect used in respect of Kharg Island in the Saudi Arabia-
Iran 1968 agreement, from H.W. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990), p. 
356. 
 
 
Bisection of angles representing the coastal fronts of two parties 
 
This is another method of modifying an equidistance line so that the effect of 
geographical features is modified.178 This method involves the drawing of two lines, 
each representing the coastal front of each party, and then bisecting the angle between 
the two lines.179 In the first segment of the single maritime boundary decided upon 
in Gulf of Maine (1984), the Chamber utilised the bisector of an angle formed by two 
lines which formed part of the rectangle shape of the Gulf itself, and which 
represented the general direction of the coasts of the US and Canada. The Chamber 
                                                             
178 Legault and Hankey (1993), p. 210 
179 Ibid., p. 210. It will be seen in Chapter 6 that this method was employed in the Sharjah-Umm al 
Qaywayn agreement of 1964. 
 
 
87 
then bisected the angle formed by perpendiculars to these lines, and then “transposed 
the resulting azimuth to the point of commencement” as agreed between the Parties 
in their Special Agreement.180 The Chamber declined to use equidistance in this first 
segment due to the complicating presence of rocks and islands along the coast and 
also the dispute between the Parties over Machias Seal Island.  
In the following section, there is conducted a brief survey and analysis of the 
case law on delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf. The case law can essentially 
be considered in three chronological stages.   
 
Case law 1969 – 1992 
 
The starting point for the purposes of this discussion is the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases (1969). By way of background to these cases, a dispute had arisen 
between Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands over the continental shelf in the 
North Sea which was related to the belief that the North Sea contained a huge amount 
of oil and gas. The geographical context is that the three states are adjacent to each 
other on a concave coastline. Of the three states, Germany was the only one which 
was not a party to the CSC 1958. It was for the ICJ to decide, therefore, what 
constituted the customary law of the delimitation of the continental shelf. Denmark 
and the Netherlands argued that Article 6 CSC 1958, which provided for 
equidistance, was binding on Germany by virtue of the fact that it was part of 
customary international law. The ICJ rejected this, obtaining support from its 
observation that the International Law Commission, during its discussions on 
delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent states in 1950 -1956, had not 
considered equidistance to be an inherent principle.181 In the particular geographical 
circumstances before the ICJ, if equidistance had been applied, it would have resulted 
in Germany having an extremely small continental shelf due to the concavity of its 
coastline on the North Sea, with Denmark and the Netherlands getting a much larger 
                                                             
180 Ibid., p, 210, and see [1984] ICJ Rep 246, paras 209-13. An azimuth is defined as “[t]the horizontal 
angle between a meridian and a line intersecting it” in Charney and Alexander, Vol. I (1993), p. xix. 
181 [1969] ICJ Rep 3, paras. 48-53. 
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area of the continental shelf, leading to inequity. This would be because the concavity 
would pull the lines of the boundaries with Germany inwards. This can be seen in 
Figure 6.  
The ICJ famously stated the customary international rule on delimitation of the 
continental shelf to be as follows: 
 
delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, 
and taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as 
much as possible to each Party all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute 
a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without 
encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the other. 182 
 
As well as its pronouncements on what constituted the customary law on delimitation 
of the continental shelf, the ICJ’s consideration of the meaning of Article 6 CSC 1958 
is also instructive. Importantly, it stated that the application of the “special 
circumstances” exception to the rule of equidistance in Article 6 was “in pursuance” 
of the aim that boundaries should be based on equitable principles.183 As such there 
did not seem to be much of a practical difference, if at all, between “special 
circumstances” and the “relevant circumstances” referred to in the ICJ’s Judgment, 
in that the consideration of either would lead to a boundary drawn on the basis of 
equitable principles. 
The ICJ went on to elaborate upon the kinds of considerations which would 
inform delimitation on the basis of the application of equitable principles. The ICJ 
made clear that there was no legal limit to the considerations which may be taken 
into account in the application of “equitable procedures”, and most of the time it will 
involve the balancing of all such considerations rather than reliance on one to the 
exclusion of all others.184 The ICJ further made clear that the weight to be given to 
different considerations will depend on the case in question.185 Geological and 
geographical factors were identified as relevant, as well as the unity of hydrocarbon 
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deposits.186 Further, a final factor to be taken into account was said to be the 
reasonable degree of proportionality between the extent of the continental shelf 
appertaining to the states concerned, and the lengths of their coastlines, which a 
delimitation based upon equitable principles ought to bring about.187 The ICJ 
Judgment made clear that the fundamental aim of the exercise of delimitation was 
that of an equitable result being arrived at having regard to a large number of relevant 
factors with no single factor preponderating. It is apparent that this approach would 
encourage negotiation and compromise on the basis of its relatively open-ended 
nature, at the expense of certainty.  
The Anglo-French Arbitration (1977) involved the drawing of the continental 
shelf boundary between the UK and France in the English Channel. Both States were 
Parties to the CSC 1958, although France’s accession to CSC 1958 had been subject 
to reservations to Article 6.188 The Arbitral Tribunal found that delimitation in the 
English Channel and the Atlantic region were subject to Article 6, and delimitation 
in the area of the Channel Islands were subject to customary law. The Tribunal stated, 
as had the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969), that in customary 
law the basic principle of delimitation is that, failing agreement, the boundary must 
be determined in accordance with equitable principles.189 However, the Tribunal also 
found that firstly, the application of Article 6, which entailed “special circumstances” 
working in tandem with the equidistance rule, and secondly, the customary law 
principle, both had as their aim a delimitation on the basis of equitable principles.190 
Therefore this meant that there would be very little distinction in the practical results 
of applying each method, as confirmed in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases 
                                                             
186 Para. 94. 
187 Para. 98. 
188 Para. 33 of the Tribunal’s Decision states that on 14 June 1965 France deposited its instrument of 
accession to CSC 1958 to which was attached a declaration which included the following in respect 
of Article 6: 
   “ARTICLE 6 (paragraphs 1 and 2)  
       In the absence of a specific agreement, the Government of the French Republic will not accept 
that any boundary of the continental shelf determined by application of the principle of equidistance 
shall be invoked against it: 
      -if such boundary is calculated from baselines established after 29 April 1958; 
       -if it extends beyond the 200-metre isobath; 
       -if it lies in areas where, in the Government's opinion, there are "special circumstances" within 
the meaning of article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, that is to say: the Bay of Biscay, the Bay of Granville, 
and the sea areas of the Straits of Dover and of the North Sea off the French coast.” 
189 Para. 82.  
190 Paras. 65, 70. 
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(1969). Again, on this basis, there is no apparent distinction between “special 
circumstances” and “relevant circumstances” in any practical sense. It is also clear 
from the case law that the relevant circumstances which may adjust a provisional line 
are applicable whichever method of delimitation is utilised. 
The notion of delimitation being one that should lead to an equitable result, is 
found in Articles 83(1) and 74(1) LOSC 1982 (dealing with delimitation of the 
continental shelf and EEZ respectively). The articles make no reference to 
equidistance, but specifically to achieving an “equitable solution”. The approach of 
utilizing the application of equitable principles, taking into account relevant 
circumstances to arrive at an equitable result was also reiterated in cases between 
1982-1992, namely Tunisia v Libya (1982),191 Gulf of Maine (1984), Libya v Malta 
(1985), Guinea/Guinea-Bissau (1985), and St Pierre and Miquelon  (1992). During 
the period of time in which these cases were heard, it may be said that Articles 83(1) 
and 74(1) LOSC 1982 with their focus on the “equitable solution”, began to exert 
their influence. The focus on equitable principles in order to arrive at an equitable 
result is an approach which has no fixed method, and is characterised by flexibility 
instead of a focus on predictability.192 Such an approach is reminiscent of the Truman 
Proclamation 1945 which stated that the delimitation of the continental shelf shall be 
determined “in accordance with equitable principles”.  As part of such an approach 
in the case law, equidistance is rejected as a mandatory approach. 
 
Case law 1993 – 2007 
 
By way of contrast, following on from these earlier cases, there was a discernible 
shift in the case law from 1993 onwards, in the form of the rise of what Evans refers 
to as the “primacy” of equidistance as a method of delimitation.193  
                                                             
191 [1982] ICJ Rep 18. 
192 Y. Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation (Hart, Oxford, 2006 
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The International Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) pp. 202-204.  
193 M.D. Evans, “Maritime Boundary Delimitation” in D.R. Rothwell, A.G. Oude Elferink, T. Scott, 
and T. Stephens, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2015), p. 254 at p. 276. A discussion of this shift in the case law is undertaken by Tanaka (2006), for 
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This development began with Greenland and Jan Mayen (1993).194 This case 
involved delimitation of the continental shelf and also the fishery zones between the 
Parties in relation to Greenland and Jan Mayen Island.195 The ICJ stated that “[p]rima 
facie, a median line delimitation between opposite coasts results in general in an 
equitable solution”196 and that an equidistance line is adjusted in the light of the 
“relevant circumstances” of customary law, which are similar to the “special 
circumstances” of Article 6 CSC 1958.197 Therefore the approach of using as a 
starting point an equidistance line and then considering if it needed to be adjusted by 
relevant circumstances, was applied as customary law for the first time. As such, the 
equidistance line was recognized as customary law for the first time in respect of 
opposite coasts. This equation between Article 6 CSC and customary law was what 
the ICJ had originally so clearly rejected in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases 
(1969). In Greenland v Jan Mayen (1993), when delimiting the fishing zone 
boundary, the ICJ applied customary law, which it said had the same effect as the 
provisions of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) LOSC 1982.198 
The second stage of the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (1999) affirmed the position 
in the Greenland v Jan Mayen (1993) case that equidistance results generally in an 
equitable solution, subject to adjustments in the light of “relevant circumstances”.199 
In that case, the Tribunal took “as its starting point, as its fundamental point of 
departure, that, as between opposite coasts, a median line obtains”.200 The Tribunal 
considered that, despite Eritrea not being a party to LOSC 1982, it had in the 
Arbitration Agreement accepted the application of provisions of LOSC 1982 which 
were relevant to the delimitation. 201 Clearly such provisions would include Articles 
                                                             
example, pp.119-126, 353-5, and (2012), pp. 202-209, where he states, for example at p. 205, that a 
feature of this phase in the case law was the “corrective-equity” approach whereby “the equidistance 
method is incorporated into the domain of customary law”.  See also Tanaka, “Reflections on 
Maritime Delimitation in the Cameroon/Nigeria case” (2004) 53 ICLQ 369, at pp. 381-388. F. 
Olorundami, in “The ICJ and its Lip Service to the Non-Priority Status of the Equidistance Method of 
Delimitation”, (2015) 4(1), Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 53, at p. 72 
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194 [1993] ICJ Rep 38. 
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74 and 83.  The Tribunal went on to state that there was no reference in the Arbitration 
Agreement to the customary law of the sea, “but many of the relevant elements of 
customary law are incorporated in the provisions of the Convention”. 202 It was 
further confirmed by the Tribunal that the equidistance line was part of customary 
law as follows: 
 
It is a generally accepted view as evidenced in writings of commentators and 
in the jurisprudence, that between coasts that are opposite to each other the 
median or equidistance line normally provides an equitable boundary in 
accordance with the requirements of the Convention, and in particular those of 
its articles 74 and 83…203 
 
The Tribunal in the event decided on a single maritime boundary which was an 
equidistance line mostly between the mainland coasts of the Parties.  
The approach where the equidistance line was considered as a provisional 
starting-point, although it was not always finally adopted, was demonstrated in Qatar 
v Bahrain (2001),204 Cameroon v Nigeria (Equatorial Guinea Intervening) (2002),205 
Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration (2006),206 Guyana/Suriname Arbitration 
(2007),207 and Nicaragua v Honduras (2007).208 This approach has been stated 
specifically to be in furtherance of Articles 74 and 83 LOSC 1982.209 As such, there 
may be said to be a parallel between the application of these provisions, which 
effectively constitute the application of customary international law, and the 
equidistance/special circumstances rule in Article 6 CSC 1958.210  
                                                             
202 Para. 130. The Convention referred is LOSC 1982. 
203 Para. 131. 
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210 At the time of writing, there are four pending cases which may shed yet further light on the latest 
direction which case law discussed in this chapter is taking. Firstly, proceedings were instituted on 25 
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Case Law 2009 – present 
 
The case of Romania v Ukraine (2009) has been seen as a milestone in the form of the 
ICJ’s attempt to impose a systematic approach by way of a three stage method which 
gives prime importance to the equidistance line in the delimitation of the continental 
shelf or exclusive economic zones, or to draw a single delimitation line.211  This was 
the first time that a three stage test had been formulated, it being apparent since the 
Greenland v Jan Mayen (1993) case that there had effectively been a two stage test 
with the third stage effectively being incorporated into the second stage.212 The first 
stage is to draw an equidistance line as a provisional line. The ICJ clearly stated that 
in the case of opposite coasts this “will” be the provisional line drawn, and in the 
case of adjacent states this “will” also be the provisional line drawn “unless there are 
compelling reasons that make this unfeasible in the particular case”.213  Invoking 
Articles 74 and 83 of LOSC 1982 and observing that the course of the final line 
should result in an equitable solution, the ICJ stated that the second stage is to 
“consider whether there are factors calling for the adjustment or shifting of the 
provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result.” 214 The third 
stage is to:  
 
verify that the line (a provisional equidistance line which may or may not have been 
adjusted by taking into account the relevant circumstances) does not, as it stands, 
lead to an inequitable result by reason of any marked disproportion between the ratio 
of the respective coastal lengths and the ratio between the relevant maritime area of 
each State by reference to the delimitation line…A final check for an equitable 
                                                             
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2 (accessed 26 June 2016). Thirdly, pending before the 
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outcome entails a confirmation that no great disproportionality of maritime areas is 
evident by comparison to the ratio of coastal lengths.215 
 
The ICJ confirmed that this should not be taken to mean that these respective areas 
should be proportionate to coastal lengths and referred to its previous observation in 
Jan Mayen (1993) where it stated that “the sharing out of the area is therefore the 
consequence of the delimitation, not vice versa”. 216 This confirms that the test is one 
of “marked disproportion” or “great disproportion” rather than proportionality 
between the respective coastal lengths and the relevant maritime area of each state.  
The Romania v Ukraine (2009) case at the time of the judgment, gave a clear 
indication that a degree of certainty was being sought and imposed. When called 
upon to delimit the continental shelf or exclusive economic zones, or to draw a single 
delimitation line, the Court proceeds in defined stages. The obvious question at the 
time was whether the importance afforded to the provisional equidistance line would 
continue. Unfortunately it is not clear that thisis the case in the subsequent decisions 
of the ICJ and tribunals.  The application of the equidistance line in these later 
decisions bears further examination in order to evaluate its continued significance. 
This is relevant to the aims of this thesis, because in later chapters, an evaluation will 
be carried out of the use of equidistance in Gulf state practice, and what parallels can 
be drawn between Gulf state practice and the more general international law usage 
of the principle.  
The next case that followed Romania v Ukraine (2009) was the first maritime 
boundary delimitation case heard by ITLOS, Bangladesh v Myanmar (2012).218 
Churchill has observed that this case followed the approach of previous cases 
delimitating the single maritime boundary, stating that “fears that involving yet 
another tribunal in maritime boundary delimitation risks fragmenting the 
international jurisprudence should have been allayed by this case”.219 In this regard, 
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it is important to note that ITLOS endorsed and adopted the three-stage test utilised 
by the ICJ in Romania v Ukraine  (2009) However, a closer examination of 
Bangladesh v Myanmar (2012) also suggests other forces at work. Evans has 
observed that while ITLOS endorsed the three stage test, it emphasised the 
importance of an equitable solution.220 Therefore, while ITLOS declared that it would 
use the three stage test, it stated as follows: 
The Tribunal observes that the issue of which method should be followed in drawing 
the maritime delimitation line should be considered in light of the circumstances of 
each case. The goal of achieving an equitable result must be the paramount 
consideration guiding the action of the Tribunal in this connection.221  
 
In the event, ITLOS commenced its delimitation with equidistance as a starting point, 
using basepoints selected by it. When it came to considering whether to adjust the 
line in light of  relevant circumstances it did so to take into account the concavity of 
the shape of Bangaladesh’s coastline, which resulted in adjustment at a particular 
point (point 11 on Map 2) where the equidistance line begins to cut the southward 
projection of Bangladesh’s coast.222  It did not excape the attention of ITLOS itself 
or that of commentators that the direction of the adjusted provisional equidistance 
line which ITLOS finally decided upon  “not differ substantially from a geodetic line 
starting at an azimuth of 215°” which was the line argued for by Bangladesh.223 The 
final delimitation line was in reality the same as an angle-bisector line.224 
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The ICJ in Nicaragua v Colombia (2012) 225 and Peru v Chile (2014) 227 also 
endorsed and followed the three stage test, alhough again, the actual resulting line 
drawn makes it unclear what the importance of equidistance actually is as a matter of 
practical reality in what Evans refers to as the “ ‘backtracking’ from the high water 
mark of equidistance” in Romania v Ukraine (2009), resulting in an indication that 
once again, despite the outward invocation of the three stage test, the need for an 
equitable solution may be coming to the fore as the most important consideration. 228    
 The Bangladesh v India (2014) case decided by arbitration pursuant to 
the procedure in Annex VII of LOSC 1982 arguably continues the trend since 
Romania v Ukraine [2009] in casting doubt upon the importance which equidistance 
has in delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ.229 Once more, “an equitable 
result” is stated to be the “paramount objective” of the delimitation process.230 Once 
again, as in the Bangladesh v Myanmar (2012) case, the provisional equidistance line 
was adjusted as a result of the concavity of Banglandesh’s coastline, and the result 
was a geodetic line.231 While the argument may be made that the status quo set down 
by the three stage test was being followed, the adjustment made to the provisional 
line following the relevant circumstances of Bangladesh’s concave coast means that 
in reality the resulting lines are so far removed from equidistance as to undermine 
the application of the principle.232 In Bangladesh/India (2014), the provisional 
equidistance line was departed from to such a great extent that, as Evans states, “[I]t 
is, in consequence, difficult to see why the provisional line was drawn at all, as it 
does not seem to have had any practical impact on the outcome”.233 As such, 
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according to Evans, equity “may be re-emerging as the dominant approach, though 
couched in the language of equidistance.” 234 
On a different, yet interesting point, in Bangladesh v India (2014) the tribunal 
did not accept that basepoints located on low-tide elevations should be used for 
delimitation. Rather, the tribunal decided that these should be located on the low 
water line of the parties’ coastlines.235 This has relevance for delimitation in the Gulf 
which is characterised by numerous low elevations. 
The indication of this most recent leaning towards the equitable solution in the 
most recent case law, which is reminiscent of the earlier cases referred to above 
where an equitable result was the primary concern, is of interest in this thesis. An 
important question is whether such an indication can be identified in the Gulf State 
practice.  
 
Equitable principles 
 
It is not intended to deal with the issue of equitable principles in any detail in this 
chapter, although it is important to touch upon it as an aid to clarifying the approach 
of the case law which in turn will help focus the analysis for the purpose of this thesis.   
Equitable principles were developed in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases 
(1969) and in the subsequent case law. They are distinct from both practical methods 
of delimitation, which have been referred to above, and from relevant circumstances 
which are dealt with later in this chapter.240 It is useful to set out here the main 
examples of what have been identified in the cases as equitable principles or criteria 
in the case law. The equitableness of equitable criteria has been said in the case law 
to depend on the individual case. The most often cited in the case law are:  i) the land 
dominates the sea;241 ii) whenever possible, there should be the prevention or 
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240 Gulf of Maine (1984) made the distinction between methods of delimitation and “equitable 
criteria”, see paras. 114 and 159.  
241 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969), para. 96; Gulf of Maine (1984) para.157. 
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limitation of any cut-off of the seaward projection of the coast of either party to the 
dispute;242 iii) whenever possible, the seaward extension of a state’s coast should not 
encroach on the natural prolongation of the other, or areas too close to the coast of 
the other state;243 and iv) where there are no special/relevant circumstances, an 
equitable solution is the equal division of the areas of overlap of the zones 
appertaining to each state.244 
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law asserts that such equitable 
principles “have a normative character as a part of general international law”. 245 
However, it is difficult to justify such a statement. This is on the basis that they are 
only ever one part of the overall approach which was made up of a number of factors. 
Additionally, the substantive content of equitable principles has been the subject of 
much academic debate.246 Furthermore, the rise of equidistance as the starting point 
of delimitation, may be said to have lessened in significance the notion of equitable 
principles so that any normative character that they might have had may well be 
subsumed within other considerations which are easier to identify, such as the 
application of relevant circumstances. In this regard, it is of interest to note Evans’ 
recent and significant consideration of the elements of what may be said to be the 
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“process” of maritime delimitation, as confirmed by most recent case law.247 In so 
doing, he refers to the first element of the process, namely the identification of 
relevant coasts and areas, and then secondly, to the identification of the method of 
delimitation, and in this respect, equidistance will be the provisional starting point 
unless there are compelling reasons not to do so. The third element is deciding 
whether or not to adjust the provisional line on the basis of special or relevant 
circumstances. It is at this point in his discussion that he refers to “geographic” 
factors which may be relevant, “three of which have become particularly important” 
stating that: 
 
The first is one of the most long established factors - described in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases as an ‘equitable principle’ - that delimitation must be 
conducted ‘without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory 
of the other’, subsequently understood in terms of there being no ‘cut off’…The 
second factor, which has come to carry great weight, is whether there is any 
significant disparity in the ratio between the ration between the lengths of the 
relevant coasts of the parties.248 
 
Thus, the equitable principles referred to above are subsumed within the category of 
relevant circumstances as  “geographic” factors. This approach is another support for 
the erosion of the significance of “equitable principles” as a separate body of norms. 
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Relevant circumstances referred to in the case law 249 
 
i. The land boundary between adjacent states 
 
In the Tunisia/Libya (1982) case, the continental shelf boundary line decided upon 
by the ICJ was one which was drawn perpendicular to the coast rather than an 
equidistance line. The undisputed land frontier established by a Convention of 1910 
was held to be a relevant circumstance in the absence of any agreement on the 
delimitation of any maritime zones which could have been of assistance in deciding 
upon the continental shelf delimitation boundary.250 The ICJ also considered the 1910 
Convention itself to be a relevant circumstance for the delimitation of the continental 
shelf between the Parties.251 Both Parties agreed in recognising the relevance of the 
land boundary starting point, reinforcing Ras Ajdir on the coast as a basic point of 
reference.252 That relevance was underlined by the fact that both Parties had used it 
as a starting point in past attempts to unilaterally establish partial maritime 
delimitations.253 In the case of Guinea/Guinea Bissau (1985), the Tribunal referred 
to the ICJ’s approach in Tunisia/Libya with approval and concluded that the land 
boundary between the two adjacent African states, and the continuation of that 
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circumstances” is associated with customary international law which continues to be applicable 
pursuant to the provisions in LOSC 1982 dealing with delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ.  
It is contended here that there is no substantive difference between “special” and “relevant” 
circumstances.  However, this issue has been the subject of some consideration. For example, R.R. 
Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd  ed., Juris Publishing, Manchester University Press, 
1999) at pp. 187-8 state that “ ‘[s]pecial circumstances’ have traditionally been regarded as being 
fairly narrow in scope: for example, the principal drafters of article 6, the International Law 
Commission, considered ‘special circumstances’ as embracing (and apparently being limited to) 
exceptional configurations of the coast, and the presence of islands and navigable channels. ‘Relevant 
circumstances’, on the other hand, have been regarded as being much wider in scope; indeed in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases the International Court suggested that there was no limit to the kind 
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boundary into the sea, known as the ‘southern limit’, was an important relevant 
circumstance to be taken into account. 254  
 
ii. Previous conduct of the parties in relation to purported maritime limits 
 
In the Tunisia/Libya (1982) case, the ICJ noted a de facto delimitation line which had 
historically existed prior to both Parties obtaining independence and which had been 
relied upon by both Parties in their subsequent boundary-related activity. In 1913, 
Italy had proposed a delimitation line between Libyan and Tunisian sponge-banks, 
drawn perpendicularly to what was considered to be the direction of the coastline at 
Ras Ajdir. This was developed more formally by Italy in 1919 as a maritime border 
between Tunisia and Tripolitania, using “the line perpendicular to the coast at the 
border point, which is, in this case, the approximate bearing north-north-east from 
Ras Ajdir”.255 The ICJ specifically identified as a relevant circumstance the fact that 
there existed a de facto maritime delimitation line from Ras Ajdir:   
 
which was the result of the manner in which both Parties initially granted 
concessions for offshore exploration and exploitation of oil and gas. This line of 
adjoining concessions, which was tacitly respected for a number of years, and 
which approximately corresponds furthermore to the line perpendicular to the coast 
at the frontier point which had in the past been observed as a de facto maritime 
limit, does appear to the Court to constitute a circumstance of great relevance for 
the delimitation.256 
 
Thus the lines established by the Parties for delimiting boundaries of petroleum 
concessions were relevant. 
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iii. Geographical factors 
 
a. A change in the direction of the relevant coastline 
 
In the Tunisia/Libya (1982) case, delimitation of the continental shelf between the 
states was held to be by way of a line perpendicular to the coast rather than an 
equidistance line, the ICJ stating that equidistance was not mandatory and had no 
privileged status.257  The Tunisian coast westward from the land boundary with Libya 
initially runs approximately in the same direction as Libya’s, but then changes 
direction so as to run approximately in a south-west/north-east direction. The change 
in direction in Tunisia’s coast was held to be a relevant circumstance which had an 
effect on the course of the second sector of the boundary line, causing it also to 
change direction accordingly.258 
In the Gulf of Maine case (1984) it was confirmed that a change in the 
relationship between the coasts of two states which changes from one of adjacency 
to being opposite to each other, might be one of the “special circumstances” 
contemplated by Article 6 CSC 1958. In that case it was noted that inside the Gulf of 
Maine, the US and Canada are adjacent to each other. However, on approaching the 
opening of the Gulf, the relationship between them changes to one of opposition, this 
change being a factor to be taken into account when drawing the delimitation line at 
that point.  
 
b. A concave coastline 
 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969), a main physical feature was 
Germany’s concave coastline. However, the ICJ, having decided that equidistance 
was not a part of customary international law, found that it was unnecessary to decide 
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whether the configuration of the German North Sea coast was a “special 
circumstance” either under Article 6 CSC 1958 or under any rule of customary law. 
Therefore, the ICJ declined to hold that a concave coastline was a special 
circumstance.259  However, a concave or convex coastline, and other coastline 
irregularities, whilst not described specifically as “special circumstances” in the legal 
sense, were stated to be geographical circumstances which, if equidistance was 
applied, would lead to inequity.260 More recently, in both Bangladesh v Myanmar 
(2012) and Bangladesh v India (2014), Bangladesh’s concave coastline was viewed 
as a relevant circumstance which required adjustment of the provisional equidistance 
line.261 
 
c. Islands, uninhabited rocks, and low-tide elevations 
 
In the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977), when delimiting the boundary between the 
UK and France, there were two main sectors of the line to decide upon. Firstly, that 
falling within the English Channel, and secondly, that extending outwards into the 
Atlantic.  
In the first sector, where customary law, and not Article 6 CSC 1958 was 
applicable, the tribunal had to decide upon the impact which the Channel Islands was 
to have on the equidistance line.  The question was whether they were a relevant 
circumstance which would justify a departure from the equidistance line. They are 
positioned closer to France than the UK, and although they are not constitutionally 
part of the UK, the Tribunal treated them as islands possessed by the UK.262 They lie 
within 12 miles of the French coast.263  The “size and importance” of the Channel 
Islands were factors to be taken into account “in balancing the equities” in the 
region.264  The Tribunal decided that giving the Channel Islands their full effect in 
delimiting the equidistance line (which was agreed by the Parties to be an appropriate 
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line if the Channel Islands did not exist) would lead to inequity in reducing the area 
of continental shelf appertaining to France, and decided that, if Article 6 CSC 1958 
had been applicable, they would constitute a “special circumstance” within that 
provision.265  A two part solution was found by the tribunal. Firstly, an equidistance 
line disregarding the Channel Islands was used, and secondly a semi enclave was 
created around the Channel Islands from the baselines of their territorial sea. These 
were 12nm enclaves, incorporating 3nm of territorial sea and 9nm of continental shelf 
and EFZ.266 Thus their maritime belts were demarcated from that the southern limit 
of France’s continental shelf in that location.  
In the second sector, in the Atlantic region, where Article 6 CSC 1958 did 
apply, each State had islands which required consideration: the UK’s Scilly Islands, 
and France’s Island of Ushant, both extending outwards from each State’s coast into 
the Atlantic Ocean. The Scilly Isles extend further westwards than the Island of 
Ushant, and the effect of the location of the Scilly Isles would be to deflect an 
equidistance line more south-westerly than if such a line was drawn from the baseline 
of the UK mainland. The result of that would be that more continental shelf would 
appertain to the UK. The Tribunal therefore decided that the position of the Scilly 
Isles was a “special circumstance” as it created a distorting effect on the equidistance 
line.267 The solution was to modify the equidistance line by taking account of the 
Scilly Isles, but to give them less than full effect and they were in fact given only half 
effect.268 This was achieved by firstly drawing a line equidistant between the two 
coasts without the use of the islands as a basepoint, and secondly drawing an 
equidistance line using the islands as basepoints. A boundary giving half effect to the 
islands was then the line drawn mid-way between those two equidistance lines. 
Islands may in fact sometimes not be treated as a special or relevant 
circumstance. Taking the Eddystone Rock in the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977), 
the Tribunal declined to decide on whether it in fact was an island (a matter of dispute 
between the Parties), but decided that it would form a relevant basepoint for the 
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equidistance line, and so it was not treated as a relevant circumstance which had the 
effect of modifying its course.269   
In Tunisia/Libya (1982), the ICJ held that the Kerkennah Islands and 
surrounding low-tide elevations were relevant circumstances. The Islands were given 
“half-effect”. Similarly, in Gulf of Maine (1984) the Chamber considered Canada’s 
Seal Island and gave it half effect when deciding upon the location of the equidistance 
line in the second segment. 270  
In North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969), the ICJ warned against seeking                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
to draw a perfectly equidistant line taking into account all coastal features, stating 
that no account need to be taken of “islets, rocks and minor coastal projections, the 
disproportionally distorting effect of which can be eliminated by other means”. 271 In 
Gulf of Maine (1984), the Chamber referred to the potential disadvantages in a 
method which takes tiny islands, uninhabited rocks or low-tide elevations as 
basepoints for the drawing of a line intended to effect an equal division of a given 
area. Indeed one reason which the Chamber gave for discounting an equidistance line 
for the first segment of the boundary was the fact that the end result would likely be:  
a line all of whose basepoints would be located on a handful of isolated rocks, some 
very distant from the coast, or on a few low-tide elevations: these are the very type 
of minor geographical features which, as the Court and the Chamber have 
emphasized, should be discounted if it is desired that a delimitation line should 
result so far as feasible in an equal division of the areas in which the respective 
maritime projections of the countries’ coasts overlap.272 
  
The fact that not all islands will be viewed as a relevant circumstance, was 
demonstrated in Bangladesh v Myanmar (2012) in respect of Bangladesh’s St 
Martin’s Island. ITLOS stated that  
 
the effect to be given to an island in the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf depends on the geographic 
realities and the circumstances of the specific case. There is no general rule in this 
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respect. 273 
 
Particular features of St Martin Island’s location are that it is located approximately 
4.5nm from Myanmar’s mainland coast in the territorial seas of both states. In the 
event it was not permitted to have an an effect on the single continental shelf and EEZ 
boundary because, due to its location, giving effect to it would result in a boundary 
line blocking the seaward projection from Myanmar’s coast causing an “unwarranted 
distortion” of the line. It was therefore not treated as a relevant circumstance.274 
 
d. A quasi-enclosed sea 
 
As demonstrated in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969), the North Sea is a 
location where several states’ claims to the continental shelf converge.275 This feature 
of the North Sea was elaborated upon in the Separate Opinion of Judge Rivero who 
referred to the North Sea as a “quasi-enclosed sea” which was a “special geographical 
configuration” resulting in the need for the adoption of a system of converging 
delimitation lines.276 Further, Judge Nervo in his Separate Opinion described the 
North Sea as an “internal sea” for practical purposes in the sense that while there 
were some outlets to the ocean, the North Sea is bordered almost along its entire edge 
by coastal states. Moreover, the bed of the North Sea is a single continental shelf in 
which the continental shelves of the coastal states overlap and indeed converge so 
that the end-point or boundary of the continental shelf of each state touches the 
continental shelf of the opposite states on the other side of the Sea.  Judge Nervo 
concluded that, in his opinion, the nature of the North Sea as an “internal” sea meant 
that special circumstances existed which justified deviation from the equidistance 
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line, and this was because an internal sea was not contemplated by Article 6 CSC 
1958.277  The Gulf can clearly also be described as a quasi-enclosed sea with a single 
continental shelf. 278 However, it is of note that in Romania v Ukraine (2009), the 
enclosed nature of the Black Sea did not call for an adjustment to the provisional 
equidistance line. 279 
 
e. A marked difference in the lengths of the relevant coastlines and the concept 
of proportionality 
 
As a concept, proportionality has featured heavily in the cases since the Judgment of 
the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969). There the ICJ referred to 
reasonable proportionality as a factor to take into account when establishing a 
boundary line according to equitable principles, referring to proportionality between 
the extent of the continental shelf appertaining to each state, and the lengths of the 
relevant coastlines of the parties.280 The Tribunal in the Anglo-French Arbitration 
(1977) confirmed this approach, stating that proportionality is an element in the 
appreciation of the appropriateness of equidistance or any other method of 
delimitation.281 In other words, it is a factor in the choice of the delimitation method. 
It further stated that proportionality is a factor to be taken into account in two ways: 
firstly, in assessing the ratio of the continental shelf appertaining to each state, to 
their coastlines, and secondly, to determine the equitable or inequitable effects of 
particular geographical features on the course of an equidistance line.282   
In Tunisia/Libya (1982), the ICJ agreed that such proportionality is indeed 
required by and follows from the fundamental principle of ensuring an equitable 
delimitation between the States concerned. The ICJ noted that the length of the coast 
of Libya from Ras Tajoura to Ras Ajdir, without taking account of small inlets, creeks 
and lagoons, is approximately 185 kilometres; the length of the coast of Tunisia from 
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Ras Ajdir to Ras Kaboudia, measured in a similar way, and treating the island of 
Jerba as though it were a promontory, is approximately 420 kilometres. Thus the 
relevant coastline of Libya stands in the proportion of approximately 31:69 to the 
relevant coastline of Tunisia. It noted further that the coastal front of Libya, 
represented by a straight line drawn from Ras Tajoura to Ras Ajdir, stands in the 
proportion of approximately 34:66 to the sum of the two Tunisian coastal fronts 
represented by a straight line drawn from Ras Kaboudia to the most westerly point 
of the Gulf of Gabes, and a second straight line from that point to Ras Ajdir. With 
regard to sea-bed areas, it noted that the areas within the area relevant for delimitation 
appertaining to each State following the method indicated by the ICJ stand to each 
other in approximately the proportion  Libya 40:Tunisia 60. This result, taking into 
account all the relevant circumstances, seemed to the ICJ to meet the requirements 
of the test of proportionality as an aspect of equity.283 The ICJ listed proportionality 
amongst the other relevant circumstances to be taken into account in achieving an 
equitable delimitation.  
In Libya/Malta (1985) the ICJ noted the “considerable disparity” between the 
lengths of the coasts of Malta and Libya, and stated that this “constitutes a relevant 
circumstance which should be reflected in the drawing of the delimitation line”.284 
The ICJ drew a distinction between the two aspects of proportionality highlighted in 
the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977). Firstly, on the one hand, the length of the 
parties’ coasts was a factor to be taken into account as part of the process of 
delimitation, and secondly, the test of a reasonable degree of proportionality is one 
which can be applied to check the equitableness of a delimitation line. On the facts 
of the case before it, the ICJ found that the difference in the coastal lengths was: 
 
so great as to justify the adjustment of the median line so as to attribute a larger 
shelf  to Libya; the degree of such adjustment does not depend upon a 
mathematical operation ….285   
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In Gulf of Maine (1984), the difference in the coastal lengths of the Parties in the 
Gulf of Maine was a “special circumstance” to be taken into account leading to a 
correction of equidistance, as part of the concept of proportionality between the 
continental shelf area attributed to each state party by the delimitation, and the 
lengths of their respective coastlines.286 However, the comparison of the coastal 
lengths was not used as a final test to check the result.  On drawing a closing line 
across the Gulf, it was clear that the only part belonging to Canada was the short right 
side, whereas both the other short side and the long side at the back of the rectangle 
belonged to the US This “special circumstance” was a factor which justified the 
correction of an equidistance line in terms of adjusting its location.  
The Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case (1984) stated that proportionality was 
neither an autonomous criterion nor a method of delimitation. 287  It described it as 
an “auxiliary criterion”.288 It did not define this, but it was interpreted by the Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judges in Libya/Malta (1985) as meaning: 
  
a criterion like any other, but it is not an autonomous one, in the sense that the 
delimitation operation should not be guided by it as a criterion independent of 
any other, whereas it should in fact be combined with other criteria.289 
 
Thus proportionality is a relevant factor among others. 290 Disproportionality may 
result from particular geographical features.   
In Libya/Malta (1985) the ICJ drew a distinction between taking account of a 
difference in the length of coastlines between states during the delimitation process 
in order to achieve an equitable boundary and making an ex post check using the test 
of proportionality to check the equitableness of the proposed result. Defining the 
difference between the coastal lengths in quantitative terms (such as by a ratio) is 
suited to this ex post assessment, operating as a final check on the equitableness of 
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287 Para. 218. 
288 Para. 218. 
289 Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Ruda, Bedjaoui, Jiménez De Aréchaga, para. 29. 
290 Guinea/Guinea Bissau (1985) at para. 120 also referred to the rule of proportionality between states’ 
coastlines and the area of continental shelf to be attributed to them as one factor amongst other 
circumstances to be taken into account in order to effect a delimitation. In that case, the general 
comparability of the Parties’ coasts was viewed as a relevant circumstance.  
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the line. 291 The ICJ stated that it was appropriate to use it to test the equitability of a 
final solution decided upon. However, in a situation where there were difficulties in 
identifying the relevant coasts a fixed mathematical ratio would not be appropriate 
to assess the relevant coasts and the continental shelf areas generated by them. 
Therefore in that case the ICJ carried out a broad assessment of the equitableness of 
the result, without reducing it to arithmetical terms, and confined itself to observing 
that there was “no evident disproportion”.292 
In Libya/Malta (1985), the ICJ made clear that an improper use of the concept 
of proportionality would be where the ratio of the coastal lengths was of itself 
determinative of the areas of continental shelves properly appertaining to each party, 
noting that if such a use of proportionality were right, “it is difficult indeed to see 
what room would be left for any other consideration”.293 Thus the aim should not be 
to achieve a predetermined ratio between the relevant coasts and the respective 
continental shelf areas.  
There was a marked disparity between the coasts of Canada and the French 
Islands in the St Pierre and Miquelon (1992) Arbitration, the ratio being, according 
to the Tribunal, 15.3:1. The Tribunal stated that the difference in the length of 
relevant coasts was an important factor to take into account for an equitable 
delimitation, in order to avoid disproportionate results, and also subsequently, to test 
the equitableness of the solution finally adopted.  Again, the dual operation of 
proportionality was referred to.294 
In Greenland v Jan Mayen (1993) the great difference in the lengths of the 
relevant coasts of Greenland and Jan Mayen (about 9:1) was found to be one relevant 
circumstance which operated to adjust the provisional median line.  
As is clear from the case law, the relationship between the lengths of the 
parties’ coastlines has been taken into account in three main ways, with the first and 
second being interlinked. Firstly, as a factor which helps to decide which method of 
                                                             
291 Para. 66.  
292 Paras. 74-75.  
293 Para. 58. See also Guinea/Guinea Bissau (1985) where it was stated by the Tribunal that “the rule 
of proportionality is not a mechanical rule based only on figures reflecting the length of the coastline” 
(para. 120). 
294 St Pierre and Miquelon (1992), para. 45. 
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delimitation will be used; secondly, it is viewed as a relevant circumstance, and this 
is somewhat linked with the choice of method; and thirdly it is considered as a test 
of the equitable nature of a provisional line ex post facto. In respect of this third 
consideration, the case law makes clear that it may be unnecessary to reduce the 
relationship between the parties to a mathematical ratio and indeed that this is an 
assessment more appropriately made in the round as a matter of judgment 
considering all the coastal and geographical features in the relevant area. Linked with 
this approach in the cases is the number of potential difficulties in applying a concept 
of proportionality as a final check in this way. For example, how to identify the 
relevant coastline in order to assess its length, how to deal with islands in that 
calculation, and how to objectively assess the disparity between coastlines’ lengths.  
For instance, the ICJ in Libya/Malta (1985) found practical difficulties in identifying 
relevant coasts and areas which rendered it impossible to reduce the differences to a 
mathematical ratio, thus illustrating the flaws in this approach.295   
As discussed earlier in this chapter, in more recent case law the test of 
disproportionality is applied at the third stage of the three stage approach to 
delimitation. This test compares the lengths of the parties’ coastlines with the 
delimited area attributed to the parties at the second stage,  resulting in an ex post 
facto check that the result reached is not inequitable. As such, it is a stage which takes 
place after relevant circumstances have been considered. This is demonstrated for 
example in Bangaldesh v India (2014), Peru v Chile (2014), Bangladesh v Myanmar 
(2012), Nicaragua v Colombia (2012) and Romania v Ukraine (2009). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
iv. Mineral deposits 
 
The ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969) stated that the location of natural 
resources is not really relevant to delimitation, as their existence is more an issue of 
                                                             
295 See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Prosper Weil in St Pierre and Miquelon (1992) at p. 1206, 
para. 24, in which he referred to the uncertainties involved in deciding which are indeed the relevant 
coasts to take into account, and how they are to be measured. He illustrated such vagueness by stating 
that one possible approach to measurement is, for instance, taking every sinuosity of the coast into 
account, while another approach measures in a more simplified and therefore more arbitrary way along 
the general direction of the coast. 
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“eventual exploitation”.296 This is particularly understandable in the context of the case 
itself, where the precise location of the natural resources in question had not yet even 
been fully ascertained. However, the Judgment goes on to state that there is no legal 
limit to the factors states should consider when ensuring that they apply equitable 
procedures to delimitations by agreement, and the process involves a balancing of all 
the considerations which will be different in every case. One such factor is said to be 
the “idea of the unity of any deposits”.297 However, the ICJ stated that it did not 
consider that the unity of a deposit constitutes “anything more than a factual element 
which it is reasonable to take into consideration in the course of negotiations for a 
delimitation”.298 In the common situation where a single deposit lies on both sides of 
a boundary dividing the continental shelf between two states and which can be 
exploited from both sides of the boundary, entailing a risk of “prejudicial or wasteful 
exploitation” by either or both states, agreements for joint exploitation were said to be 
an appropriate solution. Therefore the issue of the unity of a deposit can be dealt with 
by means of agreement for exploitation or apportionment of resources, but was not 
found to be a relevant circumstance as such in respect of delimitation of boundaries.  
Rather, the ICJ referred to natural resources in the continental shelf areas under 
consideration as a factor amongst others to be taken into account when delimiting the 
boundary.  
In Tunisia/Libya (1982) the ICJ stated that “[as] to the presence of oil-wells in 
an area to be delimited, it may, depending on the facts, be an element to be taken into 
account in the process of weighing all relevant factors to achieve an equitable 
result.”299 In the first segment of the boundary line suggested by the court, which was 
perpendicular to the general direction of the coast, the petroleum concession areas of 
the two states were divided. Similarly, the ICJ in Libya/Malta (1985) stated that: 
  
The natural resources of the continental shelf under delimitation "so far as known 
or readily ascertainable" might well constitute relevant circumstances which it 
would be reasonable to take into account in a delimitation, as the Court stated in 
                                                             
296 Para. 17. 
297 Para. 94. 
298 Para. 97. It is important to note the words “in the course of negotiations”, as opposed to it being a 
matter for the adjudication process to take into account.  
299 Para. 107. 
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the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 54, para. 101 (D) 
(2)).300 
 
In the St Pierre and Miquelon (1992) Arbitration the Tribunal noted the interest in 
“potential” hydrocarbon exploitation in areas of overlapping claims between the 
Parties, but there had not yet been any drilling undertaken. Therefore the tribunal found 
“no reason” to consider the potential mineral resources as having a bearing on the 
boundary delimitation. 301 Therefore, like Libya/Malta (1985) the actual, rather than 
hypothetical, presence of resources was an important distinguishing factor in whether 
such resources could constitute relevant circumstances. In Cameroon v Nigeria (2002) 
the ICJ also made clear that the presence of mineral resources in themselves are not 
sufficient to constitute relevant circumstances, and decided that: 
 
oil concessions and oil wells are not in themselves to be considered as relevant 
circumstances justifying the adjustment or shifting of the provisional delimitation 
line. Only if they are based on express or tacit agreement between the parties may 
they be taken into account. 302 
 
It may be concluded from the above that only in very narrow circumstances will the 
presence of mineral resources constitute relevant circumstances to be taken into 
account in delimitation. The approach in Cameroon v Nigeria (2002) was approved 
in Guyana v Suriname (2007), a case in which the Tribunal recognised that there is 
“a marked reluctance of international courts and tribunals to accord significance to 
the oil practice of the parties in the determination of the delimitation line.”303 The 
Tribunal found no evidence of such agreement between the parties before it. The 
Tribunal in Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago (2007) followed the same approach.304 
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301 Para. 89. 
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303 (2007) 139 ILR 566, para. 390. 
304 (2006) 45 ILM 798, para. 364. 
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v. General economic considerations, fisheries, landmass, security and 
navigation  
 
In Tunisia/Libya (1982) Tunisia argued economic considerations should be taken into 
account, namely the poverty of its natural resources in comparison with those of Libya, 
as well as its historic rights. Libya argued that the presence or absence of oil or gas in 
the oil wells in the continental shelf areas appertaining to either Party should play an 
important part in the delimitation process.305 The ICJ rejected that such economic 
factors were relevant for the delimitation of the continental shelf appertaining to each 
party, stating: 
 
these economic considerations cannot be taken into account for the delimitation 
of the continental shelf appertaining to each Party. They are virtually extraneous 
factors since they are variables which unpredictable national fortune or calamity, 
as the case may be, might at any time cause to tilt the scale one way or the other. 
A country might be poor today and become rich tomorrow as a result of an event 
such as the discovery of a valuable economic resource.306 
 
In Libya/Malta (1985), despite Malta’s arguments based upon disadvantages of its 
economic position and its lack of energy resources, the relative economic strength of 
states was held to be an irrelevant factor in respect of delimitation.307 The ICJ stated 
that: 
 
The Court does not however consider that a delimitation should be influenced by 
the relative economic position of the two States in question, in such a way that 
the area of continental shelf regarded as appertaining to the less rich of the two 
States would be somewhat increased in order to compensate for its inferiority in 
economic resources. Such considerations are totally unrelated to the underlying 
intention of the applicable rules of international law.308 
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306 Para. 107. 
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Having heard the Parties’ arguments relating to their impoverished status in relation to 
theirs lack of resources, the Tribunal in Guinea/Guinea Bissau (1985) decided that 
while both States are developing countries with economic and financial difficulties to 
contend with, it would not be equitable to base a delimitation “on the evaluation of 
data which changes in relation to factors that are sometimes uncertain”.309 The 
Tribunal further stated: 
 
The fact is that the Tribunal does not have the power to compensate for the 
economic inequalities of the States concerned by modifying a delimitation which 
it considers is called for by objective and certain considerations. Neither can it 
take into consideration the fact that economic circumstances may lead to one of 
the Parties being favoured to the detriment of the other where this delimitation is 
concerned.310 
 
In Tunisia/Libya (1982), the ICJ considered Tunisia’s historic fishery rights, stating 
that “[h]istoric titles must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have always been by 
long usage”.311 The ICJ confirmed that in principle Tunisia’s historic fishery rights 
may be relevant for the delimitation decision.312 However, in that case they were held 
not to be a relevant circumstance, because the delimitation line as drawn did not have 
any impact upon those rights as claimed by Tunisia. 
In relation to the third segment of the delimitation line in Gulf of Maine (1984) 
the Chamber considered the Georges Bank, and the claims to its resources by both the 
Parties. Its economic importance to the Parties lay both in the potential resources in its 
subsoil as well as its fisheries resources. The Chamber considered the Parties’ fishery 
interests and other circumstances which related to “human and economic 
geography”313 The Chamber stated that such circumstances are irrelevant as criteria to 
be applied in the delimitation process itself, but may “be relevant to assessment of the 
equitable character of a delimitation first established on the basis of criteria borrowed 
from physical and political geography”.314  The Chamber went on to clarify as follows: 
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310 Para. 123. 
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the respective scale of activities connected with fishing – or navigation, defence 
or, for that matter, petroleum exploration and exploitation – cannot be taken into 
account as a relevant circumstance or, if the term is preferred, as an equitable 
criterion to be applied in determining the delimitation line. What the Chamber 
would regard as a legitimate scruple lies rather in concern lest the overall result, 
even though achieved through the application of equitable criteria and the use of 
appropriate methods for giving them concrete effect, should unexpectedly be 
revealed as radically inequitable, that is to say, as likely to entail catastrophic 
repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of the 
countries concerned.315 
 
Thus according to the Chamber, matters such as fishing or economic factors, 
navigation or defence could be taken into account as a test of the equitableness of the 
result.316 The Chamber did not find such an effect of radical inequity in the case before 
it. The Tribunal in St Pierre and Miquelon (1992) referred to the above passage when 
considering fishing rights and economic well-being, and found that the proposed 
delimitation would not have a “radical impact” or “catastrophic repercussions” upon 
the existing patterns of fishing in the relevant area.317 
In the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (1999), the Parties raised the historical 
importance of fishing for the tribunal to consider. The Tribunal concluded that neither 
Party had demonstrated that the delimitation line proposed by the other would 
“produce a catastrophic or inequitable effect on the fishing activity of its nationals or 
detrimental effects on fishing communities and economic dislocation of its 
nationals”.318 Therefore, the Tribunal considered the Parties’ “general past fishing 
practices”, and the “potential deprivation of fishing areas or access to fishing 
resources, or arising from nutritional other grounds”, and found that they had no effect 
on the delimitation line which it decided upon.319 Another example of this reluctance 
                                                             
315 Para. 237. 
316 For discussion of this aspect, see P. Weil, ‘Geographic Considerations in Maritime Delimitation’, 
in Charney, J.I., and Alexander, L.M., (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht, 1993), Vol I, p. 115, at p. 118, and P. Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation – Reflections 
(Grotius Publications Ltd., Cambridge,1989), at p. 261.  
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is Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago (2006) where the Tribunal did not take into account 
Barbados’ fishing interests when determining the boundary. 320  
A difference in landmass between the states is irrelevant, as was made clear in 
Libya/Malta (1985).321 
In contrast with the previous cases dealing with arguments related to fisheries, 
in Greenland and Jan Mayen (1993), the fishery resources of the area were seen as a 
relevant circumstance which operated to adjust the provisional median line drawn. The 
line was pushed towards Jan Mayen as a result giving Greenland “equitable access to 
the capelin stock”. 322 The difference in treatment may result from the fact that the ICJ 
was delimiting the fisheries zone separately from the continental shelf and therefore 
fishery resources played a far more prominent role. 
It is of particular interest however, that despite the Chamber’s Judgment on the 
relevance of the Parties’ claims to the fishing resources in Gulf of Maine (1984), the 
line which it in eventually drew provided an apportionment of the resources roughly 
in accordance with each party’s established dependence.323 This suggests that 
economic factors may well have played an unstated role in the case. In relation to 
this aspect of the Gulf of Maine (1984) Judge Weil in his dissenting opinion in St 
Pierre and Miquelon (1992) stated that:    
 
It is also obvious that in the Gulf of Maine case fishery resources played a 
decisive role - and one which was moreover admitted in part: for does the 
Judgment not state that the Georges Bank was "the real subject of the dispute ... 
the principal stake in the proceedings, from the viewpoint of the potential 
resources of the subsoil and also, in particular that of fisheries that are of major 
economic importance"? One cannot escape the impression that the socio-
economic factors identified at great length in paragraphs 238 to 241 of the 1984 
Judgment as a means of verifying the result were, very precisely, the factors 
which - without it being said - directly inspired the maritime boundary line… 
One cannot escape the impression that the socio-economic factors identified at 
great length in paragraphs 238 to 241 of the 1984 Judgment as a means of 
verifying the result were, very precisely, the factors which - without it being 
said - directly inspired the maritime boundary line.324 
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324 p. 1211, para. 34. 
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More generally, he stated explicitly what has been discernible only implicitly from 
the case law that: 
 
one cannot, without plunging into artifice and fiction, completely eliminate 
economic and socioeconomic considerations from the balance of equities; this 
would be all the more paradoxical in that exploration for and exploitation of 
resources are at the root of the concepts of continental shelf, fishing zone and 
exclusive economic zone. 325 
 
With regard to the case before him, he referred to the fact that the Parties had shown 
that the fishery resources of the Saint Pierre Bank constituted the main issue which 
had been debated extensively. He stated that:  
 
By confining itself to an a posteriori verification of the absence of "catastrophic 
repercussions" of the delimitation decided on other grounds, the Decision 
(paras. 83 and 84), like the Gulf of Maine Judgment before it, is to some extent 
hiding behind its own shadow.326 
 
It for this reason that Evans is of the view that “the role of economic factors is destined 
to remain a ‘hidden hand’ for some while to come”.327 
In Guinea/Guinea Bissau (1985), the Tribunal also rejected the Parties’ 
arguments relating to security and defence as factors to take into account in respect of 
the boundary delimitation.328 The ICJ also did this in Libya/Malta (1985), although 
stated that security considerations are “not unrelated to the concept of the continental 
shelf”.329 Similarly, both the UK and France in the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977) 
                                                             
325 P. 1211, para. 34. 
326 P.1211, para. 34. 
327 Evans (2015), p. 275. 
328 Paras. 124-5. However, B. Kwiatkowska points to the reality of the decision in Guinea/Guinea 
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interests of Guinea-Bissau and adopted a boundary line that follows the thalweg in its initial section and 
allows for free access through the Orango Channel that the Guinean claim would have cut across.” See 
“Economic and Environmental Consideration in Maritime Boundary Delimitation”, Charney, J.I., and 
Alexander, L.M., (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993), Vol 
I, p. 75, at p. 99.  
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invoked navigational, defence and security interests as relevant equitable 
considerations, but the Tribunal held that they had no decisive influence on the 
boundary. More recently, in Nicaragua and Colombia (2012), the ICJ effectively 
dismissed security concerns as being relevant to delimitation, although in a rather  
general and assuaging statement it did state that  
security concerns might be a relevant consideration if a maritime delimitation was e 
ected particularly near to the coast of a State and the Court will bear this consideration 
in mind in determining what adjustment to make to the provisional median line or in 
what way that line should be shifted.330  
 
It remains to be seen from the case law precisely how and when security interests could 
be used to adjust a provisional equidistance line.  
 
Delimitation of the EEZ/EFZ 
 
There are certain considerations which are pertinent to delimitation of the EFZ/EEZ. 
The main one is that economic factors are far more likely to be relevant.331 This was 
made clear in Greenland v Jan Mayen (1993) when the Chamber took account of the 
need to ensure equitable access to Capelin stocks when determining the EFZ 
boundary.332 Another consideration was articulated by the Chamber in Gulf of Maine 
(1984). It stated that where a line which follows a complicated or zig zag course may 
be appropriate to delimit the continental shelf, and therefore delineate the location for 
states’ exploration of resources attached to the sea bed and subsoil, such a line is less 
appropriate for the delimitation of the waters of an EEZ or EFZ. This is because a more 
constant line is required so that those engaged in fishing do not have to constantly 
check their position in relation to a complicated line. 333 
                                                             
330 [2012]  ICJ Rep 624, para. 222.  
331 This proposition may be said to have its origins in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case [1951] ICJ 
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A further factor to note is that case law has demonstrated that in respect of a 
single maritime boundary, “neutral” factors relevant to both delimitation of the 
continental shelf and EEZ will be necessary in order to operate as relevant 
circumstances. In general, these will be geographical, and not, for example, those 
related to the water column, such as fisheries.  
 
Conclusions in respect of the case law 
 
Firstly, although there is no doctrine of precedent in the case law of the ICJ or the 
International Tribunals, it is possible to say that there are recognizable trends and even 
current general legal principles which may be identified in the case law, particularly 
the most recent case law.  The emergence of recognizable trends is clear despite the 
fact that the body of case law has emanated not only from the ICJ but also from various 
tribunals. Whether there are differences of approach between the different fora is an 
important matter for investigation, but is outside the scope of this study.334 
Secondly, it is apparent that there still remains some fluidity with regard to the 
practical process of effecting a delimitation, and this is seen in the more recent 
emergence of a focus upon the equitable solution. Even where a provisional 
equidistance line has been drawn, this has been heavily departed from in the final 
result, for instance in Bangladesh/India (2014). This trend is a continuation of the 
equidistance versus equitable principles debate, so clearly apparent during UNCLOS 
III and which crippled its negotiations, and which is still apparent today in the case 
law. Thirdly, in line with Articles 74(1) and 83(1) LOSC 1982 an equitable solution 
remains the final aim of delimitation, and this is furthered by the use of the 
equidistance line as the provisional starting point.335  
                                                             
334 The ICJ and Arbitral Tribunals have a different remit. Evans raises the issue of whether this has any 
real impact on the case law and expresses the view that the ICJ’s Judgments are the most authoritative 
and therefore this does have an effect on case law: see M.D. Evans, “Maritime Boundary Delimitation: 
Where Do We Go From Here?” in D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong, The Law of the Sea. Progress 
and Prospects (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), p. 137, at pp.141-143. Nevertheless, this thesis 
suggests that particularly more recent case law has assisted in creating a recognisable body of principles.  
335 For a discussion of the interrelationship between equitable principles and equidistance, and the 
manner in which both concepts compliment each other in the case law, see T. Cottier, Equitable 
Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation. The Quest for Distributive Justice in International 
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Fourthly, in general there is a recognition in the case law that the existence of 
natural resources may be relevant to the process of carrying out delimitation although 
such statements are often heavily qualified, and wider economic considerations are 
in general irrelevant to the delimitation of the continental shelf. It is highly arguable 
that in relation to mineral resources in particular, the case law shows some readiness 
to consider the presence of these relevant for the purposes of effecting a delimitation. 
This aspect is to become of relevance in the later chapters of this thesis.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Law of the Sea in the Gulf: 
National Legislation on Baselines, the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone (the 1930s to the present) 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the national legislation of the Gulf States in relation to baselines, the 
territorial sea and the contiguous zone is examined by state in order that each state 
can be examined separately. Further, observations are made in respect of the 
relationship between each state’s legislation and international law, and the degree of 
conformity with the latter.   
In the following chapter, Chapter 5, the same exercise is undertaken in respect 
of legislation in relation to the continental shelf and the EFZ/EEZ. All relevant 
legislation of the Gulf States known to author has been examined and considered in 
this chapter and the following chapter, in order to provide an evidential basis for the 
eventual conclusions of this study. 
 Below is a table of the years in which the Gulf States issued domestic 
legislation on their maritime zones and delimitation in respect of the Gulf Sea, 
encompassing all maritime zones.336  
 
 
  
 
                                                             
336 This table includes some significant official announcements made through the U.N., although does 
not include Declarations made by states on ratification of the LOSC 1982.  
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Figure 9: Table of years in which Gulf States issued national 
legislation on maritime zone limits and delimitation, including some 
official announcements on legislation 
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Saudi Arabia 
 
Saudi Arabia was the first Gulf state to issue legislation governing the breadth of its 
territorial sea. In Article 2 of the Customs Law of 29 June 1930, a boundary zone 
was established, extending “at the sea coast to a distance of four miles into the sea”.337  
  In Decree No. 6/4/5/3711 of 28 May 1949, defining the territorial 
waters of the Kingdom, the territorial sea was defined as extending for a distance of 
6nm (Article 5), and therefore was increased further from the 4nm legislated for in 
the previous decade.338 Following the 1930 Hague conference, where the majority of 
the states sought a breadth of 3nm, states gradually sought to claim wider territorial 
seas so that at the Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1960, a proposal 
for a 6nm territorial sea (as well as an additional 6nm fishery limit) failed to be 
adopted by only one vote.339 
 Article 9 claims a contiguous zone outside the territorial sea, extending for a 
further distance of 6nm. This zone was said to be for the purpose of ensuring 
compliance with the laws of the Kingdom relating to security, navigations, and fiscal 
matters.  
  Article 1 states that the term “bay” “includes any inlet, lagoon or other arm of 
the sea”. This is clearly quite a broad description and lacks any of the specific detail 
which would eventually form Article 7 TSCZ 1958 and which was repeated almost 
verbatim in LOSC 1958, as referred to in Chapter 2. By way of context, which 
explains the lack of detail, customary international law prior to the existence of the 
first of these conventions did not provide a clear answer to the question of which 
                                                             
337 Referred to in (1951) 1 U.N. Leg. Ser. 89 (Note). However, F.M.J. Al-Muwaled, Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A Study in Political Geography (PhD Thesis, 
University of Durham, 1993) states at p. 68 that the breadth of the territorial sea was first was 
established at 4nm by the 22 July 1932 Fishing and Sea Shells Regulations. 
338 (1951)1 U.N. Leg. Ser. 89. Drafted by the Aramco legal research team. The entire Decree is 
reproduced in H.J. Liebesny, “Legislation on the Sea Bed and Territorial Waters of the Persian Gulf” 
(1950) 4 The ME Journal 94. The 1949 Decree dealing with the territorial sea was eventually revoked 
by the Royal Decree concerning the territorial waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Royal Decree 
No.33 of 16 February1958), at (19701) 5 U.N. Leg. Ser. 114. 
339 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 79.  
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indentation of a coast would constitute a bay, nor also the maximum length of the 
closing line of a bay. Therefore the Saudi position was consistent with this lack of 
specificity in customary international law at the time.  
Article 1 states that the term “island” “includes any islet, reef, rock, bar or 
permanent artificial structure not submerged at lowest low tide”.  This is a far broader 
description than that which was current in customary international law, and which 
eventually found its way into Article 10(1) TSCZ 1958, repeated in Article 121(1) 
LOSC 1982, namely that an island is “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by 
water, which is above water at high tide”. Thus the Saudi version is broad enough to 
include the concept of the low-tide elevation which is defined in the Conventions as 
“a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide 
but submerged at high tide” (Article 11(1) TSCZ 1958, Article 13(1) LOSC 1982). 
The Saudi definition does not draw this distinction. As seen in Chapter 2, the 
distinction is important in international law as there are differing consequences 
pertaining to whether a feature is classified as an island or a low-tide elevation. It is 
also interesting that the term “island” includes a “rock”, which, again, is a separate 
concept which was to emerge in LOSC 1982 with its own distinct features and 
significance.   
Article 1 of the 1949 Saudi Decree refers to a further concept which does not 
appear in the conventions, namely a “shoal” which “denotes an area covered by 
shallow water, a part of which is not submerged at lowest low tide”.  
Article 4 defines the inland waters of the Kingdom as including: (a) the waters 
of bays along the coast; (b) waters above and landward from any shoal not more than 
12nm from the mainland or from a Saudi Arabian island; (c) waters between the 
mainland and a Saudi Arabian island not more than 12nm from the mainland; and (d) 
waters between Saudi Arabian islands not farther apart than 12nm. In combination 
with Article 6, which is dealt with below, these provisions operate to increase the 
area of internal waters.  
Article 6 sets out quite detailed provisions on baselines from which the 
territorial sea was to be measured, in various geographical circumstances. Article 
6(a) states that where the coast of the mainland or an island is fully exposed to the 
open sea, the baseline would be ‘the lowest low-water mark’. This is similar to Iran’s 
position in its Act of 1934, and generally reflective of customary international law at 
the time. What follows in Article 6 is a rather comprehensive set of rules establishing 
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straight baselines.  In the case of a bay, the baseline would be a line drawn “from 
headland to headland across the mouth of a bay” (Article 6(b)). This provision is 
characterized by vagueness in the sense that there is no attempt to establish the 
maximum length of the closing line of a bay, although it will be remembered that 
customary law at the time was affected by the same uncertainty.  Article 6(c) states 
that where a shoal is situated not more than 12nm from the mainland or a Saudi 
Arabian island, the baseline would be drawn from the mainland or the island and 
along the outer edge of the shoal. Article 6(d) states that where a port or harbour 
confronts the open sea, baselines are to be drawn along the seaward side of the 
outermost works of the port or harbour and also between such works.  
Article 6 continues with provisions dealing with straight baselines around 
islands. Where an island is not more than 12nm from the mainland, the baseline is 
made up of lines drawn from the mainland and along the outer shores of the island 
(Article 6(e)).  Article 6(f) states that where there is an island group which may be 
connected by lines not more than 12nm long, of which the island nearest to the 
mainland is not more than 12nm from the mainland, the baselines are those drawn 
from the mainland and along the outer shores of all the islands of the group if the 
islands form a chain, or along the outer shores of the outermost islands of the group 
if the islands do not form a chain. Article 6(g) states that where there is an island 
group which may be connected by lines not more than 12nm of which the island 
nearest to the mainland is more than 12nm from the mainland, the baselines are lines 
drawn along the outer shores of all the islands of the group if the islands form a chain, 
or along the outer shores of the outermost islands of the group if the islands do not 
form a chain.   
Like Iran in its 1934 Act, therefore, Saudi Arabia provided for a system of 
straight baselines before the ICJ Judgement in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case 
(1951), and was influenced by the Norwegian approach to the question which pre-
dated the ICJ decision. However, the effect of such provisions is that potentially very 
wide areas of waters could be classed as internal waters, which in turn could cause 
the outer limit of the territorial sea to extend further out than would otherwise be the 
case. The US State Department issued a formal reservation dated 30 November 1949 
protesting that the Decree breached international law regarding details about internal 
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waters on which the baseline was drawn, as well as the 6nm territorial sea claimed.340  
At this time, both the US and British governments still upheld a 3nm territorial sea. 
However, the US Judge Hudson, acting on behalf of the Arabian American Oil 
Company (Aramco), and advising the Saudi Government, maintained his contention 
that there were many conflicting rulings on this point; in the Gulf the Ottomans had 
declared 6 miles in 1914, and in 1934 Iran had also done so without objection from 
the US Government.341 
Article 8 deals with delimitation of the territorial sea in the event that it 
overlaps with the waters of another state, with the provision that “boundaries will be 
determined by Saudi Arabia in agreement with the State concerned in accordance 
with equitable principles”. At the time, state practice generally made use of the 
equidistance line when it came to delimitation of the territorial sea between states 
with opposite coasts, although with adjacent states, the position was less 
consistent.342 
The Royal Decree of 28 May 1949 was repealed by the Royal Decree 
concerning the Territorial Waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Royal Decree 
No.33) of 16 February 1958.343 The TSCZ 1958 and CSC 1958 were open for 
signature some two months later on 29 April 1958.  
A major new development in the 1958 Decree is that Article 4 increased the 
breadth of the territorial sea to 12nm. This claim of 12nm occurred when a majority 
of states internationally claimed territorial seas of less than 12nm, for example as 
seen in the Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1960. Article 5(a) states 
that the “lowest low-water mark” is the standard baseline as it was in the 1949 
Decree.  
Another major difference is that while in the 1949 Decree, the territorial waters 
were said to include the inland waters, Article 4 of the 1958 Decree specifically 
excludes the inland waters from the territorial sea. The rest of the Decree is largely 
the same as the 1949 Decree, including the provision on delimitation of the territorial 
                                                             
340 , J.C. Wilkinson, Arabia’s Frontiers: The Story of Britain’s Boundary Drawing in the Desert, 
(I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London, 1991, reprinted New York, 1993), p. 242. 
341 Ibid., p. 242. 
342 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 182. 
343 Reproduced in (1970) 15 U.N. Leg. Ser. 114 and published in the Official Gazette (Umm al Qura, 
No. 1706 of 21 February 1958). English text of the Decree provided by the Permanent Mission of 
Saudi Arabia to the U.N. 
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sea being effected by agreement with other states in accordance with equitable 
principles (Article 7 of the 1958 Decree). This is a repetition of the provisions of 
Saudi Arabia’s 1949 Decree on the Territorial Sea, and shows a disinclination to 
mirror Article 12 of TSCZ 1958 which refers to delimitation between two states’ 
territorial sea to be undertaken, failing agreement between the parties, by the 
equidistance line, unless justified by matters of historic title, or other special 
circumstances. Thus “equitable principles” were the benchmark for the delimitation 
of the territorial sea and the continental shelf in 1949, as will be seen in the following 
chapter, as well as for the territorial sea in 1958.  
Despite the emergence of the 1958 Conventions, the vagueness of the 
definitions in Article 1 as identified above in relation to the 1949 Decree on the 
Territorial Sea continued in the 1958 Decree.   Therefore, a bay is extremely widely 
defined as including “any inlet, lagoon or other arm of the sea” and does not have to 
meet the strict requirements in Article 7 TSCZ 1958, such as the indentation will only 
be regarded as a “bay”, if “its area is as large as, or larger than, that of the semicircle 
whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation”. In addition, the 
Saudi legislation does not stipulate the requirement in Article 7(4), (5) TSCZ 1958 
that bay closing lines of not more than 24 miles may constitute baselines. Such 
observations were made by the US Department of State in 1970 of the 1958 Decree, 
finding that ‘[v]irtually all indentations of the coast may be enclosed by bay closing 
lines.’344  
The Saudi definition of island was also analysed by the US Department of State 
which stated the following: 
 
By this definition "drying rocks" or even "rocks awash" qualify as islands which may 
be utilized for the measurement of the territorial sea or drawing straight baselines…a 
"shoal," basically an underwater area, equates with an "island" if the shoal possesses 
one drying rock. 
 
Article 5 sets out the baselines, from which the territorial sea is measured, and in so 
doing, reiterates Article 6 of the Decree of 1949. The observations made above with 
regard to vagueness associated with the drawing of the straight baselines also apply 
to this Decree. Looking more closely at these provisions in the light of international 
                                                             
344 Limits in the Seas, No. 20, “Straight Baselines: Saudi Arabia”, International Boundary Study Series 
A (Office of the Geographer, US, June 8, 1970), pp. 4-5. 
 
 
129 
law in the 1950s, it is possible to analyse how divergent the Saudi legislation is. The 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (1951) had already been decided, the effect of 
which had been incorporated in Article 4 of the TSCZ 1958, yet the 1959 Decree 
merely repeated the 1949 provisions on straight baselines.  
It is useful to compare the Saudi provisions with Article 4 TSCZ 1958 at this 
point (repeated in LOSC 1982). Article 4(1) states that where the coastline is deeply 
indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate 
vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be used. 
There is no suggestion in the Saudi legislation of these pre-requisites. Indeed, the 
Saudi coastline in the Gulf does not at all resemble the very indented coastline of 
Norway, whose straight baselines were held by the ICJ to be consistent with 
customary international law.  Article 4(2) TSCZ 1958 states that the drawing of such 
baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the 
coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to 
the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. There is no equivalent 
Saudi provision.  
Article 4(3) further states that baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-
tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently 
above sea level have been built on them. There is no reference in the Saudi legislation 
to low-tide elevations. There is a reference to an “island” which as we have seen 
previously is defined more widely than in TSCZ 1958 (or LOSC 1982), and there is 
use of the concept of a “shoal”. As has been seen previously, a “shoal” is also defined 
in Article 1 of the 1958 Decree as “an area covered by shallow water, a part of which 
is not submerged at low tide”. This is not in accordance with a “low-tide elevation”, 
defined in Article 11(1) TSCZ 1958 (and also Article 13(1) LOSC 1982) as “a 
naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but 
submerged at high tide”. Therefore a “shoal” may be partly submerged at low tide, 
while a low-tide elevation may not be. The distinction is significant. The Saudi 
Article 5(c) therefore goes further than international law in providing that a straight 
baseline may be drawn from the mainland or an island along the outer edge of the 
shoal where it is not more than 12nm away from them, and as observed by the US 
Department of State, the Decree “permits the use of the outer edge of the shoal and 
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not just the "drying rock" for the limit of the straight baseline/baseline for the 
territorial sea”.345 
 Looking at the concept of the shoal, the standard definition is that “shoals are 
shallow features submerged at all levels at the tide”.346 There is no provision in any 
of the Conventions for shoals to be used as points of the baselines, whether normal 
or straight.347 Even if a “shoal” could be said to be comparable in part to a low-tide 
elevation in the sense of the Conventions, there is no requirement as set out in the 
Conventions that a straight baseline drawn to and from a low-tide elevation is only 
permissible where lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above 
sea level have been built on them or where the drawing of baselines to and from such 
elevations has received general international recognition.  
 Article 5(d) of the Saudi Decree states that where a port or harbour faces the 
open sea, baselines are to be lines drawn along the seaward side of the outermost 
works of the port or harbour and between such works. This is a wider provision than 
Article 8 TSCZ 1958 which states that it is the “outermost permanent harbour works 
which form an integral part of the harbour system [which] shall be regarded as 
forming part of the coast". Article 5 (e) and (f) of the Saudi Decree which correspond 
to Article 6(e) ,(f) of the 1949 Decree have no basis in TSCZ 1958. 
Article 4(3) TSCZ 1958 states that “baselines shall not be drawn to and from-
low tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently 
above sea level have been built on them”. There is no such limitation in the Saudi 
legislation.  Article 4(4) TSCZ 1958 goes on to state that where the method of straight 
baselines is applicable under Article 4(1), account may be taken, in determining 
particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the 
reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage. There is no 
such equivalent Saudi provision. Article 4(5) TSCZ 1958 states that the system of 
straight baselines may not be applied in such a manner as to cut off from the high 
seas the territorial sea of another state. Again, there is no Saudi equivalent.348 Article 
                                                             
345 Ibid., p.5. 
346 Limits in the Seas, No. 61, ‘Straight Baselines: Oman (Hypothetical)’, International Boundary 
Study Series A (the Office of the Geographer, US, June 4, 1975), p. 5. 
347 Article 6 LOSC 1982 provides that in the case of islands situated on atolls or of islands having 
fringing reefs, the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the seaward low-water 
line of the reef, as shown by the appropriate symbol on charts officially recognized by the coastal 
State. These are quite limited circumstances allowing for reefs to be utilized in this way. The Saudi 
legislation does not reflect these limitations. There is no reference to reefs in the TSCZ 1958.  
348 There are no high seas in the Gulf sea.  
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4(6) TSCZ 1958 states that the state must clearly indicate straight baselines on charts 
to which due publicity must be given.349  
As observed by the US Department of State, the Decree allowed for 
“unlimited extension of the inland waters through the use of extended straight 
baselines.”350 Further, it was stated that: 
 
‘If the Saudi decree were rigorously applied, it would appear that, with the 
exception of the Gulf of Aqaba, virtually all of the state coasts would be bordered 
by straight baselines. These would extend from 12 to 20 nautical miles from the 
coast.351  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the width of the internal waters is restricted 
by the limit of 12nm in Article 5(e), (f) and (g) of the 1959 Decree.  
Article 5(2) TSCZ 1958 states that where straight baselines have the effect of 
enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been considered a part of the 
territorial sea or the high  seas, a right of innocent passage, as provided in Article 14-
23 shall exist in those waters. Looking at Article 6 of the 1959 Decree it is stated that 
if the measurement of the territorial sea in accordance with the Decree leaves an area 
of high sea wholly surrounded by the territorial sea and extending not more than 
12nm in any direction, such area shall form part of the territorial sea. Article 6 further 
states that the same rule shall apply to a pronounced pocket of high sea which may 
be wholly enclosed by drawing a single straight line not more than 12nm in length. 
Article 8, as previously provided by Article 9 of the 1949 Decree, claims a 6nm 
contiguous zone to ensure compliance with laws of the Kingdom relating to security, 
navigation, fiscal, and, mentioned for the first time in the 1958 Decree, health 
matters. Article 24 of TSCZ 1958 establishes a 12nm contiguous zone for the purpose 
of exercising control to prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea. Therefore Saudi Arabia’s 
reference to security and navigation go beyond what is provided for in the 1958 
Convention. 
                                                             
349 Saudi Arabia defined the location of its straight baselines in 2010. 
350Limits in the Seas, No. 20 (1970), p. 5. 
351 Ibid., p.5. 
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Saudi Arabia issued Council of Ministers’ Resolution No. (15) dated 25 January 2010 
which attached a draft Royal Decree No. (M/4) dated 26 January 2010, in which 
straight baselines in the Gulf were declared according to lists of geographical 
coordinates.352 This was issued in pursuance of Article 16(2) LOSC 1982. The UAE 
objected to the straight baselines claimed.353 Saudi Arabia replied stating that the 
baselines are “in strict conformity with International Law and states’ practices”.354 
Iran also protested against Saudi Arabia’s baselines as set out in the 2010 legislation. 
Iran stated that while it reserved its position as to the validity of Saudi Arabia’s 
baselines under customary international law, they breached the rules in TSCZ 1958 
and LOSC 1982.  Iran noted in particular Article 7(3) LOSC 1982 which states that 
the drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the 
general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be 
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the régime of internal 
waters. Iran further noted that a number of basepoints defining the Saudi baselines in 
the Gulf are located in open waters and therefore contravene international law. 355 
 The Statute of Maritime Delimitation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of 13 
December 2012 was issued as a comprehensive promulgation on the topic.356  
However, it is of particular interest that, despite its title, the Statute does not deal 
with delimitation of Saudi Arabia’s maritime zones.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
352 Transmitted by note verbale No. UN/SG/Treaty/191 dated 5 March 2010, from the Permanent 
Mission of Saudi Arabia to the Secretary-General of the U.N. at (2010) 72 LOSB 81-8. In this 
legislation Saudi Arabia also claimed straight baselines in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba.  
353 For example, see Memorandum of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of UAE 3/6/2 368 dated 5 May 
2010, sent to the Secretariat of U.N. The UAE subsequently expressed its objections once more, 
stating that “these baselines cut off areas of the territorial sea of the United Arab Emirates in a manner 
inconsistent with the requirements of international law.” See (2012) 78 LOSB 32.  
354 See (2011) 76 LOSB 37.  
355 See Iran’s note verbale dated 14 August 2012 addressed to the Secretary-General of the U.N., at 
(2012) 80 LOSB 36 and a further note verbale dated 20 February 2013, Annexe 1 at (2014) 81 LOSB 
25-6. Saudi Arabia replied in an Annexe to a note verbale dated 14 March 2013 from the Permanent 
Mission of Saudi Arabia to the Secretary-General of the U.N., again asserting that the straight 
baselines are “fully consistent with the rules of international law and State practice.” See (2014) 81 
LOSB 28.   
356 (2012) 70 LOSB 15. 
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a. Baselines and the territorial sea 
 
Article 1 states that the maritime baseline of the Kingdom in the Red Sea, Gulf of 
Aqaba and the Arab Gulf is delineated in accordance with the LOSC 1982. 
Article 4 states that with respect to the territorial sea, the Kingdom exercises 
sovereignty in accordance with the provisions of the LOSC 1982 and other rules of 
international law. Article 5(1) confirms that the territorial sea extends 12nm 
measured from the baselines. With respect to its outer limit, this is said to be the line 
every point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to 
the breadth of the territorial sea (Article 5(2)). 
 
 
iii. The contiguous zone 
 
Article 11(1) states that the contiguous zone extends for 12nm from the outer limit 
of the territorial sea. Article 11(2) states that the Kingdom shall exercise necessary 
control and monitoring for (a) prevention of infringement of the Kingdom’s 
regulations relating to security, environment, navigation, customs, taxes, 
immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations within the territory of the territorial 
sea, and (b) the punishment of any infringement of the aforementioned laws and 
regulations committed within the territory of the Kingdom or its territorial sea. It is 
of interest that the wording contained in Article 11(2)(a) is similar to the 
corresponding Article in Iran’s 1993 Law. There is no provision for the delimitation 
of the contiguous zone which is in keeping with the absence of such provision in 
LOSC 1982.357 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
357 As seen in Chapter 2 this is explicable on the basis that the contiguous zone is now part of the 
EEZ, and therefore the issue of the former’s delimitation has been subsumed within the latter’s.   
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Observations on the legislation of Saudi Arabia and the degree of its conformity 
with international law 
 
Saudi Arabia, from its inception, unhindered by a colonial past, was free to legislate 
as it wished on matters of law of sea. It was active and also innovative from the 1930s 
in establishing the breadth of its territorial sea as 4nm at a time when a 3nm was 
being advocated by Western powers including Britain. Further, in the 1949 Decree a 
6nm territorial sea was claimed, and in light of the majority of states claiming the 
same at UNCLOS II in 1960, Saudi Arabia was clearly abreast with international 
developments in this regard. In 1958 Saudi Arabia claimed a 12nm territorial sea, 
which, as a zone of that breadth, was not encapsulated in treaty form until LOSC 
1982 and so again was ahead of the international community in this regard. Both 
Saudi Arabia and, as will be seen in the next section of this chapter, Iran, were ahead 
of the other Gulf States in the 1930s in terms of their maritime law-making. With 
regard to the breadth of the territorial sea, both Iran and Saudi Arabia’s legislation 
were consistent with the claims being made in the international arena. At the 1930 
Hague conference, although no consensus could be reached on the subject, at the 
final meeting of the Territorial Waters committee, twenty states sought 3 miles, 
twelve sought 6 miles, and the four Scandinavian states sought recognition of their 
historic claims of 4 miles.358 Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran were subject to any 
protectorate relationship with Britain, and were therefore unhindered by control over 
their national legislation and foreign policy. This freedom is reflected in the extension 
of their territorial seas beyond the 3nm advocated by, for instance, Britain and the 
USA. at this time, and, as has already been seen in Chapter 2, at a time when a limit 
for the breadth of the territorial sea had not yet been agreed by way of an international 
convention. 
With regard to delimitation of the territorial sea, the latest legislation on the 
subject, namely the 1958 Decree, established that this is to be done on the basis of 
equitable principles. As discussed above, this did not conform with TSCZ 1958 
which set out that the general rule was that equidistance was to be applicable (unless 
                                                             
358 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed., Juris Publishing, Manchester 
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the matters of historic title or special circumstances applied). As seen in Chapter 2, 
delimitation of the territorial sea by way of the equidistance line was also a matter of 
custiomary law (and has continued in LOSC 1982). Therefore Saudi Arabian 
legislation does not conform with international law in this respect. It will be 
interesting to consider whether this lack of conformity extends to its legislation on 
delimitation of its continental shelf, which will be considered in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis.  
Saudi Arabia claimed a 6nm contiguous zone as early as the 1949 Decree 
(repeated in the 1958 Decree) which itself shows an awareness to benefit from 
developments on the international plane. In this early Decree the purpose of such a 
zone was claimed to be ensuring compliance with the laws relating to security and 
navigation and fiscal matters. This was repeated in the 1958 Decree which added 
health matters to the list. Article 11(2) of the 2012 Statute expanded the list and 
provided for a contiguous zone for prevention of infringement of laws relating to 
security, environment, navigation, customs, taxes, immigration and sanitary law. 
Saudi Arabia claimed such a zone for purposes which went beyond the purposes of 
the contiguous zone set out in TSCZ 1958 and LOSC 1982, namely preventing 
infringements of customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws in the territorial sea. 
It is of note that the 2012 Statute established a 12nm contiguous zone extending from 
the outer limit of the territorial sea, therefore bringing this zone in line with LOSC 
1982. 
As set out above, in the comparisons between Saudi legislation, and 
international law, while Saudi legislation conforms in setting the standard baseline 
as the low water line, its system of straight baselines established in its 1949 and 1958 
Decrees goes far beyond the ICJ judgment in Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (1951) and 
TSCZ 1958. Likewise, as also set out above in the comparisons with international 
law provisions, its definitions of islands and bays are also wider than international 
law provisions, as also observed by the US Department of State.  
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Iran 
 
Iran followed on from Saudi Arabia by issuing national legislation in the form of the 
Act of 15 July 1934 on the Territorial Waters and the Contiguous Zone of Iran.359  
Iran specified that its territorial sea would extend “to a distance of six nautical miles 
from and parallel to shore at the low-water mark” (Article 1). This was also the 
method specified to determine the territorial sea of its islands (Article 3). The 
reference to the low-water mark as the line from which the territorial sea was 
measured, reflected customary international law, as has been seen in Chapter 2.    
As well as establishing the breadth of the territorial sea, Article 1 claimed a 
contiguous zone, referred to as “the zone of marine supervision”, which spanned a 
breadth of 12nm from the low-water mark. The right of supervision in this zone was 
to ensure “the operation of certain laws and conventions concerning the security and 
protection of the country and its interests or the safety of navigation”. This claim to 
a contiguous zone was well in advance of the provision of such a zone in the TSCZ 
1958 which also provided for a maximum of 12nm for a contiguous zone.360 
Article 2 provided for straight baselines in relation to bays. In so doing, it was 
stipulated that the breadth of the territorial sea outside a bay was to be measured from 
a straight line drawn across the opening of a bay. Where the opening of a bay exceeds 
ten miles, a line was to be drawn across the bay in the part nearest to the entrance at 
the first point where the opening did not exceed ten miles. This reflected customary 
law at the time that a straight baseline could be drawn across the mouth of a bay, 
although there were no clear criteria or rules governing how or in what circumstances 
this was to be done.361 
In Article 3 of the 1934 Act, Iran implied the use of straight baselines in 
providing that islands comprising an archipelago shall be considered to form a single 
island, with the breadth of the territorial waters measured from the islands most 
remote from the centre of the archipelago.  Thus it is of interest that, like Saudi 
                                                             
359 Act relating to the Breadth of the Territorial Waters and to the Zone of Supervision, 19 July 
1934, (1951) 1 U.N. Leg. Ser. 81. 
360 This was extended to a maximum of 24nm in LOSC 1982. 
361 See Chapter 2 on baselines in respect of bays.  
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Arabia, Iran provided for straight baselines prior to the ICJ’s Judgment in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries case (1951).362  
In its Act of 12 April 1959 amending the Act of 15 July 1934 on the Territorial 
Waters and the Contiguous Zone of Iran, Article 3 also extended the breadth of the 
territorial sea to 12nm from the baseline of the territorial sea.363 Article 3 further 
stated that the baseline of the territorial sea was to be determined by the Government 
“with due regard to the established rules of public international law”.  
Article 4 of Iran’s 1959 Act states that when delimiting the boundary of the 
territorial sea with that of another state, whether adjacent or opposite, the boundary 
between the territorial seas of each state shall, unless otherwise agreed between those 
states, be the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point 
on the baseline of both states.364 Its occurrence here in the context of the delimitation 
of the territorial sea specifically, reflects Article 12(1) TSCZ 1958 and also Article 
15 LOSC 1982.365  
Article 5 of Iraq’s 1959 Act confirms that every Iranian island, within or 
outside the territorial sea, has its own territorial sea determined in accordance with 
the provisions of the Act.  This is consistent with Article 10(2) TSCZ 1958 which 
makes clear that an island has a territorial sea, although the breadth of the territorial 
sea had not yet been established in TSCZ 1958. 
Further, Article 5 of Iran’s 1959 Act states that islands situated at a distance 
not exceeding 12nm from one another, shall be considered as a single island and the 
limit of their territorial sea shall be determined from the islands remotest from the 
center of the archipelago. There is no basis for this claim to straight baselines in the 
TSCZ 1958.  
In its Decree No. 2/250-67 of 1973, Iran refers to the baseline established in 
the Act of 12 April 1959 concerning the limits of the territorial sea and the contiguous 
zone. In the 1973 Decree Iran sets out the baseline as straight lines joining certain 
fixed points 1 to 25 established by their geographical co-ordinates. Further, it is stated 
                                                             
362 [1951] ICJ Rep 116.The international law rules governing straight baselines are discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
363 (1974) 16 U.N. Leg. Ser. 10. 
364 This is not the first occasion that a Gulf State’s legislation refers to the principle of equidistance.  
See Iraq’s Proclamation of 19 April 1958 referred to in Chapter 5. 
365 Iran signed the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone on 28 May 1958 but 
did not ratify it. It also signed LOSC 1982 but has not yet ratified it. 
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that between certain points on Kish Island, on Larak Island and in the Strait of 
Hormuz, the low-water line shall be the baseline.366 
Iran issued the Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 
Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea, 1993.367 
 
a. Baselines and the territorial sea 
 
Article 1 declares sovereignty over the territorial sea. Article 2 confirms its breadth 
as 12nm, measured from the baseline, and states that Iranian islands, whether situated 
within or outside its territorial sea, have in accordance with this Act, their own 
territorial sea.  
Article 3 states that in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea, the baseline from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured is that determined in Decree No. 
2/250-67 of 1973;368 in other areas and islands, the low-water line along the coast 
constitutes the baseline. Article 3 goes on to confirm that waters on the landward side 
of the baseline of the territorial sea and waters between islands where the distance of 
such islands does not exceed 24nm, form part of the internal waters.  
Article 4 provides that where Iran’s territorial sea overlaps with that of states 
with opposite or adjacent coasts, the boundary line shall be, unless otherwise agreed 
between the two parties, the median line every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest point on the baseline of both states.  This provision reflects Article 15 LOSC 
1982, albeit not fully.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
366 (1980) 19 U.N. Leg. Ser. 55, reproduced in French; approved by the Iranian Council of Ministers 
on 21 July 1973. 
367 (1993) 24 LOSB 10.  
368 Referred to earlier in this chapter.  
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b. The contiguous zone 
 
Article 12 confirms that the contiguous zone is adjacent to the territorial sea, the outer 
limit of which is 24nm from the baseline, which accords with Article 33(2), which 
increased the limit from the 12nm originally provided for in Article 24(2) TSCZ 
1958. Article 13 states that Iran may adopt:  
 
measures necessary to prevent the infringement of laws and regulations in the 
contiguous zone, including security, customs, maritime, fiscal, immigration, 
sanitary and environmental laws and regulations and investigation and punishment 
of offenders. 
 
 
The references to customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws, and punishment of 
offenders mirrors Article 33(1)(a) and (b) LOSC 1982. However, the references to 
security, maritime and environmental laws were added by Iran. There is no provision 
for delimitation of the contiguous zone in Iran’s 1993 Act.  
 On 11 January 1994 the US issued a written protest against Iranian legislation, 
including Iran’s 1993 Act and the Decree of 22 July 1973, in the light of the relevant 
provisions of LOSC 1982 which was due to come into force on 16 November 1994.369 
The US stated, inter alia, that as recognised in customary international law and as 
reflected in LOSC 1982, and except where provided otherwise in the Convention, the 
normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low water line 
along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognised by the coastal 
state. It is only where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into or if there is a 
fringe of islands in the immediate vicinity of the coast that the state may choose to 
use straight baselines joining certain points.370 The US observed that the Iranian 
coastline is rarely deeply indented or fringed by islands and that Iran has employed 
straight baselines along most of its coastline, and in the vicinity of most baseline 
segments the coastline is quite smooth.  The US therefore concludes that the correct 
baseline for virtually all Iran’s coast in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman is the 
normal baseline, namely the low water line. The US stated additionally that while 
LOSC 1982 does not set out a maximum length for a straight baseline segment, many 
                                                             
369 Protest printed in (1994) 25 LOSB 101-103.  
370 See Article 7(1) LOSC 1982.  
 
 
140 
of those set out in the Iranian legislation are “excessively long”, noting that  “11 of 
the 21 segments are between 30 and 120 miles long”. The US stated its belief that 
the maximum length of an approximately drawn straight baseline segment should not 
normally exceed 24nm. The US also protested that islands may not be used to define 
internal waters except where islands are part of a valid straight baseline system or 
part of a closing line for a juridical bay. Nevertheless, Article 3 of Iran’s Act 1993 
contravenes this by, according to the US, having no basis in international law. 
The US also protested against Iran’s provisions on the contiguous zone in 
Article 13 of Iran’s Act. It objected to the provision that Iran may adopt measures 
necessary to prevent infringement of security, maritime and environmental laws, 
stating that these exceed what is provided for by LOSC 1982.  
Iran issued a written response to the US’s protest.371 This stated that Iran does 
not consider all provisions of LOSC 1982 to constitute customary law. Iran refers to 
its Declaration at the time of signing the Convention on 10 December 1982 in which 
it stated that despite the Convention intended to be of general application and of law-
making nature, certain provisions do not necessarily codify existing customary law. 
It is notable however that Iran has made no attempt in these two statements to identify 
which provisions are and which are not reflective of customary law.  
In its response, Iran emphasised that as early as its Decree of 22 July 1973, 
usage of straight baselines was provided for, and that usage of straight baselines is in 
no way considered as an unusual measure as other states also use this method under 
similar circumstances.372 Iran went on to state that since the enforcement of the 
Decree of 22 July 1973, and in spite of its international circulation via the United 
Nations, there have been no objections. Iran considered this to reflect “recognition of 
its content by the international community”. Iran goes on to agree with the US that 
international law does not set the maximum limit for the length of a straight baseline 
segment and therefore concludes that the reference by the US to a maximum of 24nm 
lacks a legal basis. Iran goes on to state that it has made an effort to employ criteria 
which have been important prior to LOSC 1982 and which are mentioned in it, and 
gives the example of firstly drawing straight baselines in such a way so that they do 
not depart in any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast (Article 
                                                             
371 Response printed in (1994) 26 LOSB  35-38. 
372 Although not specifically mentioned, this may be taken to include Saudi Arabia and Oman. 
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7(3) LOSC 1982), and secondly taking into account the economic interests pertaining 
to the region, the reality and importance of which are evidenced by long usage 
(Article 7(5) LOSC 1982).373 
With regard to the US objection to Article 3 of Iran’s 1993 Act, Iran cited its 
earlier Act on Territorial Waters and the Contiguous Zone of Iran, dated July 1934, 
as amended by the Act of 11 April 1959 which provided for similar rules. Iran stated 
that in the 1993 Act the criterion for the distance between islands had been changed 
to reflect the extension of the breadth of the territorial sea.374 
In seeming response to the US objection to the provisions on the contiguous 
zone, Iran further highlighted the importance of environmental conditions in the 
Gulf, which as a semi-enclosed sea which was the scene of fishing and the oil 
industry, was vulnerable and required its marine environment to be protected.  
The dispute between the US and Iran over Iran’s straight baseline manifested 
itself in a concrete way in an incident which took place on 19 September 1999. Iran 
complained in a note verbale dated 30 November 1999 that on that date in September, 
a US warship entered Iran’s territorial sea in the Gulf, in contravention of 
international law.375 The US responded in a note verbale dated 6 April 2000.376 It 
stated that US warships are deployed in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman as part of the 
                                                             
373 In a later objection, the US referred to this statement by Iran by making the point that in determining 
straight baselines, Iran cannot consider “the economic interests peculiar to the region concerned” 
unless the geographical prerequisites in Article 7(1) LOSC 1982 are first satisfied. See note verbale 
of 6 April 2000 from the US Mission addressed to the U.N. Secretariat, at (2000) 43 LOSB 107. 
374 It is of note that Germany, on behalf of the EU objected to Iran’s 1993 legislation in similar terms 
to the US on the basis that it is not in accordance with LOSC 1982, for example Iran’s claim to straight 
baselines “along practically the entire coastline, even where it is not deeply indented and cut into and 
there is no fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity”;  that several of the straight 
baseline segments are “excessively long”; and that “islands may only be used in defining internal 
waters where they form part of a genuine system of straight baselines or where they constitute the line 
which delimits  bay”. See démarche 14 December 1994 by the German Embassy in Tehran, 
communicated by the Permanent Mission of Germany to the U.N. in a note verbale dated 11 
September 1995. For démarche, see (1996) 30 LOSB 60-1. Iran replied in terms similar to its reply to 
the US For Iran’s reply to Germany see (1996) 31 LOSB 37-8. It added more specifically that in 
relation to using straight baselines to connect islands less than 24nm apart, with the designation of 
waters separating them as internal waters, as provided for in Article 3 of the 1993 Act, “there is nothing 
in international law to prohibit the use of that method.” 
375 Note verbale dated 30 November 1999 from the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
in Washington, D.C., addressed to the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, D.C., at (2000) 43 LOSB, 
109. This note verbale was transmitted to the U.N. Secretary General, by way of letter dated 21 
December 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Iran to the U.N., to be forwarded to the US 
Department of State, also at (2000) 43 LOSB 109. 
376 Note verbale of 6 April 2000 from the US Mission addressed to the U.N. Secretariat, at (2000) 43 
LOSB  107. 
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Multinational Interception Force authorized under UN Security Council Resolution 
665 (1990) concerning Iraq. In accordance with its mandate pursuant to Resolution 
665, a US warship intercepted a Belize-flagged merchant vessel suspected of 
conducting prohibited trade with Iraq in violation of economic sanctions imposed by 
the Security Council. It confirmed that the US warship’s position as described by 
Iran was in international waters approximately 5.6 miles outside of Iran’s 12nm 
territorial sea as measured from the low-water lines, and the warship intercepted the 
merchant vessel approximately 3.5 miles outside Iran’s territorial sea thus measured, 
and therefore the warship was in international waters. The US once more objected 
against Iran’s straight baselines, stating that they were in breach of both customary 
international law and Article 7(1) LOSC 1982, and confirmed that at the position of 
the coast closest to where the warship intercepted the vessel, the appropriate baseline 
is the low-water line.  
In 1996, Qatar in a note verbale to the U.N. set out a number of objections on 
the basis that parts of the Act contravened both customary law and LOSC 1982.377  
Qatar objected to the straight baselines claimed by Iran, and waters between islands 
not more than 24nm apart being considered as internal waters. It also objected to the 
provisions of the 1993 Act providing for measures to be taken in the contiguous zone 
to prevent the infringement of environmental and security regulations of Iran as 
provisions which “go well beyond what is permitted by international law.” 378 
 
 
Observations on the legislation of Iran and the degree of its conformity with 
international law 
 
As early as 1934 Iran had established a 6nm territorial sea, and, showing the same 
innovation as Saudi Arabia, this was extended to 12nm in its 1959 Act. As set out 
above, delimitation of territorial sea in 1959 Act and 1993 Act is to be effected by 
the  equidistance line which reflects  TSCZ 1958 and LOSC 1982. It is interesting 
                                                             
377 Note verbale from Permanent Mission of Qatar to U.N., at (1996) 32 LOSB 89-90. 
378 Iran replied in a similar way to its previous responses to the US and Germany. For its reply to 
Qatar, see (1997) 33 LOSB 87-8. 
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that these Iranian provisions are different to the equivalent Saudi Arabian provisions, 
which, as we have seen, provided for delimitation of the territorial sea by means of 
the application of equitable principles. 
As early as 1934 Iran had also legislated for a 12nm contiguous zone, in 
advance of TSCZ 1958 which provided for a maximum of 12nm for a contiguous zone. 
In further conformity with international law, the 1993 Act extended the contiguous 
zone to 24nm from the baseline, bringing its breadth in line with LOSC 1982. 
However,  like Saudi Arabia, the purposes for which the contiguous zone is established 
by Iran in its 1993 Act goes far beyond those set out in LOSC 1982, and were subject 
to US objection as set out above.  Like Saudi Arabia, Iran in its 1993 Act provides for 
a contiguous zone to take measures to prevent infringement of security and 
environmental law, which do not have a place in the international law provisions. 
Indeed Iran added another new element to the list, namely maritime matters, not 
referred to by Saudi Arabia.  
While Iran reflects international law in its provision for the low-water mark as 
the standard baseline, like Saudi Arabia its provisions on straight baselines do not 
confirm with international law. The effect of Article 3, and the Decree of 22 July 1973, 
is that Iran has claimed straight baselines along its entire coastline along the north of 
the Gulf despite the fact that there are no major indentations along its coast and 
although there are some islands offshore, they do not form a fringe. As set out above, 
the US objected to the straight baselines claimed by Iran, as it did to the Saudi Arabian 
claims to straight baselines. A number of states have also protested on the basis that 
Iran’s claims to straight baselines do not comply with international law as contained 
in Article 7 LOSC 1982.379  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
379 See Limits in the Seas, No. 114, “Iran’s Maritime Claims” (The Geographer, Washington D.C., 
1994).  
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Kuwait 
 
The legislative activity of Kuwait in this decade is explained by its obtaining of 
independence from Britain in 1961. In this regard, Kuwait first issued a Decree 
Regarding the Delimitation of the Breadth of the Territorial Sea of the State of 
Kuwait on 17 December 1967. 380 This legislation has explicit leanings towards the 
TSCZ 1958 which had come into force on 10 September 1964.  
The Preamble explicitly notes, amongst other matters, TSCZ 1958. Article 1 
extends the territorial sea for a distance of 12 miles from the baselines of the mainland 
and of Kuwaiti islands, bringing Kuwait into line with the other Gulf States referred 
to above.381   
Article 2 deals with baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. 
Article 2(a) provides that where the shore of the mainland or an island is fully 
exposed to the open sea, the baseline is the low-water line, which is again in 
accordance with the general rule in TSCZ 1958. Article 2(b) defines straight 
baselines and states that in the case of a port or harbour, the outermost permanent 
harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour system are considered as 
forming part of the coast for the purpose of the baseline. This language is precisely 
in line with TSC 1958 and LOSC 1982 (although there is no exception, as stated in 
Article 11 LOSC 1982, that off-shore installations and artificial islands shall not be 
considered as permanent harbour works.)  
Article 2(c) states that in the case of a low-tide elevation situated not more than 
12 miles from the mainland or from a Kuwaiti island, the outer edge of that low-tide 
elevation constitutes the baseline for measuring the territorial sea of the mainland, 
or, as the case may be, of the island off which the elevation is located. This is similar 
to the provision contained in Article 11(1) TSCZ 1958 (which is repeated in Article 
13(1) LOSC 1982) which states that where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or 
partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland 
or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for 
                                                             
380 Published in the Official Gazette No. 658 of 24 December 1967, p. 4 and reproduced in (1970) 15 
U.N. Leg. Ser. 96. 
381 References are to miles rather than nautical miles in the translation of the Decree, but nautical 
miles may be presumed. 
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measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. The definitions of “island” and “low-tide 
elevation” contained in Article 3 of the Kuwaiti Decree are precisely the same as the 
definitions in Article 10(1) and 11(1) respectively of TSCZ 1958 (as repeated in 
LOSC 1982). 
Article 2(d) of the Kuwaiti Decree provides that in the case of Kuwait Bay, the 
waters of which are stated to be internal waters, the baseline is the closing line across 
the entrance to the Bay. While this is in general in line with the TSCZ 1958, there is 
no detail on the maximum limit of the closing line, and neither is a bay defined, 
whether in line with the Conventions, or at all. There is no reference to a system of 
straight baselines, apart from the line drawn across the entrance to Kuwait Bay.  
Article 4 of the Kuwaiti Decree states that where the territorial sea overlaps 
with that of another state or of the partitioned Zone, the boundary shall be determined 
in accordance with Article 12 TSCZ 1958, which, as we have seen refers to the 
equidistance line, in the absence of agreement.382  
In Article 6 of the Decree, Kuwait reserves rights in the zone contiguous to its 
territorial sea. 
Kuwait issued Decree No. (317) Concerning the Delimitation of the Marine 
Areas Pertaining to the State of Kuwait, as amended on 29 October 2014.383 It is a 
comprehensive law dealing with a range of law of the sea issues. Its Preamble, amongst 
other matters, refers to its ratification of LOSC 1982. Article 8 makes clear that it 
supersedes the previous Decree of 17 December 1967, as well as any other provisions 
contrary to the new Decree. 
 Article 1 defines an “island” and a “low-tide elevation” in accordance with the 
definitions in Articles 121(1) and 13(1) LOSC 1982 respectively. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
382 See Chapter 6 for the 1965 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait regarding partition of 
the Neutral Zone between them. 
383Website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), Office of Legal 
Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, at: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/Kuwait_Legislation.pdf 
(accessed 8 July 2016). Article 5 was amended by Decree No. (141/2015) issued on 12 May 2015. 
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a. Baselines and the territorial sea  
 
Article 2 sets out mechanisms for determining the baselines of Kuwait. Article 2(a) 
states that when the coast of the mainland or of a Kuwait island faces the open sea, 
the normal baseline shall be the low-water line, which is consistent with Article 5 
LOSC 1982 which provides for the “normal baseline”. Article 2(b) of the 2014 
Decree provides that where there is a port on the coast, the outermost seaward 
permanent harbour works are regarded as forming part of the coast. This reflects 
Article 11 LOSC 1982 although it does not refer to the latter’s caveat that off-shore 
installations and artificial islands are not considered as permanent harbour works. 
Article 2(c) provides that where there is a low-tide elevation not exceeding 12nm 
from the coast of the mainland or an island, the outer edge of it shall be the normal 
baseline. This is broadly in conformity with Article 13(1) LOSC 1982. Article 2(d) 
of the 2014 Decree states that the baseline of Kuwait Bay shall be the Bay’s closing 
line. Again there is a lack of detail on how the closing line is constructed, as was the 
case with Kuwait’s 1967 Decree dealing with the baseline of Kuwait Bay. Both the 
1967 and 2014 Decrees do not provide for straight baselines other than in relation to 
the Bay. 
 
 
b. Internal waters 
 
Article 3 states that Kuwait’s internal waters are those on the landward side of the 
normal baseline, which is in accordance with 8(1) LOSC 1982. 
 
 
c. The territorial sea 
 
Article 4 confirms that Kuwait’s territorial sea is 12nm, measured from the normal 
baselines, as did Article 1 of the 1967 Decree. Article 4 of the also provides that 
delimitation of the territorial sea with an adjacent or opposite state, in the absence of 
agreement shall be by way of a median line. This reflects to an extent Article 15 
LOSC 1982. 
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d. The contiguous zone 
  
Article 5 claims a 12nm contiguous zone from the outer limits of the territorial sea, 
in which it shall exercise control to prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, 
immigration and sanitary law within its territory or territorial sea, and to punish 
infringements. The claim is confined to the purposes for which supervision in the 
zone may be undertaken as contained in Article 33(1) LOSC 1982. Delimitation of 
the contiguous zone with an opposite or adjacent state, in the absence of agreement, 
shall be by way of the median line. As noted in Chapter 2, such a provision is not 
provided for in LOSC 1982. 
 
Observations on the legislation of Kuwait and the degree of its conformity with 
international law 
 
It is quite clear that Kuwaiti legislation can be characterised as having a high level of 
conformity with international law. The 1967 Decree makes explicit references to 
TSCZ 1958. In that Decree, reiterated in the 2014 Decree, Kuwait claimed a 12nm 
territorial sea. The 1967  and 2014 Decrees both provide for delimitation of the 
territorial sea to be by way of the equidistance line, in the absence of agreement, 
which reflects the reference to the equidistance line in TSCZ 1958 and LOSC 1982. 
The 2014 Decree claims a 12nm contiguous zone from the outer limits of the 
territorial sea, therefore bringing it in line with LOSC 1982. It is of note that the 
Kuwaiti claim to a contiguous zone, unlike Saudi and Iranian legislation is confined 
to the purposes set out in TSCZ 1958 and LOSC 1982. 
Further conformity with international law is evidenced by the provision for 
the low water line as the normal baseline, and the definitions of “island “and “low-
tide elevation” are the same as in TSCZ 1958 and LOSC 1982. While there is 
provision for a straight baseline in respect of Kuwait Bay, this is somewhat lacking 
in detail. In all the circumstances, the Kuwaiti legislation is highly compatible with 
international law.  
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 United Arab Emirates 
 
The UAE, as a single entity, issued Federal Law No. 19 of 1993 on Determination of 
the off-shore territories of the United Arab Emirates. 384 This was intended to be a 
comprehensive treatment of these aspects of the law of the sea. 
 Article 1 sets out a number of definitions. An “island” is defined as “a natural 
formation of land surrounded by water and emerging above water at high tide” which 
is the essentially the same definition in Article 121(1) LOSC 1982 (and in TSCZ 
1958), although it is interesting that the word “emerging” is used rather than “above 
water at high tide” in LOSC 1982 and which suggests a slight distinction. A “group 
of islands” is defined as “a formation of two or more islands constituting with their 
interconnecting waters an interrelated geographical and economic entity”. There is 
no such corresponding separate definition in LOSC 1982, although it is of interest 
that the UAE definition seems to have looked to Article 46(b) LOSC 1982 which 
defines “archipelago” as “a group of islands, including parts of islands, 
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely inter-related 
that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, 
economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.” 
Plainly, the UAE is not an archipelagic state, but is seeking to benefit from the 
baseline provisions applicable to such states, and this is made clearer in the UAE’s 
Article 6(3) dealt with below.  
The UAE’s definition of a “low-tide elevation” corresponds with the definition 
in Article 13(1) LOSC 1982 (and Art 11(1) TSCZ 1958). The UAE’s definition of a 
“bay” conforms with Article 10(2) LOSC 1982, although it does not contain the part 
of the definition in the latter which states that an indentation shall not, however, be 
regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle 
whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation. Nor does it 
contain the further detailed provisions in Article 10 dealing with the measurements 
                                                             
384 Certified translation of the law published in the UAE Official Gazette, Vol. No. XXIII, Issue No. 
257, dated 20 October 1993, p.7-17; See also version in (1994) 25 LOSB 94-100. 
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of the bay or the drawing of straight baselines across the entrance of the bay, the 
maximum length of such closing line being 24nm, although some of these factors do 
appear in Article 6(2) of the 1993 Law, which is examined below. This definition, 
however, is more in conformity with international law than the Saudi and Omani 
legislation of the 1950s and 1970s respectively in defining a “bay”. The phrase 
“nautical mile” is defined as 1852 metres which conforms with international practice. 
  
a. Internal Waters 
 
Article 2 of the 1993 Law states generally that internal waters are those on the 
landward side of the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea of the State 
is measured. This is a generally accepted proposition and reflects the wording in 
Article 8(1) LOSC 1982, save that the latter also refers to the exceptions in Part IV, 
which deal with archipelagic baselines. Article 2 of the UAE Law goes on to state 
that internal waters specifically include the following areas of water: 
 
1. The waters of bays located along the entire length of the coast; 
2. The waters of any low-tide elevation lying at a distance not exceeding 12 nautical 
miles from the mainland or from any island belonging to the State; 
3. The waters between the mainland of the State and any island belonging thereto 
whose distance from the mainland does not exceed 12 nautical miles; 
4. The waters between the islands belonging to the State, the distance between each 
of which does not exceed 12 nautical miles. 
 
The above provisions should also be seen in conjunction with Article 6 of the UAE 
Law which deals with the baselines from which the UAE’s territorial sea shall be 
measured (as to which see below).  
With regard to Article 2(1), there is no reference to the length of the closing 
line which may be drawn to enclose internal waters within the bay, although this is 
referred to in Article 6(2). In respect of Article 2(2), the phrase “the waters of any 
low-tide elevation…” is not particularly clear, although Article 6(5) adds some 
further clarity, and both provisions should be read in conjunction. Article 2(3) does 
 
 
150 
not seem to contravene LOSC 1982 although there is no separate corresponding 
provision. Article 2(4) does not seem to have a clear basis in LOSC 1982. 
 
 
b. Baselines and the territorial sea 
 
Article 4 states that the UAE’s sovereignty extends to the airspace above the 
territorial sea as well as its bed and subsoil. Article 4 further states that the UAE shall 
exercise its sovereignty over the territorial sea in accordance with the provisions of 
this Law and the rules of international law. This is consistent with Article 2 LOSC 
1982. Article 4 is also consistent with Article 3 LOSC 1982 in that it states that the 
territorial sea of the UAE extends 12nm from the baseline.  
Article 6 provides a number of ways that the baseline from which the territorial 
sea is to be measured. Article 6(1), consistent with the TSCZ 1958 and LOSC 1982 
states that the low-water mark is the baseline where the coast is exposed to the open 
sea, thereby reflecting the general international rule. However, where the coastline is 
deeply indented or cut into, there is to be a method of straight baselines to be 
determined by the UAE’s competent authorities. Clearly the requirement for the 
coastline to be “deeply indented or cut into” is reminiscent of Article 7(1) LOSC 
1982, however, the placing of the final decision of how to draw the baselines in the 
hands of the UAE’s authorities is a direct expression of state autonomy in the matter.  
Article 6(2) reflects Art 10(4) LOSC 1982 on straight baselines being drawn 
across the entrance to bays, stating that such lines not exceeding 24nm are to be 
drawn between the low-water marks of the entrance of bays. Reflective of Art 10(5) 
LOSC 1982 is the further provision that if the width of the bay’s entrance exceeds 
this distance, the line is to be drawn between any two low-water marks closest to the 
entrance (thus enclosing the maximum amount of water), provided that the distance 
between them does not exceed 24nm.  
Article 6(3) states that where there is a group of islands, the territorial sea is to 
be measured from straight lines joining the outer points of the outermost islands 
forming the group. This provision for straight baselines is reminiscent of Oman’s 
1972 Decree Art 2(c). It does not have a corresponding provision in LOSC 1982, 
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apart from the reference to archipelagic baselines in Article 47(1) which states that 
an archipelagic state may draw straight baselines joining the “outermost points of the 
outermost islands…” as long as various requirements are met. Clearly the UAE is 
seeking to benefit from such a provision although geographically it does not fulfil 
the requirements to claim such baselines according to LOSC 1982.  
Article 6(4) states that where there is a port or harbour, the territorial sea is to 
be measured from lines drawn adjacent to the seaward side of the outermost port or 
harbour installations and lines drawn between the outer points of such installations 
provided that such works are an integral part of the port or harbour system. This 
reflects Article 11 LOSC 1982 which states that for the purpose of delimiting the 
territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour works which form an integral part 
of the harbour system are regarded as forming part of the coast. Article 11 adds a 
caveat, not reflected in the UAE’s provision, namely that off-shore installations and 
artificial islands shall not be considered as permanent harbour works.  
Article 6(5) states that where a low-tide elevation is wholly or partly situated 
at a distance from the mainland or from any island not exceeding the width of the 
territorial sea, such low-tide elevation may be used as a baseline for measuring the 
breadth of the territorial sea. This is reminiscent of Article 2(c) of Oman’s 1972 
Decree. It is also reflective of Article 13(1) LOSC 1982 which states that in the 
circumstances outlined in the UAE provision, the low-water line on that elevation 
may be used as the baseline.  
Article 7 states that if the measurement of the territorial sea in accordance with 
this Law leaves an area of EEZ wholly surrounded by territorial sea and extending 
not more than 12nm in any direction, such an area shall form part of the territorial 
sea.  Further, the same rule shall apply to any area of EEZ which may be enclosed by 
drawing a single straight line not more than 12nm long. There is no equivalent 
provision in LOSC 1982.  
Article 8 states that the outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point 
of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of 
the territorial sea. This mirrors Article 4 of LOSC 1982. 
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c. The contiguous zone 
 
Article 10 of the 1993 Law states that the UAE shall, in a zone contiguous to its 
territorial sea, exercise supervision and control for the purposes of i) preventing 
infringement of its security, customs, fiscal, sanitary or immigration laws within its 
land territory, internal waters or territorial sea, and ii) punishing infringement of such 
laws if committed within the UAE’s land territory, internal waters or territorial sea. 
As has been seen in Iran’s 1993 Act, the UAE has added “security” to the list of 
purposes for which supervision in the contiguous zone may be undertaken in Article 
33(1) LOSC 1982. Article 11 of the UAE Law states the breadth of the contiguous 
zone is 12nm measured from the outer limits of the territorial sea.  
 
 
d. Delimitation of the territorial sea and contiguous zone 
 
Article 19 states that the following provisions on delimitation apply to the 
delimitation of the maritime zones of islands belonging the UAE 
Article 23(1) states that where the territorial sea of the UAE is opposite or 
adjacent to the territorial sea of another state, the outer limit of the UAE’s territorial 
sea shall be the median line. This to an extent reflects Article 15 LOSC 1982 but does 
not mirror it. 
Article 23(2) states that in the absence of agreement between the UAE and 
another adjacent or opposite state, the outer limit of the contiguous zone shall be the 
median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the 
baselines. LOSC 1982 does not specifically deal with delimitation of the contiguous 
zone, although Article 24(3) TSCZ 1958 provided for delimitation by the median 
line. It is generally accepted that this continues to be customary law.  
Article 24 stipulates that the UAE shall publish official charts to show 
accurately the outer limits of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Article 25 
makes clear that the 1993 Law shall not affect the validity of agreements previously 
concluded between the individual Emirates and the Emirates have the right to enter 
into agreements regarding maritime boundaries between themselves. 
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The Council of Ministers’ Decision No. (5) 2009 in respect of the Application 
of the Straight Baselines System to a Part of the Coast of the United Arab Emirates 
was issued on 14 January 2009.385 It lists a number of coordinates between which 
straight baselines are to be drawn on parts of the UAE’s coast. The straight baselines 
thus established are to be used to delimitate the UAE’s maritime zones in those parts. 
Many of the coordinates are islands near the coast. Saudi Arabia protested against 
this Decision in a note verbale dated 9 August 2009, despite Saudi Arabia’s own 
extensive claims to straight baselines.386 Saudi Arabia objected on the grounds that 
international law allows straight baselines:  
 
only in special coastal conditions and only when certain criteria exist. One of these 
criteria is that the straight baselines do not deviate substantially from the general 
direction of the coastline.  
  It is obvious that a part of the straight baselines opposite the Saudi coast 
has no relation to the United Arab Emirates coast, and substantially deviate from 
the general direction of the coast of the United Arab Emirates.   
 
 
The UAE replied stating that the system of straight baselines claimed in the Decision 
of Ministers No. 5 of 2009 “is consistent with the criteria established by international 
law.”387 
 
 
Sharjah 
 
 A Decree concerning the Territorial Waters of Sharjah Emirate and its Dependencies 
and Islands of 10 September 1969 declared sovereign rights in a 12nm belt of 
territorial sea, applicable to Sharjah and the island of Abu Musa.388 On 5 April 1970, 
another Supplementary Decree concerning the Territorial Sea of the Emirate of 
                                                             
385 (2009) 69 LOSB 78  
386 Note verbale dated 9 August 2009 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the UAE,  at (2010) 71 LOSB 47-8. Saudi Arabia also made clear that 
the UAE Decision did not affect in any way the bilateral Agreement between Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE signed on 21 August 1974. This agreement is referred to in Chapter 6.  
387 See note verbale dated 12 November 2009 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the UAE to the 
Secretary-General of the U.N. at (2010) 71 LOSB 50-51. 
388 Text in 37 Petroleum Legislation, Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts (Middle East), pp. 
Sharjah A-O. 
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Sharjah and its Dependencies confirmed once more that the territorial sea extended 
to 12nm from the baselines on the coasts of the mainland and of the islands (Article 
1).389  
 
Observations on the legislation of the UAE and the degree of its conformity with 
international law 
 
As early as 1969 Sharjah claimed a 12nm territorial sea, and as such, was keeping 
abreast with the most recent developments on the international plane.  The UAE’s 
1993 Law also claims a 12nm territorial sea. With regard to delimitation of the 
territorial sea, this is said to be by way of the equidistance line, therefby reflecting 
Article 15 LOSC 1982. 
The 1993 Law also claims a 12nm contiguous zone from the outer limits of the 
territorial sea, as provided by LOSC 1982. However, it is of interest that like Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, the UAE goes beyond international law in adding “security” to the 
list of laws in respect of which the the contiguous zone is established to prevent 
infringement.  
 As set out above, the 1993 Act demonstrates a degree of conformity with 
international law, although it may be said that the Act features a significant number 
and range of  contributions which do not have a place in international law. The basic 
definition of an “island” is broadly reflective of TSCZ 1958 and LOSC 1982, and the 
definition of  a “low-tide elevation” corresponds with the definitions in these 
Conventions, and like the legislation of, for example Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the 
definition of “bay” does not conform with the international law definition, having far 
less detail and specificity. 
Like the legislation of other Gulf states discussed in this chapter, the UAE Law 
follows general international law in establishing the standard baseline as being the 
low-water mark. However, as with other Gulf states, provisions dealing with straight 
baselines go beyond international law. For example, like Oman’s 1972 Decree, 
referred to below, the UAE provides for straight baselines joining the outer points of 
the outermost islands in a group. 
                                                             
389 Ibid., pp. Sharjah B-O. 
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Oman 
 
The Royal Decree of 17 July 1972 concerning the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf 
and Exclusive Fishing Zones of the Sultanate of Oman established a number of 
important and wide-ranging aspects of law of the sea.390 This Decree was the first 
legislation emanating from Oman dealing with the issue of the limit of the territorial 
sea.  In accordance with Article 2(2) 1982 LOSC, Article 1 of the 1972 Decree 
confirms that Oman (as other Gulf States have confirmed in their own legislative 
provisions) has sovereignty over the airspace above and the seabed and subsoil below 
the territorial sea. Article 2 of the 1972 Decree establishes that Oman’s territorial sea 
extends 12 nm, and is to be measured from a number of baselines.  
Article 2(a) begins in accordance with the TSCZ 1958 and LOSC 1982 with 
the reference to the general rule regarding the low water line of the mainland 
constituting the baseline. However, its remainder differs from the Convention 
provisions where it states that the baseline may be that of the low-water line of an 
island, rock, reef, or shoal more than 12nm distant from the mainland or another 
island, rock, reef, or shoal, where the coast faces open sea. There is no definition 
provided of these features, unlike the Saudi Decree of 1958 which did provide 
definitions of an “island” and a “shoal”. Reefs are not dealt with in TSCZ 1958. 
Although Article 6 LOSC 1982 refers to the low water line of reefs as constituting 
the baseline, such a situation specifically applies in the case of islands situated on 
atolls or islands having fringing reefs. There is no such specificity in Oman’s Article 
2(a). Further, there is no provision in the Conventions for a wholly submerged rock, 
reef or shoal (if these are what Oman refers to) to be used to establish a baseline. The 
words “rock”, “reef” and “shoal” could refer to wholly submerged features, or may 
equally relate only to low-tide elevations as defined in the Conventions.  Article 13(1) 
LOSC 1982 states that the low-water line on low-tide elevations may constitute the 
baseline, where they are wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of 
the territorial sea (12nm) from the mainland or an island. The limitation imposed on 
                                                             
390 For the text see (1974) 16 U.N. Leg. Ser. 23. The Decree is also printed in Limits in the Seas, No. 
61, ‘Straight Baselines: Oman (Hypothetical)’, International Boundary Study Series A (the Office of 
the Geographer, US, June 4, 1975), pp. 1-4.  
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distance is specifically not matched by Oman. It is further to be observed that the 
references to islands, rocks, reefs and shoals are lacking in any kind of definition in 
the Decree, and thus the lack of any attempt to bring their definition in line with the 
TSCZ 1958 (or LOSC 1982) means that the latter’s specified requirements for 
baselines in relation to such features, whether normal or straight, are not reflected by 
Oman.  
The following provisions of Oman’s Decree deal with straight baselines. 
Article 2(b) does reflect the Conventions to the extent that straight baselines not 
exceeding 24nm are drawn so as to join the low water marks of the entrance to bays, 
as stated in Article 10(4), (5) LOSC 1982. However, Oman has not defined the term 
“bay” or “gulf”, and the latter is not a term of art in the Conventions.  
Article 2(c) and (d) are much wider in their import than the provisions on 
straight baselines in the Conventions. Article 2(c) provides for straight lines 
connecting the nearest point on the mainland with the outer-most extremities of an 
island, rock, reef, or shoal, or group of such islands, rocks, reefs, or shoals, less than 
12nm distant from each other, if any part of such island, rock, reef or shoal or group 
of islands, rocks, reefs, or shoals lies within 12nm from the mainland.  
Further, Article 2(d) provides for straight lines connecting the outer-most 
extremities of islands, rocks, reefs, or shoals, more than 12nm distant from the 
mainland, but less than 12nm distant from each other. As such, there is no 
requirement for a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity as stated 
in the Conventions. Even a single island, rock, reef or shoal is sufficient. As seen 
already in relation to Saudi Arabia’s 1958 Decree, there is no provision in any of the 
Conventions for shoals to be used as points of the baselines, whether normal or 
straight. Even if a “shoal” could be said to be comparable in part to a low-tide 
elevation in the sense of the Conventions, there is no requirement in Oman’s Decree 
as set out in the Conventions, that a straight baseline drawn to and from a low-tide 
elevation is only permissible where lighthouses or similar installations which are 
permanently above sea level have been built on them or where the drawing of 
baselines to and from such elevations has received general international recognition.  
In 1975, the US Office of the Geographer found that on the basis of a 
hypothetical application of Oman’s Decree, a number of areas of Oman would 
qualify for the drawing of a straight baseline system according to the criteria 
established therein, including the Musandam peninsula, an area of bays, indentations, 
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and small islands, which is located in the Gulf.391 In a map published by that 
organisation, sixteen hypothetical straight baseline segments were suggested. The 
longest segment from Ra’s Shaykh Mas’ud to Jazirat al Ghanam would be 
approximately 11.1nm while the shortest, from Great Quoin island to Gap island 
would be 1.25nm. The total length of the hypothetical system was 75.6nm with an 
average segment of approximately 4.73nm in length.392 The importance of this issue 
for the US and also internationally,  was due to the fact that such a creation of a 
baseline system would enclose within Oman’s internal waters the principal 
navigation channel of the Strait of Hormuz, lying between the Musandam Peninsula 
and the line connecting Great Quoin-Gap- Little Quoin islands.393 It was concluded 
that on consideration of the physical conditions of the coast of Oman probably no 
extensive straight baseline system could be developed according to the principles of 
international law.394 
 
                                                             
391 Limits in the Seas, No. 61, ‘Straight Baselines: Oman (Hypothetical)’ (International Boundary 
Study Series, published by Office of the Geographer, US, June 4, 1975), p.6ff. It is stated at p. 5 that 
six areas could qualify, according to Oman’s legislation, for straight baseline systems as follows: i) 
the Musandam Peninsula area; ii) the Daymaniyat islands west of Muscat; iii) Fahal island and the 
adjacent area offshore from Muscat; iv) Al Masirah island in the Arabian sea; v) the Kuria Muria 
islands also in the Arabian sea; vi) a small group of islands along the coast of Oman near the Yemen 
(Aden) boundary (not charted on the map attached to the publication). Only the Musandam Peninsula 
is situated in the Gulf.  
392 Ibid, p. 6. 
393 Ibid, p. 6. 
394 Ibid, p. 8. 
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Figure 10: Hypothetical application of Oman’s 1972 Decree to the 
Musandam Peninsula, from Jaywardene, H.W., The Regime of Islands 
in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht; London, 1990), p. 
66, reflecting map in Limits in the Seas, No. 61, ‘Straight Baselines: 
Oman (Hypothetical)’ (International Boundary Study Series, 
published by Office of the Geographer, US, June 4, 1975). 
 
 
Article 7 of the 1972 Decree deals with the situation where the territorial sea, 
continental shelf, and EFZ of Oman overlaps with those of another state with either 
an opposite or adjacent coast. It is stated that boundary of those maritime zones of 
Oman shall be the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest 
points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Oman and the 
territorial sea of other states is measured. With respect to the delimitation of the 
territorial sea, this provision partly reflects Article 12 TSCZ 1958 which itself is 
contained in Article 15 LOSC 1982. However, Oman’s provision does not refer to 
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delimitation by way of agreement, or the derogation from equidistance where historic 
title or other special circumstances make it necessary.  
 Oman issued a Royal Decree concerning the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf 
and Exclusive Economic Zone dated 10 February 1981.395  Pursuant to Article 10 of 
the 1981 Decree, the provisions of the Decree of 17 July 1972 and the Royal Decree 
No. 44/77 of 15 June 1977 and all other provisions which contravene the provisions 
of the 1981 Decree are cancelled.396 
Article 2 reiterates that the territorial sea extends 12nm. Article 2(a) goes on to 
state that the outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a 
distance of 12nm from the nearest point of the baseline. Thus Articles 3 and 4 of 
LOSC 1982 are closely reflected.  
Article 2(b) states that except as otherwise provided, the normal baseline for 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low water line along the coast of the 
mainland or of islands or rocks. This does not reflect Article 3 TSCZ 1958 which 
stated, as has been seen, that the general rule that the baseline for measuring the 
territorial sea is the low water line along the coast. Article 2(c) refers to Oman’s 
intention to issue a directive which will set out a system of straight baselines for the 
coast and also relating to the closed waters lying within gulfs and bays or in between 
islands and the mainland coast so that any line described therein is to be regarded as 
the baseline. 
Article 8 states that in relation to another opposite or adjacent state, the outer 
limits of the territorial sea (as well as the EEZ and continental shelf) of Oman shall 
be the median line so that every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points 
on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Oman and the 
territorial sea of other such states is measured. 
On 1 June 1982 Oman issued a Notice relating to the application of the straight 
baselines system for the demarcation of baselines for the territorial sea, the internal 
waters and the enclosed waters.397 
Pursuant to Article 2(c) of the Royal Decree of 1981 referred to above, Article 
1 of this Notice sets out the co-ordinates of latitudes and longitudes in order to 
                                                             
395 (1983) 1 LOSB, pp. 33-34. 
396 Oman’s 1977 Decree is discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
397 (1983)1 LOSB, 35. 
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determine the positions of points for drawing straight baselines. Article 1 also states 
that the co-ordinates referred to shall also be the basis for demarking the internal and 
enclosed waters. The co-ordinates are set out in Groups A to D.   Oman has thus 
claimed straight baselines around the Musandam Peninsula (Group A).398 The system 
claimed by Oman is very similar indeed to that suggested by the US Office of the 
Geographer as a hypothetical application of Oman’s 1972 Decree as highlighted 
above. The straight baselines seem to constitute only 14 segments but the start and 
finish points are the same as in the hypothetical map, namely from Ra’s Shaykh 
Mas’ud to Ra’s Haffah. The longest segment, from Ra’s Shaykh Mas’ud to Jazirat al 
Ghanam is the same in both. 
In a note dated 4 February 1983, Iran issued a Note to the United Nations 
relating to Oman’s notification of 1 June 1982, attached to Note No. MO/262/82, 31 
August 1982. 399 Iran’s note stated that it viewed Oman’s notification as a unilateral 
extension of Oman’s internal waters and territorial sea.  As stated above, the US’s 
concern, that Oman would enclose as internal waters areas which had not previously 
been internal waters, was matched by Iran in its Note of 4 February 1983. Iran’s 
concern related to the right of innocent passage for its ships through Oman’s internal 
waters, and invoking international law in general, and citing Articles 4 and 5 TSCZ 
1958 and Article 8 LOSC 1982 in particular, presumed that this claim by Oman did 
not alter the right of passage of ships of other states. Article 8(2) LOSC 1982 states 
that where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with Article 7 results 
in enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been established as 
such, a right of innocent passage as provided in the Convention shall exist in those 
waters. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
398 Limits in the Seas, No.113, “Djibouti-Oman: Straight Baseline Claims” (The Geographer, 
Washington D.C., 1992). 
399 (1983) 1 LOSB 38. 
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Observations on the legislation of Oman and the degree of its conformity with 
international law 
 
As early as 1972, and again in its 1982 Decree Oman claimed a 12nm territorial sea 
and it is of note that delimitation of the territorial sea shall be by the equidistance line, 
partly reflecting Article 12 TSCZ 1958 and LOSC 1982. However, as set out above, 
Oman’s 1972 Decree differs considerably from Convention provisions in additionally 
establishing baselines of maritime features of islands, rocks reefs and shoals more than 
12nm from the mainland or from another island rock reef or shoal. Nor is there any 
attempt to define an island, and it is not clear what “rocks”, “reefs” and “shoals” are.  
 Like other Gulf states Oman establishes the low water line as the standard 
baseline in 1972, however, in the 1981 Decree an addition was made to this so that 
the normal baseline was stated to be the lower water line not only of the mainland or 
islands but also rocks (which are undefined). Further, once more, as seen above in 
relation to the legislation of Saudi Arabia and Iran, Oman’s provisions for straight 
baselines in the 1972 Decree were subject to heavy criticism by the US on the basis 
that they do not meet the requirements of international law. The US contention that 
they do not conform with international law is clearly well-founded.   
 
Bahrain, Qatar and Iraq 
 
 
i. Bahrain 
 
Bahrain issued Decree No. 8 of 1993 with respect to the territorial sea and contiguous 
zone of the State of Bahrain on 20 April 1993. 400 The Preamble states that Bahrain 
exercises sovereignty over the territorial sea, and sovereign rights, control and 
jurisdiction over the seas and the continental shelf adjacent to its shores “in accordance 
with the rules of international law and within the limits prescribed by that law”.  
                                                             
400 (1993) 24 LOSB 5. It is worth noting that although Bahrain is a State constituted by islands, it is 
does not claim archipelagic status pursuant to Part IV LOSC 1982 , and therefore does not claim 
archipelagic baselines 
 
 
162 
Further, in the Preamble Bahrain recognises that the LOSC 1982 “represents a 
statement of the rules of contemporary international law which accords with the views 
of the States generally in relation to the matters dealt with in the provisions of this 
Law”.  
Article 1 states that the territorial sea is 12nm measured from baselines drawn 
in accordance with LOSC 1982. Article 2 states that the contiguous zone shall be 
24nm, and is also to be measured from the same baselines as referred to in Article 1, 
also in accordance with LOSC 1982.  
 
 
ii. Qatar 
 
Qatar issued Decree No.40 of 1992 defining the Breadth of the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone of the State of Qatar, dated 16 April 1992. 401 This followed Qatar’s 
signing of LOSC 1982 on 27 November 1984, and indeed that Treaty, as well as CSC 
1958, is referred to in the Preamble of this Decree. Qatar ratified LOSC 1982 on 9 
December 2002. 
Article 1 states that the breadth of Qatar’s territorial sea is 12nm measured 
from the baselines “determined in accordance with the rules of international law”.402 
Qatar states that it exercises “sovereignty over its territorial sea, the airspace, seabed 
and subsoil thereof in accordance with international law…” Article 3 confirms that 
Qatar has a contiguous zone with a breadth of 12nm measured from the outer limit 
of the territorial sea, over which the state exercises “all rights and powers provided 
for under international law”. There is no provision for delimitation of the territorial 
sea or contiguous zone between Qatar and other states. 
  Thus in 1992, Qatar was legislating in accordance with international law with 
respect to the limits of the territorial sea and contiguous zone and the powers 
exercised within those zones. 
 
 
                                                             
401 (1993) 23 LOSB 22. 
402Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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iii. Iraq 
 
A note dated 2 February 1956 was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, 
stating that no legislation existed at that current time dealing with the regime of the 
territorial sea. It further went on to state that it was the normal practice to apply in 
this respect “the general rules recognised by public international law”.403 Thus Iraq 
stated its desire to achieve consistency with the international law of the sea. 
 Iraq issued a Republican Ordinance No. 435 on 15 November 1958.404 In 
Article 2, Iraq confirmed that its territorial sea extends 12nm, measured from the 
low-water line of the Iraqi coast. This brought Iraq in line with Saudi Arabia.  
Article 3 further states that where Iraq’s territorial sea overlaps with that of 
another state, the boundaries shall be determined by agreement with the other state 
in accordance with the “recognised rules of international law” or with such 
understanding as may be reached between the states.405 Clearly this is a broad 
provision, but intended to operate in accordance with either international law, or 
agreement, with agreement or the genuine attempt to reach one having a long- 
standing and historical place in the customary law of delimitation.406 Agreement as a 
means of delimitation is also referred to Article 12 TSCZ 1958 dealing with 
delimitation where the territorial sea of two states overlap.407  
Articles 2 and 3 were repeated in Law No. 71 of 1958.408 However, in the latter, 
there was an addition in Article 2 to the effect that the 12nm territorial sea was to be 
measured from the low-water mark “following the sinuosities” of the Iraqi coast. This 
makes clear that straight baselines are not being claimed. 
                                                             
403 (1957) 6 U.N. Leg. Ser. 26. 
404 Published in the Official Gazette No. 74 of 15 November 1958, and reproduced in (1970) 15 U.N. 
Leg. Ser. 89. 
405 (1970) 15 U.N. Leg. Ser. 89. 
406 For example, as made clear in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969), albeit in the context 
of delimitation of the continental shelf.  
407 Article 15 LOSC 1982 on delimitation of the territorial sea also repeats the provision for agreement. 
408 Published in the Official Gazette No. 82 of 25 November 1968, and reproduced in (1970) 15 U.N. 
Leg. Ser. 90. 
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Iraq issued national legislation on 16 March 2011 to confirm straight baselines 
which it claimed.409 There is a list of geographical coordinates with a map attached. 
 
 
Observations on the legislation of Bahrain, Qatar and Iraq and the degree of 
their conformity with international law 
 
In the brief legislation of 1993, which is somewhat limited in the rights and jurisdiction 
which it sets out, Bahrain clearly intended and explicitly states that, as far as this 
legislation goes, this is to be “in accordance with” and “within the limits prescribed” 
by “the rules of international law”. Further, LOSC 1982 is invoked in the Preamble 
which Bahrain ratified on 30 May 1985. It could not be more clear that Bahrain 
explicitly allied itself with international law. It is therefore no surprise that Bahrain 
claims a 12nm territorial sea and 24nm contiguous zone in accordance with LOSC 
1982.  Similarly, Qatar also explicitly invokes international law, referring to CSC 1958 
and LOSC 1982 in the Preamble of its 1992 Decree, and also claiming a 12 territorial 
sea and 12nm contiguous zone, both consistent with LOSC 1982. In addition, Iraq also 
claims a 12nm territorial sea, with the standard baseline being the low-water line in 
the usual way. Iraq’s legislation is permeated with references to its explicit affirmation 
that it recognises the general rules of international law. 
 
Observations on the claims to straight baselines in the region 
 
As has been highlighted above, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman and Iraq have all 
claimed systems of straight baselines. The US objections to those of Iran, Saudi 
Arabia and Oman are justified on the basis that such claims are not on accordance 
with international law, and it is clear when examining the reasoning that such 
objections are justified.  However, of further interest is that some of the Gulf States 
have objected to each other’s excessive straight baselines as contravening 
international law, even though they themselves have dubiously claimed them. As has 
                                                             
409 (2012) 77 LOSB 15. Transmitted through a letter to the U.N. dated 16 March 2011. Deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the U.N. under Article 16(2) of the LOSC 1982. 
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been seen, Oman’s baselines have been objected to by Iran; Iran’s have been objected 
to by Qatar; Saudi Arabia’s have been objected to by the UAE and Iran; and the 
UAE’s have been objected to by Saudi Arabia.410 As such, while it may be said that 
a number of Gulf States have claimed straight baselines in a way which exceeds 
international law, it cannot be said that there is a clear recognition by any of the Gulf 
states that the claims are in accordance with law. As such there is little ground to 
argue that that there is a regional customary international law governing claims to 
straight baselines.411 Further, as will also be seen in Chapter 6 of this thesis, the 
claims to straight baselines, disputed as between Gulf States, has not affected the 
delimitation agreements entered into by them, as straight baselines were not relied 
on in the agreements.412 Again, this supports the view that claims to straight baselines 
by some Gulf States are not accepted by others both within and outside the Gulf area, 
and that there is no consistent state practice that could be said to give rise to a local 
custom. 
  
General concluding remarks on the degree of conformity of the Gulf states with 
international law of the sea   
 
The 1950s saw the finalisation of the TSCZ 1958 and CSC 1958. None of the Gulf 
States were parties to these conventions, although Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran did 
attend the Geneva Conferences. In 1971, the remaining Gulf States ended their 
protectorate relationship with Britain which had involved a control over their 
legislation and foreign policy. UNCLOS III began in 1973 at which the Gulf States 
participated, with eventually all ratifying LOSC 1982 with the exception of Iran and 
UAE, although they both signed it.  
A particularly contentious aspect of Gulf State practice referred to above is the 
extensive straight baselines claimed by the Gulf States with the longest coastlines, 
                                                             
410 Saudi Arabia’s objections to the UAE’s are bound up with a dispute between both States as to the 
effect of the 1974 bilateral agreement between them. For further discussion of this agreement see 
Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
411 For a brief discussion of customary international law and regional customary international law, see 
Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
412 See for example the Saudi Arabia-Iran 1968 agreement dealt with in Chapter 6.  
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namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE and Oman.   It is in this area that can be see the 
most obvious departure from international law.  
Saudi Arabia and Iran, which were unique in the Gulf as the only two Gulf 
states whose foreign policy was not controlled by the British were the first to legislate 
in the area of baselines, the territorial sea and the contiguous zone.  Indeed it may 
also be said that they were innovative and proactive in the way they were aware of 
international law developments and clearly were influenced by each other. Therefore, 
for example, Saudi Arabia’s 1949 Decree which provided for a 6nm territorial sea 
Clearly this followed Iran’s 1934 Act which legislated for a territorial sea of the same 
breadth. It is clear that the Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq were ahead of other states in 
the international arena in claiming a 12nm territorial sea. 413 
Obvious examples of conformity with international law are the laws of 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Iraq which explicitly refer in their legislation to TCSZ 
1958, LOSC 1982 and international law as sources of law governing their maritime 
claims. As seen above, all the Gulf States claim a 12nm territorial sea, with most 
doing so many years before LOSC 1982 came into existence. Those Gulf States 
which provide for delimitation of their territorial sea all do so by way of the 
equidistance line apart from Saudi Arabia which refers to equitable principles, and 
Iraq which provides for delimitation according to the rules international law or 
agreement. 
Most of the Gulf States also claim a contiguous zone, the breadth of which is 
said to be 12nm from the outer limit of the territorial sea or 24nm from the baselines, 
thereby conforming with LOSC 1982. However, as observed above a particularly 
unususal aspect of the legislation of Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE is that they 
claim a contiguous zone for purposes going outside those provided by international 
law, including for matters relating to security, navigation and environmental matters.  
                                                             
413 In the arbitral award of Petroleum Development Ltd. v The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 
144, at 151, Lord Asquith found that Abu Dhabi’s territorial sea was 3 miles in breadth. This was in 
accordance with British foreign policy at the time. The decision was in relation to the 1939 oil 
concession agreement, and it is unlikely that this was binding in any way other than for the purpose 
of the concession. Moving forward from the 1950s, and writing in 1977, Alexander states that by the 
beginning of 1976, 29 states claimed a 3 mile territorial sea, 18 states claimed between 3 and 12 miles, 
56 states claimed 12 miles, 11 claimed between 12 and 200 miles, and 9 claimed 200 miles. See 
Alexander L.M., ‘Regional Arrangements in the Oceans’, (1977) 71 AJIL 84 at p. 85. 
 
 
167 
On the basis of the examination carried out in this chapter, it may be concluded 
that in general Gulf States are in conformity in many respects with international law 
in this area. The question of whether this conformity extends to legislation governing 
the the continental shelf and EEZs of the Gulf States and their delimitation is the 
subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Law of the Sea in the Gulf: 
National Legislation on the Continental Shelf and the EEZ (the 
1940s to the present) 
 
Introduction 
 
A main force propelling delimitation in the Gulf has been, and continues to be, the 
desire to explore and exploit oil and gas resources in the seabed and subsoil. This 
economic motivation has necessarily sought the definition of areas in which such 
activities took place, so as to provide certainty for the actors involved in the process 
of exploitation of such natural resources.414 The Truman Proclamation on the 
Continental Shelf in 1945 resulted in subsequent national legislation promulgated by 
the Gulf States regarding their rights in the seabed and subsoil.  
The Gulf is characterised by a number of offshore islands of varying sizes and 
of varying distances from the coasts of states. There are many continuing territorial 
disputes concerning them, which have delayed or prevented agreements over 
maritime delimitation taking place.415 Some bilateral agreements have resolved some 
of these disputes. The manner in which islands have been taken into account, if at all, 
when boundary lines have been agreed is therefore of importance.  
The Gulf Sea is relatively shallow, having an average depth of less than 40 
metres.416 Due to its surface area, Gulf States can claim neither an entire 200nm EEZ 
nor a continental shelf to a distance of 200nm in the Gulf. The Gulf Sea is generally 
                                                             
414 Fisheries are another resource which are of importance in the region, although they have not 
motivated delimitation in the same way as the desire to explore mineral resources, and are not dealt 
with in this thesis.  
415 One such example of a territorial dispute is that between Sharjah and Iran over Abu Musa Island 
which has prevented a continental shelf boundary being agreed between them.  
416 C.G. MacDonald Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Law of the Sea (London, Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 
25. 
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not more than 100 metres deep, with the deeper waters existing at its entrance, along 
the Iranian coast, and in certain pockets in the south along the Arab coast. It is 
characterised by islands and reefs which have an impact upon delimitation issues as 
will be seen in due course. One significance of the shallowness of the Gulf is that it 
has in the past given rise to lengthy discussion of the question of whether or not a 
continental shelf exists in the Gulf in both the geological and legal sense. Because of 
its shallowness it is often said to have either no continental shelf at all or the Gulf as 
a whole is said to constitute an extended continental shelf. There has been some 
debate among commentators with regard to this issue.417 
As outlined earlier, Article 1 CSC 1958 refers to the continental shelf as the 
seabed and subsoil of submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the territorial 
sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of those areas. 
As has been seen already, a legal continental shelf is presently defined in Article 76 
LOSC 1982 as extending either from beyond the territorial sea to the outer edge of 
the continental margin (of which the geological shelf is only a part), or to a distance 
of 200nm from the baselines. Again, the distance criterion of 200nm does not depend 
on the existence of an actual continental shelf in a geological sense.  It is therefore 
suggested, that in relation to the provisions in both Conventions, it is irrelevant 
whether or not an actual continental shelf exists in the Gulf, and the applicability of 
the provisions is therefore not affected by its absence.  
 
 
                                                             
417 As stated by R. Young, in “Saudi Arabian Offshore Legislation”, (1949) 43 AJIL 530 at 531: ‘…as 
a factual matter, no continental shelf exists in the Persian Gulf, which is merely a basin much less than 
100 fathoms on the Asian continental mass’.  Young changed his mind in time, writing that the Gulf 
as a whole was clearly a continental shelf in the legal sense, in “Equitable solutions for offshore 
boundaries: the 1968 Saudi Arabia-Iran agreement”, (1970) 64 AJIL 152. See also H. Lauterpacht, 
“Sovereignty over Submarine Areas”, (1950) 27 BYIL 376 at 384, where he states that the fact that in 
the Persian Gulf there is no rapid drop or a depth of 600 feet, so that the geographical concept of the 
continental shelf does not seem applicable, and this explains why there is no reference to the 
continental shelf in the Proclamation issued by the Gulf States. Other examples of similar views are 
those expressed by H.M. Al-Baharna, The Arabian Gulf States (2nd ed, Beirut, 1975), p. 279; J.Y. 
Brinton, “Jurisdiction over Seabed Resources and Recent Developments in the Persian Gulf Area”, 
(1949) 5 REDI 131 at 137. See also G. Blake, Maritime Aspects of Arabian Geopolitics (Arab 
Research Centre, Research Paper Series, Arab Papers, No.11, September 1982), p. 4 who opines that 
on the basis that “[p]hysically it is akin to an inland sea occupying a large depression, so it is not 
strictly continental shelf, but its shallow waters gives it this status according to international law”. 
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Saudi Arabia  
 
A Royal Proclamation of 28 May 1949, issued in the wake of the Truman 
Proclamation of 1945 declared that the subsoil and seabed of the areas contiguous to 
the Saudi Arabian coast was declared to appertain to Saudi Arabia and subject to its 
jurisdiction and control.418 Although this went beyond the Truman Proclamation in 
that it declared Saudi Arabian jurisdiction and control over the seabed and subsoil 
instead of just over the natural resources contained within them, as has already been 
observed in Chapter 2, Lord Asquith in Petroleum Development Ltd v Sheikh  of Abu 
Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144 found that the Gulf Proclamations broadly conformed with 
the Truman Proclamation.419  
It was further stated in the Saudi Proclamation that the boundaries of such areas 
with other states would be determined in accordance with equitable principles by 
agreement with the other state or states, which was reflective of customary 
international law at the time. This reference to delimitation on the basis of equitable 
principles reflected the reference to them in the Truman Proclamation on the 
continental shelf of 1945. 
It is notable that, unlike Iran’s Bill of 1949, which is referred to below, there 
is no mention of the “continental shelf” as a concept specifically, only a reference to 
the seabed and subsoil, because of uncertainty at the time as to whether it in fact 
could be said that there was a continental shelf in existence due to the fact that the 
Gulf is so shallow, and geologically, a continental shelf does not appear to exist in 
the physical sense.420 
 
                                                             
418 Royal Pronouncement concerning the Policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with respect to the 
Subsoil and Sea Bed of Areas in the Persian Gulf contiguous to the Coasts of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, 28 May 1949, (1951) 1 U.N. Leg. Ser. 22.  
419 A similar view is expressed by R. Young, “The Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the High 
Seas’, (1951) 45 AJIL 225 at 228 who states that “[i]nsofar as the claims apply to submarine areas, it 
would seem unprofitable to speculate on possible shades of meaning in the various phrases used. All 
have in common a minimum intent to control exclusively the resources of certain areas of sea bed and 
subsoil; and as a practical matter it would seem impossible to control these resources in situ without 
controlling the sea bed and subsoil which contain them.” 
420 MacDonald relates that in a private interview with Richard Young on 23 April 1976, an American 
who had been advising the Saudi Government on its maritime claims at the time of the 1949 
Proclamation, Mr Young confirmed the term “continental shelf” was not used in the Proclamation 
because there was physically no “edge” in the continental shelf in the Gulf. See C.G. MacDonald, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Law of the Sea (London, Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 155, n. 37. 
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A Declaration concerning the Limits of the Exclusive Fishing Zones of Saudi Arabia 
in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf was issued in 1974.421 The Preamble of the 
Declaration affirms the provisions of Article 9 concerning fishing in the Saudi Decree 
No. 33 of 16 February 1958.422 Article 1 states that the EFZs of the Kingdom are 
those areas contiguous to the coasts of the mainland and islands. It goes on to state 
that if the EFZs, measured from the baselines referred to in Article 5 of Decree No. 
33 of 1958, overlap with those of another state, the boundary shall be the median line 
every point of which is equidistant from the baselines from which the territorial sea 
is measured. This does not reflect Article 74 of LOSC 1984 which refers to 
delimitation of the EEZ which shall be effected by agreement on the basis of 
international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.  
 As seen in Chapter 4, Saudi Arabia’s most recent legislative activity is in the 
form of the Statute of Maritime Delimitation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of 13 
December 2012.423  Article 12 states that the EEZ extends to the maritime borders 
with adjacent and opposite states. No outer limit is set. Article 13 sets out the 
Kingdom’s rights in the EEZ. Firstly, it has exclusive sovereign rights for the purpose 
of exploring natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent 
to the seabed and its subsoil, to conserve and manage such resources, and in relation 
to other activities for economic exploration and exploitation of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from water, currents and wind. Secondly, there is exclusive 
sovereignty over a) the protection and preservation of the marine environment, b) 
marine scientific research, c) the establishment and use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures and a safety zone around them, and the sovereign right to 
issue law and regulations regarding the customs, taxes, sanitary laws, and the laws 
of security, safety, immigration and others. Further, Article 13(3) is a catch-all 
provision which claims all other rights in accordance with LOSC 1982 and other 
rules of international law. Article 13 reflects Articles 56 and 60 LOSC 1982, although 
the use of the word “security” by Saudi Arabia in Article 13 is not found in the 
                                                             
421 For the text see Appendix V of A. A. El-Hakim, The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the 
Sea (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1979), p. 204. It was translated by El-Hakim from a 
copy of the original Arabic acquired by courtesy of the Ambassador of Kuwait in London, see p. 
204, n. 1. 
422 For discussion of this Decree see Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
423 (2012) 70 LOSB 15. 
 
 
172 
corresponding LOSC 1982 provision. This addition of “security” was also made by 
Iran in its 1993 Law as discussed below.  
Article 17 confirms that the Kingdom’s continental shelf comprises the seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas extending beyond the territorial sea throughout 
the natural prolongation of its land territory. Article 18(1) states that the Kingdom 
exercises its sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring 
it and exploiting its natural resources. Article 18(2) defines the aforementioned 
natural resources as the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and 
subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, namely 
organisms which, at the harvestable stage, are either immobile on or under the seabed 
or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or subsoil. 
Both Article 17 and 18 reflect LOSC 1982. 
Article 19 states that the Kingdom has the exclusive right to authorize drilling 
in the continental shelf for all purposes. This mirrors Article 81 LOSC 1982. 
However, Article 19 goes on to state that Saudi Arabia can exploit the subsoil by 
digging tunnels regardless of the depth of the water above the seabed at that location. 
This provision does not appear in LOSC 1982. 
Article 22 confirms that this statute does not invalidate previous agreements 
between the Kingdom and neighbouring states regarding maritime borders or the 
exploitation of natural resources.  
It is notable that the Saudi Statute, despite its name, does not include provisions 
governing delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, making no reference, for 
example, to the equidistance line. 424 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
424 As seen in Chapter 4, this omission is also in respect of the delimitation of the territorial sea and 
contiguous zone.  
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Observations on the legislation of Saudi Arabia and the degree of its conformity 
with international law 
 
Saudi Arabia’s legislation demonstrates a significant degree of conformity with 
international law. From the early 1949 Proclamation, there was a desire to reflect the 
Truman Proclamation in the nature of the jurisdiction over the continental shelf. The 
2012 Statute also frames the expression of rights over the continental shelf in 
accordance with international law in the form of LOSC 1982, although as set out 
above, the right to exploit the subsoil by digging tunnels regardless of the depth of the 
water above the seabed at that location goes does not have a corresponding provision 
in LOSC 1982.  
  The 1974 Declaration established rights in an EFZ rather than an EEZ. This 
has been developed by the 2012 Statute into a claim to an EEZ. The description of the 
rights in the EEZ largely comply with LOSC 1982, and indeed, as stated above, the 
2012 Statute contains a catch-all provision which claims all other rights contained in 
LOSC 1982 and other rules of international law. However, it is of particular note, as 
set out above, that the 2012 Statute makes an addition, not found in LOSC 1982, of 
the word “security” to the list of matters over which it has jurisdiction in relation to its 
artificial islands, installations and structures in the EEZ. It may be noted that Saudi 
Arabian legislation on the contiguous zone (found in Chapter  4 of this thesis) added 
“security” (as well as matters pertaining to the environment and navigation) to the 
matters of infringement for which the contiguous zone can be used, which again fell 
outside the provisions in LOSC 1982. The issue of “security” is clearly a matter of 
some importance to Saudi Arabia in both these zones.  
 Delimitation of the continental shelf was stated in the 1949 Proclamation to be 
in accordance with equitable principles, which as stated above, was in accordance with 
the Truman Proclamation 1945 and indeed with customary international law at the 
time. Delimitation of the continental shelf has not been dealt with further by any Saudi 
Arabian legislation since that time. It is of interest also, that while the 1974 Declaration 
invoked equidistance for the delimitation of the EFZ claimed in that legislation, no 
further legislation on the delimitation of the EEZ was issued. It has been noted above 
that the reference to equidistance in relation to delimitation of the EFZ/EEZ is not 
matched in LOSC 1982. However, despite the dearth of legislative provision by Saudi 
Arabia on delimitation, the next step to take is to examine the Saudi Arabian 
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continental shelf delimitation by way of its bilateral agreements and place this in the 
context of the international Conventions and also of international case law. This 
exercise is carried out in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis.  
 
 
Iran 
 
On 19 May 1949 a Bill was submitted to the Iranian Parliament relating to sub-sea 
resources. The opening statement of the Bill states that Iran’s claim is made in view 
of international regulations passed recently on the subject of natural resources, and 
is clearly based upon the Truman Proclamation 1945. Article 1 states that the natural 
resources at the bottom of the sea and under the bottom of the sea up to the limits of 
the continental shelf belong to the Iranian Government.  Article 2 states that 
delimitation of the “continental shelf” with another adjacent country will be fixed 
equitably between the states with respect to the natural resources of the continental 
shelf.425 However the Bill did not become law until 1955.  
 In the Act of 18 June 1955 on the Exploration and Exploitation of the Natural 
Resources of the Continental Shelf of Iran, Iran issued similar legislation to the flurry 
of Proclamations of the other Gulf States of 1949.426 Unlike those Proclamations, the 
word “continental shelf” is used. Like the Saudi Proclamation, Article 2 of the 1955 
Act states that “the (submarine) areas as well as the natural resources of the sea-bed 
and subsoil thereof, up to the limit of the continental Shelf” adjacent to Iran’s coast 
and that of its islands belong to Iran and “remain under its sovereignty”. Article 3 
states that where Iran’s continental shelf overlaps with another state’s, the dispute 
shall be resolved according to equity.427 
  Iran issued a Proclamation of 30 October 1973 concerning the outer limit of 
the Exclusive Fishing Zone of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.428  Oman 
was the first to establish its claim in this respect in 1972, having been influenced by 
                                                             
425 See (1949) 5 REDI 347 where the text of the Bill is reproduced. 
426 (1974) 16 U.N. Leg. Ser. 151 
427 (1970) 15 U.N. Leg. Ser. 366, where the text of Article 3 is in French. 
428 (1976) 18 U.N. Leg. Ser. 334. 
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trends in state practice and UNCLOS III, with Iran doing so in the following year.429 
Article 1 of Iran’s Proclamation 1973 states that the outer limit of the EFZ in the Gulf 
is the outer limit of the superjacent waters of the continental shelf of Iran. Article 
1(a) states that where the continental shelf of Iran has been delimited under bilateral 
agreements with other states, the outer limit of the EFZ is the outer limit of the 
continental shelf as specified in those agreements.  
Article 1(b) states that where the outer limit of the continental shelf has not 
been delimited in bilateral agreements, unless otherwise agreed, the outer limit of the 
superjacent waters of the continental shelf of Iran shall be, for the purpose of 
delimiting the EFZ, the median line every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of the 
parties concerned are measured. As has been seen already, this provision for the 
delimitation of the EFZ on the basis of equidistance is not what was eventually 
decided in respect of delimitation of the EEZ in Article 74(1) LOSC 1982.430 Iran’s 
endorsement of equidistance for delimitation of the EFZ did not extend to the same 
for the continental shelf itself. In 1955 Iran had stated that delimitation of the 
continental shelf would be effected according to the principles of equity. 
Article 2 sets the outer limit of the EFZ of Iran in the Sea of Oman as 50 nm 
from the baseline from which the breadth of territorial sea of Iran is measured. Again 
in this Article, Iran confirms that in areas where the EFZ of Iran and that of another 
state may overlap, unless otherwise agreed, the boundary shall be the median line 
every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial seas of the parties are measured. Considering the 
language used in these provisions which incorporate equidistance, Iran utilized the 
phrase “unless otherwise agreed”. This appeared in the provisions on delimitation of 
the territorial sea in TSCZ 1958 and the continental shelf in CSC 1958 (as well as in 
the LOSC 1982 in respect of delimitation of the territorial sea), where equidistance 
                                                             
429 It is therefore not the case, as contended by C.G. MacDonald in Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Law of 
the Sea (London, Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 200, that Iran set a precedent in the Gulf when it claimed 
an EFZ in October 1973. He does not in fact mention Oman’s legislation on the EFZ at all. 
430 As has been seen, Article 74(1) provides that delimitation shall be effected by agreement on the 
basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ in order to achieve an 
equitable solution. Article 74(2) states that where no agreement can be reached within a reasonable 
period of time, the states involved shall resort to the procedures for settlement of disputes in Part XV 
LOSC 1982. 
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is referred to. However, unlike those provisions, there is no reference to historic title 
or special circumstances which may negate the use of equidistance.  
As seen in Chapter 4, Iran issued the Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea, 1993.431 Articles 14 confirms 
Iran’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ with regard to: 
 
(a)  Exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of all natural 
resources, whether living or non-living, of the seabed and subsoil thereof and its 
superjacent waters, and with regard to other economic activities for the production of 
energy from water, currents and winds. These rights are exclusive; 
 
(b)   Adoption and enforcement of appropriate laws and regulations, especially for 
the following activities: 
 
(i) The establishment and use of artificial islands and other installations and 
structures, laying of submarine cables and pipelines and the establishment of relevant 
security and safety zones; 
(ii) Any kind of research; 
(iii) The protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
 
(c) Such sovereign rights as granted by regional or international treaties. 
  
 
Much of this mirrors Article 56 LOSC 1982 which provides for rights jurisdiction 
and duties in the EEZ. However, there are a number of differences in which Iran’s 
provisions go beyond LOSC 1982, namely: Iran’s Article 14 (b)(i) which adds the 
words “laying of submarine cables and pipelines and the establishment of relevant 
security and safety zones”; Article 14(b)(ii) which refers to “any kind of research” 
instead of “marine scientific research” in Article 56(b)(ii) LOSC 1982; and Iran has 
added Article 14(c) which does not appear in LOSC 1982. 
 Article 15 of the 1993 Act confirms Iran’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
over its continental shelf. In this regard it states that its Article 14, set out above, 
applies “mutatis mutandis” to Iran’s rights and jurisdiction in its continental shelf. 
This departs from Article 77(1) LOSC 1982 which instead provides that a state 
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights “for the purpose of exploring it 
and exploiting its natural resources”. Conversely, in the 1993 Act, there is also no 
equivalent of Article 80 LOSC 1982 which provides that the same rights of  
construction and management of artificial islands, installations and structures in the 
                                                             
431 (1993) 24 LOSB 10.  
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EEZ as set out in Article 60 applies “mutatis mutandis” to artificial islands, 
installations and structures on the continental shelf. It is of note that Iran does not 
provide for an outer limit for its EEZ.  
   Iran’s Article 15 states that the continental shelf comprises the seabed and 
subsoil of the marine areas that extend beyond the territorial sea throughout the 
natural prolongation of the land territory. This utilizes the same language of the 
definition in Article 76(1) LOSC, however, it does not include the latter’s method of 
setting the limit of the continental shelf. Indeed, Iran does not set the limit of its 
continental shelf.  
Article 19 deals with delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf, stating that 
their limits, unless otherwise determined in accordance with bilateral agreements, 
shall be a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point on the 
baselines of the two States. As will be seen in due course in this chapter, this is similar 
to the provisions of other Gulf States, but it is not in accordance with the delimitation 
provisions of the EEZ and continental shelf in LOSC 1982. 
A number of States objected to Iran’s provisions relating to the EEZ and 
continental shelf in Article 14 of its 1993 Act, and although not strictly matters of 
delimitation, it is useful to consider these protests briefly on the basis that they have 
relevance for the wider consideration of Iran’s compliance with international law. 
The US, in a protest dated 11 January 1994, stated that the provision in Article 
14(b)(i) for “security zones” to be established in the EEZ is impermissible in the light 
of Article 60(4),(5) LOSC 1982 which provides only for “safety zones” of a radius 
not exceeding 500 metres around artificial islands and other installations and 
structures within the EEZ. The US was concerned about the distinction Iran drew in 
Article 14(b)(i) between “security” and “safety” zones, with only the latter being 
provided for in the limited circumstances as outlined by the US Further, the US was 
clearly concerned about the lack of definition of the size of such a security zone as 
claimed by Iran.  
The US further protested about the apparent provision in Article 14(b)(i) for 
more authority to control the laying of submarine cables and pipelines on Iran’s 
continental shelf than is permitted by international law as reflected in Article 79 
LOSC 1982, which, inter alia, gives states rights to lay submarine cable and pipelines 
in the continental shelf of other states. The US also protested against the phrase “any 
kind of research” in Article 14(b)(ii) which, as discussed above, goes beyond the 
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reference “marine scientific research” the regulation of which only is provided for by 
LOSC 1982 in the EEZ. The US was keen to make the point that hydrographic 
surveys conducted seaward of the territorial sea are not marine scientific research.432 
Iran replied stating that due to the high number of oil exploitation platforms and the 
volume of shipping traffic, a security zone is “completely necessary” for the security 
of installations as well as international navigation. With regard to the laying of 
submarine pipelines and cables Iran considered prior permission a necessary 
requirement, and referred to its reservations on this subject when it signed the CSC 
1958.433  
Qatar also protested against Article 14 in a similar vein to the US in two ways. 
Firstly Qatar protested against Article 14 giving Iran greater authority to control the 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines than permitted in Article 79 LOSC 1982.434 
Secondly, Qatar protested against the reference to “any kind of research” in Article 
14(b)(ii) when “international law” permits a state to conduct only marine scientific 
research in its EEZ. Iran replied stating that there is no customary law limiting the 
rights of a state to have control over the laying of cables and pipelines by other states 
in its continental shelf. Here, Iran relied on the fact that it was not a party to either 
CSC 1958 or LOSC 1982.435 Iran also correctly stated that according to Article 79(3) 
LOSC 1982 the delineation of the course for the laying of such pipelines on the 
continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal state. However, this did not 
answer the entirety of the concern that Iran was trying to control the laying of 
pipelines and cables ab initio.  Iran further dubiously justified the reference to “any 
kind of research” in the EEZ in Article 14(b)(ii) on the basis that: 
 
any research conducted in that area would be directly linked to the rights of coastal 
States concerning the exploration and exploitation of living and non-living 
resources.436  
                                                             
432 For the US’ protest see (1994) 25 LOSB 101-3.  
433 See Iran’s comments on the US’ viewpoints, communicated by the Permanent Mission of Iran to 
the U.N. in a note verbale No. 224 of 24 May 1994, at (1994) 26 LOSB 35-8. 
434 See note verbale outlining the position of Qatar with regard to Iran’s 1993 Act, 32 LOSB (1996) 
89-90. The note verbale incorrectly refers to the offending provision as Article 14(a); the correct 
reference is Article 14(b)(i). 
435 It is not at all clear that customary law was on Iran’s side, as hindering other states laying cable 
and pipelines in its continental shelf is arguable in breach of the concept of the freedom of the high 
seas.  
436 Iran further stated that it had reserved its right for the adoption and enforcement of appropriate 
laws and regulations in this respect. For Iran’s reply to Qatar see letter dated 18 October 1996 from 
the Permanent Representative of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General of the U.N., at (1997) 33 
LOSB  86- 88. 
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Observations on the legislation of Iran and the degree of its conformity with 
international law 
 
With regard to the provision of rights over the continental shelf and the EEZ, while 
this began modestly in the 1955 Act in respect of the continental shelf (and with little 
detail in respect of the EFZ in the 1973 Proclamation), these were set out more 
extensively and in far more detail in the 1993 Act. As set out above, there are a number 
of departures in the 1993 Act from LOSC 1982. While the description of the 
continental shelf accords with LOSC 1982, Iran claims rights more widely in the 
continental shelf as well as the EEZ. As indicated above, these claims have been 
subject to detailed objections by the US and Qatar. It is also of particular interest that 
one of the ways in which Iran’s 1993 Act goes beyond LOSC 1982 is the provision 
for the establishment of “security zones” as well as “safety zones” in its EEZ, while 
LOSC 1982 only allows states to establish  safety zones of a radius not exceeding 500 
metres around artificial islands and other installations and structures within the EEZ.  
As seen above, the US objected to Iran’s legislation in this respect. Iran’s response 
was that security zones were essential because of the many installations which exist 
for oil exploration in its EEZ as well as to protect navigation. This is an interesting 
glimpse into two major concerns for Iran in the Gulf. This mirrors the findings of 
Chapter 4 of this thesis that Iran went beyond LOSC 1982 in providing in its 1993 Act 
for a contiguous zone in which it could adopt measures necessary to prevent 
infringement of laws relating to matters of “security” (as well as “maritime” and 
“environmental” matters).  
 Delimitation of the continental shelf in the 1955 Act was stated to be in 
accordance with “equity”. However, in the 1973 Proclamation, delimitation of the EFZ 
was stated to be by way of the equidistance line, and this method was extended to both 
the continental shelf and the EEZ in Iran’s 1993 Act. These provisions are not in 
accordance with LOSC 1982, although they do reflect the importance given to 
equidistance in international case law. 
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Kuwait 
 
The States under British protection also issued proclamations declaring rights to 
contiguous subsoil and seabed areas in 1949, including Kuwait on 12 June 1949. This 
Proclamation, like the others in the Gulf, was also similar to the Saudi Proclamation 
in declaring that that the seabed and subsoil appertain to the State, being subject to its 
jurisdiction and control presumably so that British interests were not undermined in 
the region by any differences of approach.  This Proclamation, like the others, also 
made no reference to the continental shelf specifically and specifies that delimitation 
of the seabed and subsoil areas would be determined on equitable principles. 
 In a note verbale of 12 July 1971 provided by Kuwait to the U.N., Kuwait 
stated that although it was not a party to the CSC 1958, it was aware of the provisions 
of the Convention, and had adopted the median line in delimiting the boundary of its 
continental shelf with its neighbours.437 At this time however, Kuwait had only 
entered into one bilateral agreement, namely the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia 1965 
agreement partitioning the Neutral Zone.438  
 In Decree No. (317) of 2014 Concerning the Delimitation of the Marine Areas 
Pertaining to the State of Kuwait, as amended, Kuwait legislated in respect of its EEZ 
and continental shelf.439 
 Article 6 claims an EEZ, and Article 7 defines the continental shelf in 
accordance with Article 76 LOSC 1982. The breadth of these zones are not specified. 
However, it is of note that in both these provisions, Kuwait goes further than LOSC. 
In Article 6 in relation to it EEZ, it “shall exercise the same rights and powers 
exercised in its territorial sea, relative to natural resources and wealth, in addition to 
the rights and powers established by Article 56” of LOSC 1982. Similarly, in Article 
7, in respect of the continental shelf, it “shall exercise the rights and powers it 
exercises in its territorial sea, relating to natural resources and wealth of the seabed 
and subsoil thereof, as well as the other rights contained in Article 77” of LOSC 
                                                             
437 Reproduced in (1974) 16 U.N. Leg. Ser. 152. 
438 See Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
439Website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), Office of Legal 
Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, at: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/Kuwait_Legislation.pdf 
(accessed 8 July 2016). Article 5 was amended by Decree No. (141/2015) issued on 12 May 2015 
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1982. Although somewhat cryptic, these provisions goes beyond the LOSC 1982. 
While Articles 56 and 77 allows for sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, 
exploiting and managing resources in the EEZ and the continental shelf, as well as 
other jurisdiction in the EEZ as set out in Article 56(1)(b) LOSC 1982, there is a 
distinction between such rights, and the sovereignty which might be enjoyed over the 
“natural resources and wealth”, to use the wording in the 2014 Decree, in the 
territorial sea.  
With regard to delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf, the median line 
shall be the boundary with any adjacent or opposite state, in the absence of 
agreement, echoing provisions of other Gulf States. 
 
 
Observations on the legislation of Kuwait and the degree of its conformity with 
international law 
 
Kuwait’s initial position in respect of its rights in the continental shelf in its 1949 
Proclamation was, as has been seen, in line with the Truman Proclamation 1945. 
However, as indicated above, in its 2014 Decree, Kuwait’s rights in both the 
continental shelf and the EEZ go beyond what is contained in LOSC 1982. However, 
whether this really does amount to the exercise of new more extensive powers is 
unlikely. By way of explanation, it will be remembered that the 1949 Proclamations 
of various Gulf States on the continental shelf claimed jurisdiction and control over 
the seabed and subsoil instead of just over the natural resources contained within them. 
It has already been observed earlier in this chapter in relation to Saudi Arabia’s 
legislation that there is nothing significant in this distinction. By analogy, it is arguable 
that in the same way, Kuwait’s legislation does nothing controversial, and indeed this 
argument is fortified by Kuwait’s references in its legislation to CSC 1958 and LOSC 
1982, including a reference to its ratification of LOSC 1982 in the Preamble to the 
2014 Decree.  
 With regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf, in Kuwait’s 1971 note 
verbale, there was a clear acknowledgement of CSC 1958 and accordingly, it was 
stated that the boundary of its continental shelf was to be by way of the equidistance 
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line reflecting the reference to equidistance in CSC 1958. It is of note that the 
equidistance line was the method of delimitation provided for in the 2014 Decree in 
respect of both the continental shelf and EEZ. This does not reflect the corresponding 
provisions in LOSC 1982, although it does reflect the place given to equidistance in 
international case law. 
 
 
The UAE, Oman and Bahrain  
 
i. The UAE 
 
Prior to the formation of the UAE in 1971, the Gulf Sheikhdoms which subsequently 
became part of the U.A.E were under British protection.  These Sheikhdoms issued 
proclamations declaring rights to contiguous subsoil and seabed areas in 1949 as part 
of a series which also included Kuwait (referred to above), Bahrain and Qatar 
(referred to below) and which were all in the same terms. The Gulf Sheikhdoms 
issued their Proclamations as follows: Abu Dhabi on 10 June, Dubai on 14 June, 
Sharjah on 16 June, Ras al Khaimah on 17 June, Ajman on 20 June, and Umm al 
Qaywayn on 20 June.440 As referred to above in respect of Kuwait, these 
Proclamations were similar to the Saudi Proclamation in declaring that that the 
seabed and subsoil appertain to the States, being subject to their jurisdiction and 
control, They also made no reference to the continental shelf specifically. Further, 
they all specify that delimitation of the seabed and subsoil areas would be determined 
on equitable principles.  
  The UAE issued its first legislation on the law of the sea as a single 
entity in the form of the Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning 
the Exclusive Economic Zone and its delimitation dated 25 July 1980. 441  
                                                             
440  For the texts of the Proclamations see (1951) 1 U.N. Leg. Ser. 22-30  
441 Website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), Office of Legal 
Affairs U.N. Secretariat, at: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ARE_1980_Declaration.
pdf (accessed 9 July 2016). 
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Article 1 asserts that the UAE possesses an EEZ adjacent to its main coasts and 
to the coasts of its islands both in the Gulf Sea and the Sea of Oman. Article 2 states 
that the EEZ shall be measured from the baselines from which the territorial sea of 
its coasts including that of its islands is measured.  Article 3 does not set the limit at 
200nm. Once again, as seen in the case of other Gulf States, this is unsurprising 
because the UAE would not be able to claim it due to overlap with other states.  
Instead, and similar to Qatar’s Declaration of 1974, it states that the outer limit of the 
EEZ shall be determined according to the provisions of the agreements concluded by 
the Emirates in relation to their continental shelf. In other words, the outer limit of 
the EEZ will coincide with the outer limit of the continental shelf as agreed.  If there 
are no such agreements, the outer limit of the EEZ shall extend to the median line 
every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines. Again, 
there is a provision of delimitation of the EEZ by means of equidistance, which is 
not characterised by the generality of the provision on delimitation of the EEZ which 
states that the aim is to achieve an “equitable solution” in LOSC 1982.  
Article 4 states that the UAE shall exercise full sovereign rights over the natural 
resources located within its EEZ for the purpose of the exploration, exploitation, 
management, development and conservation of such resources. As will be seen later 
in this chapter, this is reminiscent of Qatar’s expression of its rights within its fishing 
zone. However, the UAE Declaration reflects more closely the language of Article 
56 LOSC 1982 in the Declaration’s reference to rights in the EEZ. It also states that 
the UAE shall possess full rights of jurisdiction within the EEZ for the purpose of 
exercising supervision over scientific research conducted therein and taking the 
requisite measures for the protection of the marine environment and for the 
construction of the structures, installations and artificial islands needed for the 
purposes of the zone. 
Article 6 confirms that the rights exercised by the UAE over the EEZ shall 
not prejudice international navigation rights of states provided for by international 
law. 
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As seen in Chapter 4, the UAE, as a single entity, issued Federal Law No. 19 of 1993 
on Determination of the off-shore territories of the United Arab Emirates. 442  
Article 12 states that subject to Articles 23(2) and 24 (about which, see below), the 
UAE shall have an EEZ the breadth of which does not exceed 200nm from the baseline 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This reflects Article 57 LOSC 
1982. 
Article 13 states that the UAE shall have in the EEZ sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, 
whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed, and of the 
seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic 
exploration and exploitation of the zone, such as the production of energy from the 
water, currents and winds. Article 14 states that in the EEZ there shall be jurisdiction 
with regard to 1) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and 
structures 2) marine scientific research and 3) the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment.  Both these Articles repeat what is in Article 56(1)(a), (b) LOSC 
1982.  
Article 17 states that subject to Articles 23(2) and 24 (about which, see below), 
the continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
extending beyond the territorial sea and considered a natural prolongation of the land 
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200nm from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer 
edge of the continental margin does not extend to that distance.  This repeats what is 
contained in Article 76(1) LOSC 1982 as the definition of the continental shelf. 
Article 18, modelled upon Article 77 LOSC 1982, states that there shall be 
exercised over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting its natural resources and that these rights are exclusive to the UAE This is 
because no one may exercise them without its express consent and that the rights 
over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on 
any express proclamation.  Article 18 goes on to state that the “natural resources” 
referred to:  
                                                             
442 Certified translation of the law published in the UAE Official Gazette, Vol. No. XXIII, Issue No. 
257, dated 20 October 1993, p. 7-17. See also version in (1994) 25 LOSB 94-100. 
 
 
 
185 
 
consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil 
together with the living organisms belonging to sedentary species, meaning the 
organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the 
seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed 
or the subsoil. 
  
Article 20 is common to both the EEZ and the continental shelf under the UAE 
regime. Article 20(1) states that in both these zones the State shall have the exclusive 
right to construct, operate and use 1) artificial islands 2) installations and structures 
for the purposes of scientific research, preservation of the environment or other 
economic purposes, and 3) installations and structures which enable the State to 
exercise its rights. Article 20(2) confirms that the State shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over such artificial islands, installations and structures including 
jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and 
regulations. Article 20 thus follows LOSC 1982 Articles 60 and 80.  
Article 21 states that the State may establish safety zones around the artificial 
islands, installations and structures referred to in Article 20(2), for the purpose of 
ensuring their safety.443 The UAE is to determine the breadth of such zones “taking 
into account applicable international standards”, not exceeding a distance of 500 
metres around them, measured from each point of their outer edge, except where 
excess is authorized by generally accepted international standards. Such provisions 
follow Articles 60(4),(5) and 80 LOSC 1982.  
Article 19 states that the following provisions apply to the delimitation of the 
maritime zones of islands belonging the UAE Article 23(2) states that in the absence 
of agreement between the UAE and another adjacent or opposite state, the outer limit 
of the continental shelf and the EEZ shall be the median line every point of which is 
equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines. As has been seen, the UAE 
provisions on delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ do not mirror LOSC 
1982.  
Article 24 stipulates that the UAE shall publish official charts to show 
accurately the outer limits of the EEZ and the continental shelf. Article 25 makes 
                                                             
443 This is in line with Article 60(4) LOSC 1982, although in the latter there is a reference to safety 
zones around artificial islands, installations and structures in which it may take measures not only to 
ensure the safety of these structures but also the safety of navigation. The UAE does not refer to the 
safety of navigation in its equivalent provision. 
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clear that the implementation of this law shall not affect the validity of contracts and 
concessions concluded prior to its promulgation for the exploration and exploitation 
of resources in the maritime zones. Nor shall it affect the constitutional rights or other 
rights acquired by the Emirates as a result of the exploitation of resources or the rights 
acquired as a result of any agreements or contracts to be concluded between them 
regarding these zones. Further, the 1993 Law shall not affect the validity of 
agreements previously concluded between the Emirates and the Emirates have the 
right to enter into agreements regarding maritime boundaries between them. 
 
 
ii. Oman 
 
The Royal Decree of 17 July 1972 concerning the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf 
and Exclusive Fishing Zones of the Sultanate of Oman declared jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf for the first time.444 Article 3 states that Oman “exercises sovereign 
rights over the continental shelf …for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its 
natural resources”. This reflects Article 2(1) CSC 1958 and Article 77(1) LOSC 
1982. Article 4 provides that the continental shelf encompasses  
 
the seabed and natural resources upon and beneath the seabed adjacent to the coast 
of the mainland or of an island, rock, reef or shoal, but outside the territorial Sea 
of the Sultanate, to a depth of 200 metres or to such greater depths as admit of the 
exploitation of natural resources.  
 
Clearly this provision reflects Article 1 CSC 1958 apart from the references to “an 
island, rock, reef or shoal”. It does not reflect the reference to distance which was 
eventually to appear in the definition of the continental shelf in Article 76 LOSC 
1982.  
Oman is extremely rich in fisheries, and therefore it is not surprising that this 
first national legislation sought to protect them by way of an EFZ. Article 5 provides 
for an EFZ over which Oman exercises sovereign rights for the purposes of 
                                                             
444 For the text see (1974) 16 U.N. Leg. Ser. 23, The Decree is also printed in Limits in the Seas, No. 
61, “Straight Baselines: Oman (Hypothetical)”, International Boundary Series A (Office of the 
Geographer, US, June 4, 1975), pp. 1-4.  
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exploring, developing and exploiting its living resources, including but not limited to 
fish. Article 6 defines the limit of EFZ as 38nm from the outer limits of the territorial 
sea. 
Article 7 of the 1972 Decree deals with the situation where the territorial sea, 
continental shelf, and EFZ of Oman overlap with those of another state with either 
an opposite or adjacent coast. It is stated that the boundary of those maritime zones 
with Oman shall be the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Oman 
and the territorial sea of other states is measured. In relation to delimitation of the 
continental shelf, Oman’s provision partly reflects Article 6(1),(2) CSC 1958 which 
refers to delimitation between states by way of equidistance, although the latter states 
that equidistance is only applicable in the absence of agreement between the parties, 
or unless another boundary is justified by special circumstances. Again Oman has 
not referred to either aspect. Oman’s provision does not reflect Article 83(1) LOSC 
1982 which moved away from CSC 1958 in providing, as has been seen in an earlier 
chapter, that delimitation shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international 
law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statue of the ICJ, in order to achieve an 
“equitable solution”.  
In relation to Oman’s provision for delimitation of the EFZ by way of 
equidistance there was no reference in any convention to the EFZ/EEZ until the 
LOSC 1982 which provided for a 200nm EEZ. The provisions for delimitation of the 
EEZ in Article 74(1) of the LOSC 1982 are the same as those for the continental 
shelf, and therefore the above comments apply in relation to the difference in Oman’s 
provision on the EFZ. 
Oman’s Royal Decree No. 44 of 15 June 1977 amended Article 6.445 Article 1 
of the 1977 Decree states that the area designated by the Sultanate for fishing 
purposes is extended to 200nm offshore, to be measured “from the basic lines by 
which territorial waters on the high seas are measured”. This clearly reflects the 
growing acceptance of a 200nm EEZ/EFZ which occurred amongst states during 
                                                             
445 (1980) 19 U.N. Leg. Ser. 244. 
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UNCLOS III and before the finalisation of the 200nm EEZ in LOSC 1982.446 Article 
2 of the 1977 Decree states that the outer limit of this area in respect of another 
opposite or adjacent state shall be determined by the mid-line on which every point 
is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the territorial sea 
of Oman and of the other state is measured.   
As referred to in Chapter 4, Oman issued a Royal Decree concerning the 
Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone dated 10 February 
1981.447  Pursuant to Article 10 of the 1981 Decree, the provisions of the Decree of 
17 July 1972 and the Royal Decree No. 44/77 of 15 June 1977 and all other provisions 
which contravene the provisions of the 1981 Decree are therefore cancelled. Article 
4 of the 1981 Decree states that Oman exercises sovereign rights over the EEZ for 
the purposes of exploring, developing and exploiting its natural wealth, whether 
living or non-living. Article 5 confirms that the zone extends 200nm and is measured 
from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. The claim 
to 200 nm is understandable considering its position in the Gulf and its prospect out 
to open sea. Both Article 4 and 5 reflect LOSC 1982.  
Article 6 of the 1981 Decree states that Oman exercises sovereign rights over 
its continental shelf for the purposes of exploring and exploiting its natural 
resources. Article 7 further states that Oman will be issuing a declaration for 
delimiting the span of its continental shelf. It would seem that Article 7 was 
promulgated in order to take into account the changes effected by the 1982 
Convention. 
Article 8 states that in relation to an opposite or adjacent state, the outer limits 
of the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf of Oman shall be the median line 
                                                             
446 While Oman, like the other Gulf States, cannot claim a 200nm EEZ or continental shelf in Gulf 
Sea, it may do so in the Arabian Sea. Oman has in fact indicated to the U.N. that it intends to claim 
“outer limits” of its continental shelf beyond 200nm from the baseline to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to Article 76(8) LOSC 1982. Preliminary information 
compiled in respect of this claim is at the website of Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the 
Sea (DOALOS), Office of Legal Affairs. U.N. Secretariat, at: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/omn_2009_preliminaryinfo.pd
f (accessed 9 July 2016). According to the website of the Commission on the Limits on the 
Continental Shelf, it has not yet received Oman’s submissions; see 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm (updated on 8 July 2016 and 
accessed 9 July 2016). 
447 (1983) 1 LOSB 33-34. 
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every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea of Oman and the territorial sea of other such 
states is measured. Apart from the delimitation of the territorial sea by means of 
equidistance, as has been seen equidistance to delimit the EEZ and continental shelf 
is not reflected in the LOSC 1982 provisions.  
 
 
iii. Bahrain 
 
Bahrain issued a Proclamation declaring rights to contiguous subsoil and seabed 
areas on 5 June 1949, as did Kuwait and the Gulf Sheikhdoms, and was in the same 
terms. As has been seen above, they all specify that delimitation of the seabed and 
subsoil areas would be determined on equitable principles (with the exception of 
Bahrain which refers to “just” principles, although there is no ostensible 
differentiation), following consultation with the neighbouring states.  
 Bahrain issued Decree No. 8 of 1993 with respect to the territorial sea and 
contiguous zone of the State of Bahrain on 20 April 1993. 448 The Preamble states 
inter alia that Bahrain exercises sovereign rights, control and jurisdiction over the 
seas and the continental shelf adjacent to its shores “in accordance with the rules of 
international law and within the limits prescribed by that law”.  Further, in the 
Preamble Bahrain recognises that the LOSC 1982 “represents a statement of the rules 
of contemporary international law which accords with the views of the States 
generally in relation to the matters dealt with in the provisions of this Law”.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
448 (1993) 24 LOSB 5. It is worth noting that although Bahrain is a State constituted by islands, it is 
does not claim archipelagic status pursuant to Part IV LOSC 1982 , and therefore does not claim 
archipelagic baselines 
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Observations on the legislation of the UAE, Oman and Bahrain, and the degree 
of their conformity with international law 
  
With regard to the 1949 Proclamations of the Gulf Sheikhdoms, these are in the same 
terms as those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and are consistent with international law, 
as explained earlier in this chapter. Further, as set out above, there is a great deal of 
conformity with LOSC 1982 in the 1980 Declaration and the 1993 Law in the 
provisions on the UAE’s rights in the continental shelf and the EEZ. With regard to 
delimitation of the boundaries of these zones with other states, the 1980 Declaration 
stated that this was to be way of the equidistance line in respect of the EEZ. This was 
repeated in the 1993 Law in respect of both the EEZ and the continental shelf. While 
these provisions do not reflect the corresponding provisions in LOSC 1982, they 
reflect the importance given to equidistance in international case law. 
As set out above, Oman’s legislation also shows a great deal of conformity 
with international law. The provisions relating to the rights in the continental shelf 
and EEZ set out in the 1972 Decree and 1981 Decree largely reflect CSC 1958 and 
LOSC 1982.  The provisions on delimitation of both these zones in the 1972, 1977 
and 1981 Decrees refer to the equidistance line as the method of delimitation. 
Bahrain’s legislation is minimal regarding the continental shelf and there is no 
legislation regarding an EFZ or EEZ. The early 1949 Proclamation was in general in 
line with international law, as observed in respect of the same Proclamation made by 
other Gulf States. Further, there is only a brief reference to the continental shelf in 
the Preamble of the 1993 Decree but Bahrain declares that those rights are exercised 
in accordance with international law and its limits, specifically invoking LOSC 1982 
as a statement of contemporary international law. It is thus possible to observe that 
Bahrain, while its legislation lacks any specific detail on the continental shelf and 
EEZ, generally allies itself with international law generally and LOSC 1982 in 
particular.   
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Qatar and Iraq 
 
i. Qatar 
 
Qatar  also issued a Proclamation declaring rights to contiguous subsoil and seabed 
areas on 8 June 1949, as did Kuwait, Bahrain and the Gulf Sheikhdoms, which was 
in the same terms, specifying that delimitation of the seabed and subsoil areas would 
be determined on equitable principles following consultation with the neighbouring 
states.  
 Qatar issued a Declaration by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 2 June 1974.449 
Article 1 states that Qatar shall have exclusive and absolute sovereign rights over 
natural and  marine resources and fisheries in the areas “contiguous” to the territorial 
sea off the coasts of the State of Qatar and its islands, without prejudice to the 
freedom of international sea and air navigation, “in accordance with the established 
principles of international law”. It is thus apparent that Qatar was claiming a fishing 
zone as well as rights over the continental shelf.450  
Article 1 also deals with delimitation. It states that the outer limits “of these 
areas” shall be in accordance with bilateral agreements which have been, or shall be, 
concluded. In the absence of an agreement: 
 
the outer limits of the continental prolongation of the State of Qatar, or the median line in 
which every point is equidistant from the baseline from which the territorial sea of the State 
of Qatar and of other States concerned is measured, shall be regarded as the determining 
factor in accordance with the principles of international law.  
 
Article 2 states that within the area specified in the preceding section, Qatar shall 
have exclusive rights in respect of:  
 
                                                             
449 Website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), Office of Legal 
Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, at: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/QAT_1974_Declaration.
pdf (accessed 9 July 2016). 
450 See El-Hakim (1979) p. 28.  
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exploration, prospecting, exploitation, development, fishing and the establishment 
of installations and zones for the security, control and protection of all marine and 
natural resources, on, under or above the seabed. 
 
In this Declaration, Qatar dealt with a number of issues. For the first time since 1949 
when it was under the protection of Britain, Qatar provided for its rights in a fishing 
zone, and the reference to control of marine and protection of marine resources above 
the sea bed foreshadows the right to protect and preserve the marine environment in 
the EEZ contained in Article 56(1)(b)(iii) LOSC 1982. The limits of these maritime 
areas is not established, and this is unsurprising considering that due to the 
dimensions of the Gulf as a semi-enclosed sea, and therefore the overlap with the 
maritime zones of other states, Qatar would not be able to claim a 200nm continental 
shelf or EFZ, as provided for in LOSC 1982.  Instead, there are provisions for 
delimitation where these maritime zones overlap with those of other states. 
Delimitation of the areas mentioned in Article 1 are to be established by agreement 
(whether agreed to already or not). So, it is apparent that in the case of a bilateral 
agreement on delimitation of the continental shelf, the outer limit of the fishing zone 
would be that agreed upon in respect of the continental shelf. In the absence of 
agreement, equidistance is invoked. It is not entirely clear, but it is implied that 
equidistance applies both to the fishing zone as well as the continental shelf. The 
reference to agreement reflects Article 6(1), (2) CSC 1958 which dealt with 
delimitation of the continental shelf, in the absence of agreement, by the equidistance 
line. Article 6(1) and (2)’s reference to special circumstances negating the use of 
equidistance, are not reflected by Qatar’s provisions. With regard to the fishing zone, 
the reference to equidistance does not accord with Article 74(1) LOSC 1982 which, 
as has been seen, refers to the need to achieve an “equitable solution”. However, 
Article 74(1) does refer to agreement to be used to reach that outcome, and the 
importance to which Qatar gives agreement is in the same vein. 
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ii. Iraq 
 
With respect to the continental shelf, Iraq issued an Official Proclamation of 23 
November 1957.451 It refers to Iraq’s desire to exploit underwater natural resources 
contiguous to the territorial sea. Iraq declared that all natural resources existing on 
the seabed and the subsoil beneath it are the “property” of Iraq. In so doing Iraq 
claimed ownership of those resources in the same way as the other Gulf States did. 
Also like the other Gulf States, with the exception of Iran, the Iraq Proclamation does 
not use the term “continental shelf” but instead refers to the resources under the 
waters contiguous to the territorial sea. The Iraq  Proclamation 1957 goes on to state 
that Iraq has exclusive general jurisdiction over such resources and over their 
preservation and exploitation, and the exclusive right to take all measures necessary 
for the exploration and exploitation of such resources. It further expresses the right 
to take administrative and legislative measures necessary for the protection of all 
“constructions” required by the process of exploration and exploitation. It is also 
stated that the “Government of Iraq wishes to assert that the “sole purpose” of its 
issue of this Proclamation is the exercise of rights established by international 
practice”. Thus there is at least a general expression of an intention to exercise rights 
in line with international law.  
Iraq elaborated further in a Proclamation of 10 April 1958.452 This referred to 
the aforementioned Proclamation of 23 November 1957 and made reference to the 
rights established in that earlier Proclamation in the waters contiguous to Iraqi 
territorial waters. The Proclamation of 10 April 1958 confirmed that such works and 
constructions as have been or will be undertaken in the territorial sea or the waters 
contiguous to it are subject to Iraqi sovereignty. Iraq also declared “its adherence to 
international practice…and to the principle of equidistance which guarantees to Iraq 
freedom of passage into and out of the high seas”.  This wording is not entirely clear. 
For example, it does not relate the principle of equidistance to delimitation of the 
                                                             
451 Published in the Government Gazette No. 4069 of 27 November 1957 and reproduced in (1970) 
15 U.N. Leg. Ser. 368.  
452  Published in the Government Gazette No. 4128 of 10 April 1958 and reproduced in (1970) 15 
U.N. Leg. Ser. 369. 
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boundary of a particular maritime zone, but instead is a general endorsement of the 
principle.   
In a note verbale of 15 May 1973 provided by Iraq to the U.N., the text of a 
statement of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs made in 1968 was set out.453 That 
statement referred to a joint communiqué between Kuwait and Iraq issued on 13 
January 1968 which stated that both States had agreed on a “final solution regarding 
the continental shelves pertaining to both States”.454 Iraq’s response to this joint 
statement was to state that in view of the fact that its territorial waters and continental 
shelf had boundaries with both the States, it declared its sovereignty over those areas. 
Iraq further states however that it fully adheres to the “rules and principles of 
international law”. 
  
 
Observations on the legislation of Qatar and Iraq, and the degree of their 
conformity with international law 
 
Like many other Gulf States, Qatar began with a Proclamation in 1949 which, as has 
been referred to above, was in line with international law at the time. The 1974 
Declaration then claimed rights to the continental shelf and fishing zone, explicitly 
basing these claims on principles of international law, without defining these rights 
in any detail. Delimitation of the continental shelf, and it would seem, the EFZ as 
well, is said be by way of an equidistance line, in the absence of agreement, 
specifically stating that this is to be in accordance with the principles of international 
law. CSC 1958 clearly referred to the equidistance line in relation to delimitation of 
the continental shelf, and it is apparent that Qatar was attempting to align itself with 
the provisions in that Convention, although this does not reflect LOSC 1982.  
With regard to the legislation of Iraq it is similar to the Qatar’s legislation in 
the manner in which its makes general reference to international law, purporting to 
comply with it in a general sense. The lack of detail in Iraq’s legislation is 
                                                             
453 (1976) 18 U.N. Leg. Ser. 25. 
454 It eventually transpired that no final solution in fact could be reached due to territorial disputes 
between Iran and Kuwait. 
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exemplified by its general invocation of the equidistance principle in its 1958 
Proclamation but without reference to its application to any particular zone.  
 
General concluding remarks on the degree of conformity of the Gulf states 
with the international law of the sea   
 
From the early Proclamations following the Truman Proclamation of 1945, it may be 
said that the Gulf States have sought to benefit from the rights afforded to them by 
international law rules. In general, it may be said that there is evidence of a significant 
degree of conformity with international law  in the provisions governing the rights in 
the continental shelf and EFZ/ EEZ.  
However, as has been noted above, there has been some significant departures, 
most notably in the legislation of Saudi Arabia and Iran. With regard to Saudi Arabia, 
its 2012 Statute makes an addition, not found in LOSC 1982, of the word “security” 
to the list of matters which it has jurisdiction over in in relation to its artificial islands, 
installations and structures in the EEZ. It is of note that Saudi Arabia added “security” 
(as well as matters pertaining to the environmental and navigation) to the matters of 
infringement for which the contiguous zone can be used, which again fell outside the 
provisions in LOSC 1982.  
Similarly, one of the ways in which Iran’s 1993 Act goes beyond LOSC 1982 
is the provision for the establishment of “security zones” as well as “safety zones” in 
its EEZ, while LOSC 1982 only allows states to establish to safety zones  of a radius 
not exceeding 500 metres around artificial islands and other installations and 
structures within the EEZ.  As seen above, Iran’s response to the US objection was 
that security zones are essential in light of the need to protect oil platforms in the 
EEZ which are engaged in the exploration of oil, as well as the need to protect ships 
in the process of navigating the Gulf waters. Iran also went beyond LOSC 1982 in 
providing in its 1993 Act for a contiguous zone in which it may adopt measures 
necessary to prevent infringement of laws relating to matters of “security” (as well 
as “maritime” and “environmental” matters). The right to set up a security zone in 
the EEZ is not provided for in LOSC 1982 (only a safety zone). The need for security 
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and the protection of interests in oil exploration and navigation are crucial factors 
which arise out of one of the primary uses of the Gulf, namely the exploration and 
exploitation of mineral resources, and their movement through the Gulf which is 
therefore replete with vital shipping routes through the narrow Strait of Hormuz.  
With regard to the legislation of the Gulf States on delimitation of the 
continental shelf, it is quite clear that the majority of the Gulf States, namely Iran, 
Kuwait, UAE, Oman, and Qatar and Saudi Arabia (in respect of the EFZ) provide for 
delimitation of by means of the equidistance line. This is of great interest, because 
this is the case even in legislation which postdates LOSC 1982, for example Iran’s 
1993 Act, the UAE’s 1993 Law, and Kuwait’s 2014 Decree. As has been noted, while 
Bahrain and Iraq do not explicitly provide for this, Bahrain invokes international law 
in its legislation, and Iraq refers to its adherence to the principle of equidistance in 
general, also expressly finding support in international law. Saudi Arabia, after its 
early 1949 Proclamation providing for delimitation of the continental shelf by way 
of equitable principles did not issue any subsequent legislation in respect of 
delimitation of the continental shelf. However, rather than contradicting the other 
Gulf States, it is silent on the matter. It is notable that none of the Gulf legislation 
refers to the special circumstances referred to in CSC 1958 which may cause a 
departure from the equidistance line in delimitation of the continental shelf. Further, 
as has been seen, LOSC 1982, does not refer to the equidistance line at all in its 
provisions on delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, rather it refers to an 
equitable solution. It has however been seen in Chapter 3 of this thesis, that 
equidistance has been an important feature in delimitation of the continental shelf 
and the EEZ in international case law, and this provides an important context to the 
primacy given to equidistance in Gulf legislation. The links which may be drawn 
between the case law and delimitation in the Gulf will be discussed in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis.  
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Chapter 6 
 
The Delimitation of the Maritime Boundaries of the Gulf States  
 
Introduction 
 
Having considered the national legislation of the Gulf States in the previous two 
chapters, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the delimitation of the 
maritime boundaries between the Gulf States. Most of such delimitations have been 
effected by bilateral agreements between the Gulf States delimiting the continental 
shelf boundaries between them.  
Also included in this chapter is a consideration of the two adjudicated boundaries 
in the Gulf, namely the Dubai /Sharjah Border Arbitration (1981), and the 
Qatar/Bahrain (2001) case before the ICJ.455  The examination in respect of these 
adjudications is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of them, but rather the 
purpose is to consider the main elements which had a material effect on the drawing 
of the lines in question. The inclusion of these decisions within a chapter which also 
deals with delimitation agreements is done with the intention that they can be 
compared with the agreements, in order that material may be identified which is 
significant for the research aims of this study as set out in Chapter 1, and which assists 
in assessing the relationship between Gulf State practice and International Law.  
                                                             
455 There is another well-known reported arbitration in relation to the Gulf Sea, namely Petroleum 
Development Ltd. v The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144 but this decided upon rights under an 
oil concession granted by the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi in 1939, and did not draw any boundary. See also 
Ruler of Qatar v International Marine Oil Co Ltd (1953) 20 ILR. 534 and Saudi Arabia v Aramco 
(1958) 27 ILR 117 which also did not draw a boundary line. 
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A list of these delimitations appears in Figure 10 below.456 All references to 
the sources of the agreements in this chapter are publications of English translations. 
 
1. 1958   Bahrain - Saudi Arabia 
2. 1964   Sharjah - Umm al Qaywayn 
3. 1965   Kuwait - Saudi Arabia (Partition of Neutral Zone) 
4. 1965   Saudi Arabia - Qatar 
5. 1968   Abu Dhabi - Dubai 
6. 1968   Saudi Arabia - Iran 
7.       1969   Qatar - Abu Dhabi 
8.       1969   Iran - Qatar 
9.       1971    Bahrain - Iran 
10. 1974   Iran - Oman  
11. 1974   Saudi Arabia- UAE  
12.     1974   Iran - UAE (Dubai) 
13. 1981   Dubai - Sharjah 
14.  2000   Saudi Arabia – Kuwait 
15. 2001   Qatar - Bahrain 
16.  2008   Saudi Arabia - Qatar 
Figure 11: Table showing a list of delimitations of maritime 
boundaries in the Gulf  
                                                             
456 Maritime boundaries between Iran and Kuwait, at the head of the Gulf, were addressed by a draft 
agreement between the two sides which came about in 1962, but it is not in force because of Iraq’s 
continued territorial disputes with Iran and Kuwait and is not dealt with here. 
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1. 1958   Bahrain – Saudi Arabia 457 
 
(signed 22 Feb 1958, entered into force  26 Feb 1958). 
 
This is a boundary between States with opposite coastlines. The agreement is the first 
dealing with the continental shelf to be concluded in the Gulf and therefore it has 
acted as an important precedent for the region. Further, it was also the first in the 
world to provide for the sharing of revenue from resources derived from the 
seabed.458 It has three main limbs. Firstly, delimitation of the continental shelf 
between the opposite coasts of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, delimitation of the 
boundary of the Fasht Abu-Sa’fah oilfield, and thirdly, determination of state 
sovereignty over the islands of Lubainah al-Saghirah and Lubainah al-Kabirah.  
For some time, Bahrain had claimed sovereignty over the Fasht Abu-Sa’fah 
area and the islands of Lubainah al-Kabirah and Lubainah al-Saghirah. Indeed, the 
Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) had tried to operate in the region of the 
islands in 1941, but ceased to do so after objections from Saudi Arabia in 1949. By 
at least 1954, if not earlier, both States had agreed in principle to divide the Fasht 
Abu-Sa’fah oil field, but could not agree the method of delimitation of it.459 
Therefore, as an alternative, they agreed to delimit the northern sector of their 
continental shelf boundary so that it was aligned with the edge of the oil field, thus 
                                                             
457 Reproduced in 16 (1974) U.N. Leg. Ser. 409, and Limits in the Seas, No. 12, “Continental Shelf 
Boundary: Bahrain-Saudi Arabia”, International Boundary Study Series A (Office of the Geographer, 
US, March 10, 1970), pp. 2-5. Iran protested against this agreement and declared that it was void, a 
stance taken as a result of its territorial claim to Bahrain. However this claim by Iran was later 
renounced. For a discussion of Iran’s claim to Bahrain see M. Khadduri, “Iran’s Claim to the 
Sovereignty of Bahrayn”, (1951) 45 AJIL 631-647. For the text of the agreement and diagram of the 
boundary line, see Appendix, pp 288-292. 
458 G. Blake, “Shared zones as a solution to problems of territorial sovereignty in the Gulf States”, in 
Schofield, R. ed.,  Territorial foundations of the Gulf States (UCL Press, London 1994), pp. 200-210, 
at p. 205. Blake also refers at p. 210, n.7 to the fact that in Limits in the Seas, No. 108, Maritime 
Boundaries of the World (US Department of State, the Geographer, 1990), p.34, it is stated that there 
are at least 13 joint arrangements in the world providing for the exploitation of resources in the 
proximity of maritime boundaries, three of which are in the Gulf. 
459 For this history see G. Blake (1994), pp. 206-8. Blake also refers to British archival material, letter 
from the British Residency, 7 May 1957, FO 371/126934 which suggests that Saudi Arabia might 
have been willing for Abu-Sa’fah to be divided equally, see p.210, n.8.  
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placing the whole oil field on Saudi Arabia’s side of the boundary.460 The agreement 
provides for a revenue sharing arrangement, pursuant to which Saudi Arabia, which 
has sovereignty over the field, exploits it and shares the revenues equally with 
Bahrain.   
The entire boundary line is approximately 98.5nm in length.461 It runs through 
14 points and the lines between each point are straight. Clause 1(1) of the agreement 
refers to the boundary line beginning on the basis of “the middle line”, from point 1. 
This may be taken to be a reference to the median or equidistance line.462 However, 
nowhere is there reference to the principle of equidistance, and the agreement does 
not utilise a true equidistance line. In fact, the boundary is mainly constituted of a 
number of midpoints between predetermined coastal points, with small islands and 
low-tide elevations not being chosen as such coastal points.463 However, drying reefs 
belonging to both parties were used to draw the modified equidistance line.464  The 
locations of the points are set by reference to either fixed geographical landmarks on 
the territory of both States, or to certain identified latitudes and longitudes and in this 
regard points 1-6, 10 and 11 are equidistant between fixed landmarks on each State’s 
territory.465 
At points 1-4 and 7, small islands in between the coasts were not used to 
determine the mid-point between both States’ territory.466 Point 8 is located on the 
western extremity of the island of Lubainah al-Saghirah and point 9 is located on the 
                                                             
460 J.I. Charney and L.M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries Vol II (Martinus 
Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993), p. 1490. 
461Limits in the Seas, No. 12, “Continental Shelf Boundary: Bahrain-Saudi Arabia”, International 
Boundary Study Series A (Office of the Geographer, US, March 10, 1970), p. 5; Limits in the Seas 
No. 94, “Continental Shelf Boundaries: The Persian Gulf” (Office of the Geographer, US, September 
11, 1981), p. 4. 
462 The original Arabic text refers to “al khat al wasat”, the translation of which is “the middle line”. 
English translations however refer to the median line, for example the translation in Limits in the Seas, 
No. 12 (1970), at p. 2. 
463Limits in the Seas No. 94 (1981), p. 4. In his commentary on this agreement, C.G. MacDonald states 
that the boundary line is only an approximate equidistance line, being based upon “predetermined 
landmarks”, and not taking into account the configuration of the coast or certain small islands, see 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Law of the Sea: Political Interaction and Legal Development in the Persian 
Gulf (Greenwood Press, England, 1980), p. 126. At pp.157-8, note 66, he goes on to state that in an 
interview with Richard Young who claimed to have prepared the draft of the agreement, Young 
described the agreement as “ad-hoc” and “pragmatic”, indicating that it was signed to enable the oil 
exploitation from the Fasht Abu-Sa’fah oil field to begin. 
464 D. Bowett, “Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations”, 
in J.I. Charney and L.M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries (Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 
1993), Vol I, p. 131 at p.148. 
465 Limits in the Seas, No.12 (1970) p. 5. 
466 Ibid., p. 5. 
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eastern extremity of Lubainah al-Kabirah. Points 12-14 are determined by reference 
to geographical coordinates, irrespective of the principle of equidistance. After point 
12, the boundary line extends north east to points 13 and 14. If an equidistance line 
was utilised, it would have crossed the Fasht Abu-Sa’fah oil field. Instead, its unity 
is preserved.467 As seen in clauses 1(16) and 2(7) the oil field is placed to the left of 
the boundary line under the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia. Clause 2(7) also states that 
the exploitation of the oil in this oil field is to be undertaken by Saudi Arabia in the 
manner it chooses, on condition that it grants to Bahrain one half of the net revenue 
accruing to Saudi Arabia from the exploitation.468 In late December 1992, Saudi 
Arabia increased Bahrain’s share to 70% of all revenue for a period of two years.469 
The two islands of Lubainah al-Saghirah and Lubainah al-Kabirah were left to 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia respectively, with the former on Bahrain’s side of the 
boundary line, and the latter on Saudi Arabia’s (see Clause 1(8) and (9) of the 
agreement). Both islands are roughly equidistant from the coasts of both States. 
Neither of these islands was granted a territorial sea in the agreement.470  
By the time of this agreement, both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain had issued 
legislation dealing with their continental shelves in 1958 and 1949 respectively, with 
delimitation being said in both to be on the basis of equitable principles following 
agreement with their neighbours. In this agreement, there are two instances of a 
variation on the principle of equidistance, leading to a modified equidistance line. 
Firstly, the fact that the line is mostly based on pre-determined landmarks and not 
the configuration of the coastline. Secondly, small islands between the coasts are not 
used to determine the midpoints between the two coasts in relation to Points 1-4 and 
7. Finally, the Agreement is notable for the legal arrangement for the development 
of the Fasht Abu-Sa’fah oilfield whereby the continental shelf boundary coincides 
with the limit of the oilfield. Not only was a main motivation for entering into the 
agreement economic, economic considerations in the form of the location of the oil 
                                                             
467 See the following agreements: Iran-Qatar 1969; Qatar-Abu Dhabi 1969; Bahrain-Iran 1971; Iran-
Oman 1974 for their dealings with oil fields when delimiting maritime boundaries. 
468 Subsequent to this agreement a number of joint development zones were established, for example 
between Japan-Korea, France-Spain (in Bay of Biscay), and Iceland-Norway. 
469 G. Blake (1994), at p. 206. 
470Cf the following agreements: Saudi Arabia-Iran 1968; Qatar-Abu Dhabi 1969; Iran-UAE (Dubai) 
1974. See the entitlement of islands to a territorial sea in Article 10 TSCZ 1958 and Article 121 LOSC 
1982. 
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field influenced the location of the boundary. It will be remembered that Saudi Arabia 
had legislated for a comprehensive system of straight baselines in its Royal Decree 
No.33 1958. This claim to straight baselines did not find its way into the agreement 
and so had no effect on the boundary line as finally agreed. 
 
2. 1964  Sharjah - Umm al Qaywayn 471 
 
(Signed 1964, entered into force 1964). 
 
This is a continental shelf boundary line between adjacent coastlines. Prior to the 
formation of the UAE in 1971, both Emirates had their own individual treaty relations 
with the United Kingdom, which had control of their foreign relations. In 1961, the 
United Kingdom wished to establish maritime boundaries between the Trucial States 
in order to advance the exploration of hydrocarbon resources.472  However, a problem 
experienced by the British Foreign Office at the time was the fact that its 
hydrographic charts for the area were not adequately precise to enable true 
equidistance lines to be drawn.473 This limitation led to the proposal by Britain, to 
the Parties, of the utilization of the delimitation method which is seen in this 
agreement.474 This boundary is part of a series of boundaries proposed by the British 
to the Trucial States prior to the formation of the UAE in 1971.475 
Both Parties accepted the British proposal, and the agreement itself consists of 
two unilateral declarations made by each party.  
The mechanism of delimitation consists of bisecting the angle formed by 
drawing straight lines between the coastal terminal points of the land boundary, 
resulting in a “simplified” equidistance line.476 It is a boundary which is essentially 
                                                             
471 Agreement printed in J.I. Charney and L.M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries 
(Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993), Vol II, p. 1555. For the text of the agreement and map of the boundary 
line see Appendix, pp. 293-4. 
472 Charney and Alexander, Vol II (1993), p. 1550. 
473 Ibid., p.1552. 
474 Ibid., p. 1552. 
475 Another such proposal which led to a delimitation agreement is the 1968 Abu Dhabi-Dubai 
agreement dealt with later in this Chapter.   
476 Charney and Alexander Vol II (1993), p. 1552. 
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perpendicular to the coast. This method is appropriate in the case of adjacent 
coastlines. 
A feature of the locus in question is the island of Abu Musa. Sharjah and Iran 
both lay claim to this island, creating a long-standing and entrenched dispute between 
them. It is some 31nm from the land boundary between the two States. In 1971 it was 
agreed that the island should have a 12nm territorial sea and the lateral boundary 
extends around the 12 mile arc which denotes the island’s territorial sea limit. 477 
 
 
3. 1965 Kuwait - Saudi Arabia (Partition of Neutral Zone) 478 
(In force on 25 July 1966). 
 
The Kuwait - Saudi Arabia (Najd) Neutral Zone was established by the Uqair 
Protocol of 2 December 1922 between these adjacent States. The Neutral Zone is an 
area of land territory spanning the land boundary between the States. The 1922 
Protocol established that in the Neutral Zone, each party would share equal rights 
until Britain assisted the Parties in reaching further agreement. Despite the fact that 
the Neutral Zone was believed to contain oil, no guidelines were established to 
regulate any arrangement regarding this between the Parties. In the event, oil 
production began and continued throughout the years in the offshore areas, and the 
common ownership principle was assumed to apply to the offshore area of the 
Neutral Zone as well to the land territory. In 1963, following years of discussion, an 
equal partition of the Neutral Zone was agreed in principle, and in July 1965 an 
agreement was reached dividing the Zone into two equal parts, which would be 
                                                             
477 See D. Bowett, “Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary 
Delimitations”, in J.I. Charney and L.M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries 
(Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993), Vol I, p. 131, at p.141. This boundary is to the south of Abu Musa. To the 
north of Abu Musa, the boundary settled in the Dubai/Sharjah Arbitration 1981 adopted the same 
solution, so that the equidistance boundary line deviated around the arc around the island’s 12nm 
territorial sea. See ibid., at p.141, n. 72. 
478 Agreement reproduced at 15 (1970) U.N. Leg. Ser. 760. As stated in n. 1, the official Arabic text 
is in Kuwait Al Yoam (“Kuwait Today”), No. 581, 19 June 1966. For the text of the agreement and 
diagram of the partition, see Appendix, pp. 295-9. 
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annexed as each party’s territory. Equal rights to exploit hydrocarbon resources were 
agreed to continue. 
Article VII of the agreement established the territorial sea of the partitioned 
zone as 6nm. According to Article VIII, beyond this 6nm limit, the Parties have equal 
rights in the submerged resources by means of joint exploitation unless they agree 
otherwise.  
 
4. 1965 Saudi Arabia – Qatar 479 
 
(Signed 4 December 1965, entered into force 31 May 1971). 
 
It is uncertain whether this agreement, which governs both land and sea boundaries 
between the Parties and which was signed by both Parties, is in force.480 
Nevertheless, looking at the terms of the agreement, and with regard to the maritime 
boundary, Article 1 states that Dawhat Salwa (the Bay of Salwa) shall be divided 
equally between the two countries on the basis of equidistance from the two coasts. 
The States have adjacent coastlines at the point where this boundary would be drawn. 
The article goes on to state that a straight median line shall be adopted “to the extent 
possible”.  
 
 
                                                             
479 A.A. El-Hakim, The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1979) states at p. 121 that this agreement is unpublished. However a translation of it 
can be found at the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), 
Office of Legal Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, at: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/SAU-
QAT1965OB.PDF (accessed 22 June 2016). For the text see Appendix, pp. 300-1. 
480El-Hakim (1979), p. 121. El Hakim therefore states that the offshore boundary line “still remains 
formally undetermined.”  Looking at Limits in the Seas, No. 94 (981), as at 1981 the US was of the 
view that the Saudi Arabia-Qatar boundary remained to be negotiated, see. p. 2. This view was 
expressed in the later publication of 1990, Limits in the Seas, No. 108 “Maritime Boundaries of the 
World” (First revision, Office of Ocean Affairs, November 30, 1990), p. 27.  
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5. 1968 Abu Dhabi – Dubai 481 
 
 (signed 18 Feb 1968, entered into force on same date). 
 
This is a continental shelf boundary agreement between Parties with coastlines which 
are adjacent to each other. The agreement refers to a pre-existing agreement between 
the Parties, and modifies it. That previous agreement established a boundary which 
was initially an administrative frontier for the purpose of oil exploration and 
concession in 1951 which was roughly perpendicular to the coast, and which was 
subsequently adopted by the Parties as their offshore boundary in 1965, in an 
agreement reached through British mediation, beginning at Ras Hasain on the 
coast.482  In 1968, as a result of the modification of the land boundary, when the 
seaward terminus of the land boundary was no longer desired to be Ras Hasain, the 
boundary was moved 10km westwards.483 The same seaward projection was 
followed, and it remains a straight line.  
The agreement does not specify the distance of the boundary’s extension 
seawards, but it may be inferred that the intention was that it would intersect with an 
Iran – Abu Dubai boundary which was yet to be established. When a boundary was 
subsequently agreed between the latter two States, the eastern terminal point of that 
boundary line was the point of intersection with the Abu Dhabi – Dubai boundary.  
This is one of the maritime boundaries which Britain proposed to the Trucial 
States and which were in general composed of straight lines joining the coastal 
terminal points of the land boundary. The angles formed were then bisected, with the 
bisectors being extended seaward to delimit the continental shelf boundary, creating 
a “simplified equidistant line”.484  
                                                             
481 Agreement published in Charney and Alexander, Vol II (1993), p. 1480, and in Selected Documents 
of the International Petroleum Industry 1968 (The Information Department of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries, Vienna, 1968). For the text of the agreement and a diagram of the 
delimitation see Appendix, pp. 302-3. 
482 Charney and Alexander, Vol II (1993), p. 1475 -6. 
483 Ibid, p. 1475. 
484 Ibid., p. 1477. Charney and Alexander go on to state at p. 1477 that the reason for the selection of 
such a simplified equidistance line is not clear. Firstly, they refer to a report written by the Research 
Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Middle East Section, four years after the 
boundary was established, which states: “[t]he question of adequate mapping both here and on the 
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It is a very short agreement, stating very little about the principles of delimitation 
upon which it is based. However, it is apparent that the boundary is approximately 
perpendicular to the general direction of the coast. Here, in the vicinity of the land 
boundary between the Parties, the coastline is relatively straight.  Such a method is 
quite frequently used between states with adjacent coasts where there are no unusual 
coastal features or islands, and it corresponds approximately with a simplified 
equidistance line.485 It will remembered that case law examined in Chapter 3 has 
utilized this method of delimitation. 
Charney and Alexander state that “[e]conomic considerations - a common 
desire to facilitate offshore oil exploration and production - motivated the 
delimitation but did not affect the location of the boundary”.486 While the first part 
of the statement is clear, the second part is difficult to justify. It is highly arguable 
that economic considerations did directly influence the location of the boundary as 
can be seen from the terms of the agreement itself. On the face of it, the agreement 
makes clear that the boundary line is redefined from the previous boundary agreed in 
1965 so that Dubai obtained a maritime area lying to the west of the 1965 boundary 
and which was to the west of the Fateh oil wells. That area, including the Fateh wells, 
is therefore to pertain to Dubai. The new boundary is therefore in Dubai’s favour. 
Further, when considering the history of the re-definition of the boundary, it is clear 
that economic considerations were an operative factor. In 1966, following the 
discovery of oil in the vicinity of the Fateh wells by Dubai’s concessionaire, 
Continental Oil Company, the ruler of Abu Dhabi questioned the validity of the 1965 
agreement. The 1968 agreement therefore settles any dispute to this resource-rich 
area.  
                                                             
Trucial Coast has been considered more recently, and the consensus of opinion seems to be that 
existing Admiralty charts are not sufficiently accurate for the construction of true median lines, though 
probably adequate for the modified lines used in the Persian Gulf”. Charney and Alexander further 
state that Commander Peter Beazley who was involved in the delimitation and who was a member of 
the American Society of International Law research project, “clearly recalls that no difficulty was 
presented by the relevant Admiralty charts per se, including their accuracy for navigation and 
delimitation purposes. He reports that a cartographical problem arose as a result of the fact that the 
Admiralty chart did not show the position of the land frontier that was necessary for the generation of 
the maritime boundary. The cartographers had some difficulty accurately transferring on to the 
Admiralty chart the position of the land frontier which was shown on the sketch maps.”    
485 R.R. Bundy, “Maritime delimitation in the Gulf”, in Schofield, R. ed., Territorial foundations of 
the Gulf States (UCL Press, 1994), p.176, at p. 179, where he also states that other examples of its use 
include the delimitations between Uruguay and Brazil, and between Panama and Costa Rica.  
486 Charney and Alexander, Vol II (1993) p. 1476. 
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6. 1968  Saudi Arabia - Iran 487 
(signed 24 Oct 1968, entered into force 29 Jan 1969). 
 
This continental shelf boundary agreement, between States with coastlines which are 
opposite to each other, firstly deals with the longstanding matter of sovereignty over 
the islands of Al-‘Arabiyah and Farsi, and secondly, with the delimitation of the 
continental shelf between the two States. It is the longest continental shelf 
delimitation in the Gulf, with a length of 138.75nm.488 
 The history of the agreement is of interest. The catalyst behind the Parties 
wishing to enter negotiations was economic in nature, specifically their overlapping 
oil concessions; in particular Iran’s oil concession to Pan-American Petroleum 
Corporation overlapped with Saudi Arabia’s concession to Aramco. This overlap 
hindered commercial operations in the area.489 In 1965 the Parties reached a draft 
agreement which delimited the continental shelf boundary on the basis of 
equidistance as well as resolving territorial disputes over the islands of Al-‘Arabiyah 
(allocated to Saudi Arabia), and Farsi (allocated to Iran).490 Before the agreement 
was ratified, a new petroleum deposit was discovered by the Iranian concessionaire 
in the Marjan-Feyerdoon region, mainly situated on the Saudi side of the line as 
established in the draft agreement. Subsequently, after further negotiations, Saudi 
Arabia agreed to adjust the boundary to apportion the newly discovered structure 
more equitably. This amendment to the line was effected in the 1968 agreement.  
Turning to the provisions of the agreement, the Preamble states that the Parties 
are “desirous of determining in a just and accurate manner” the boundary line, “with 
due respect to the principles of the law and particular circumstances”. Article 1 grants 
sovereignty of Al-‘Arabiyah Island to Saudi Arabia, and sovereignty of Farsi Island 
to Iran. It is further agreed that each island has a territorial sea of its own, 12nm in 
                                                             
487 The text of the agreement is published at 18 (1976) U.N. Leg. Ser. 403 and in Limits in the Seas 
No. 24, “Continental Shelf Boundary: Iran-Saudi Arabia”, International Boundary Study Series A 
(Office of the Geographer, US, July 6, 1970), pp. 2-4. For the text of the agreement and a diagram of 
the boundary line see Appendix, pp. 304-11. 
488 Limits in the Seas No. 24 (1970), p. 5. 
489 Charney and Alexander, Vol II (1993) at p. 1520. 
490 Ibid., p. 1520. 
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width, measured from the line of lowest low water on each of the islands.491 This is 
the method of enclaving, which has been discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis as a 
feature of case law, and in this case, there is a semi-enclaving effect. It is specifically 
stated in Article 1(1) that where the territorial seas of each island overlap, there shall 
be a local boundary line to separate those territorial seas, which is equidistant 
throughout its length from the lowest low water lines on each island. Both islands are 
situated very near a hypothetical equidistance line between both mainland coasts, but 
both are the left of the line, slightly closer to Saudi Arabia than Iran. They both have 
a maximum elevation of 10 feet and are uninhabited.492 The islands have no 
continental shelf rights beyond their territorial seas.493 The boundary line would have 
been very different if instead of granting each island a territorial sea, each had been 
used as a basepoint for an equidistance line. Therefore, the equidistance line has been 
departed from by giving each island a 12nm territorial sea. 
Article 2 states that each state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting the natural resources in the seabed and subsoil on its side of the 
boundary line agreed upon. Saudi Arabia (unlike Iran) historically avoided use of the 
term ‘continental shelf’ due to arguments surrounding the issue whether one in fact 
existed in the Gulf Sea. 
Under Article 3, there are 16 points established by reference to specified 
latitudinal and longitudinal co-ordinates. Article 3 confirms that except in the vicinity 
of Al-‘Arabiyah and Farsi, the lines between the points are straight. Between points 
1-3 there is essentially an equidistance line between the mainland coasts.494 Kharg, 
the Iranian island, has no effect on the line here south of Al-‘Arabiyah and Farsi, as 
it is too far away. From point A, the line extends in an arc until point B. Between 
point B and C is the local equidistance line which separates the overlapping territorial 
seas of the islands. At point C the overlap between the territorial seas ends. Then the 
                                                             
491 This is a more specific reference to the baseline than provided in 1958 TSCZ, which contains the 
more general reference to the low water mark. That Convention was in force at the time of the 
agreement, although neither State was a party. Nevertheless, it is broadly in accordance with the 
baseline provisions in that Convention, and the 12nm territorial sea is in accordance with both States’ 
national legislation which had by the time of this agreement extended their territorial seas to 12nm. 
As has been seen already, a 12nm territorial sea eventually appeared in LOSC 1982.  
492 Limits in the Seas No. 24 (1970) p. 6, n. 4. 
493 In this regard, see also the following agreements: Qatar-Abu Dhabi 1969 (Abu Dhabi’s island of 
Dayyinah); Iran-UAE (Dubai) 1974 (Iran’s island of Sirri). 
494Limits in the Seas No. 24 (1970) p. 5. 
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line extends in an arc following the territorial sea of Farsi until point D.495  Apart 
from the granting of territorial seas to these islands, and the delimitation of the local 
boundary between their territorial seas, these islands have been ignored for the 
purpose of delimiting the boundary line between the two mainland coasts. As referred 
to below, other small Saudi Arabian islands have also been ignored in calculating the 
equidistance line. 
From point D, the line extends northwards, deviating from the equidistance 
line. There are two main features in this northern sector of the line. The first main 
feature is Kharg Island. It is a significant island from the Iranian perspective, 
containing the main Iranian terminal for the export of oil by tankers.496 It is 
approximately 17nm from the mainland of Iran. 497 It has an area of approximately 
12 square nautical miles. 498 In addition, Iran’s chief oilfields are connected with the 
island through pipelines traversing along the sea bottom. 499 The second main feature 
in the northern sector of the agreed boundary line is an oilfield known as the Marjan-
Feyerdoon oilfield.  
Kharg Island was given half effect in drawing the equidistant boundary.500 As 
has been explained in Chapter 3 of this study, the process of giving Kharg half-effect 
involved drawing a half-effect line. This is a line dividing equally the area between 
two lines. The first line is one which is equidistant between the Saudi Arabian 
mainland and Kharg Island (therefore giving the latter full effect). The second line is 
drawn between both the mainlands of Iran and Saudi Arabia, ignoring Kharg 
Island.501 The islands of Nakhilu on the Iranian side of the line, and Abu Ali on the 
Saudi Arabian side were given partial effect.502 Other small islands on both sides of 
the line were ignored in drawing the boundary. For example, Saudi Arabia’s islands 
of Janah, Al-Jurayd, Al-Qurayyin, Qiran and Hurques had no effect on the 
                                                             
495 This solution to the presence of islands was also used by Italy and Yugoslavia in islands in the 
Adriatic Sea. See Limits in the Seas No. 9, “Continental Shelf Boundary: Italy-Yugoslavia”, 
International Boundary Study Series A (Office of the Geographer, US, February 20, 1970). 
496 A. Razavi, Continental Shelf Delimitation and Related Maritime Issues in the Persian Gulf 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1997), p. 174, n.34. 
497 Limits in the Seas No. 24 (1970), p. 8.  
498 Limits in the Seas, No. 94 (1981), p. 7. 
499 El-Hakim (1979), p. 244, n.54. 
500 See Limits in the Seas No. 24 (1970), p. 5.  
501 Ibid.,p. 8. For an explanation of the method used in this agreement to give Kharg half effect see 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. For a diagram, see Figure 8. 
502 Razavi (1997), p. 135. 
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delimitation of the continental shelf, although they are within 12 miles of the Saudi 
Arabian coast and of each other, and therefore may be considered as being within the 
Saudi Arabian baseline, in accordance with the 1958 Saudi Decree on the territorial 
sea.503 
Article 4 states that both states agree that neither of them shall conduct, or 
authorise to be conducted, oil drilling within a zone extending 500 metres in width 
in the submarine areas on each side of the boundary line as agreed. By exchange of 
letters, the states agreed further to certain actions they would take or omit from taking 
with regard to oil drilling operations in such relatively close proximity to each other. 
Thus, this line is based upon equidistance. Part of it is essentially equidistant, 
where it begins in the south, as set out above, and part is a modified equidistance line 
to take into account Kharg Island. As has already been seen, by the time of this 
agreement, both Saudi Arabia and Iran had enacted a detailed system of straight 
baselines, but neither party’s claims to such baselines had any influence on the 
boundary line as agreed.   
When the northern sector of the line is examined, it is clear that economic 
considerations were not only the motivation for the agreement, but also had an impact 
upon the line in the vicinity of the oilfield. The line was adjusted from that originally 
agreed in 1965, based upon equidistance, to one which was specifically intended to 
apportion natural resources in a more equitable manner.504 
Looking at the northern sector, the line deviates from a strict equidistance line 
in a serious of short straight line segments which are drawn solely in order to effect 
this apportionment. Indeed, the half-effect that was originally given to Kharg is 
modified by the part of the line in the region of the petroleum structure in question, 
and the original equidistance line agreed in 1965 and which originally gave half–
effect to Kharg, was further modified in this part of the line in order to apportion the 
                                                             
503 El-Hakim (1979), p. 95. 
504 The oil deposit was in fact divided so that Iran was given a very small net gain by way of seabed 
area, see R. Young, “Equitable solution for off-shore boundaries: the 1968 Saudi Arabia-Iran 
Agreement”, (1970) 64 AJIL152 at p.155. 
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petroleum structure more equitably.505 Thus the drawing of this part of the line was 
motivated purely by economic considerations.  
 
7. 1969  Qatar – Abu Dhabi 506 
      (signed 20 March 1969, entered into force on same date). 
 
This agreement provides for a continental shelf boundary which extends for 
115nm.507 However, unlike the Abu Dhabi–Dubai 1968 agreement, the boundary is 
not based on a line perpendicular to the coast. The line’s terminal points, A and D, 
are equidistant from the coasts of both states. Both State Parties are adjacent to each 
other, but there are aspects of oppositeness to their relationship due to the concave 
coastline and therefore the aspects of equidistance are appropriate.508  The agreement 
deals with well No. 1 of the Al-Bunduq oilfield, which had been the subject of a 
dispute between the Parties and which is in the vicinity of the Parties’ continental 
shelf boundary. The agreement also settles territorial disputes, providing for the 
UAE’s sovereignty over the island of Dayyinah, and Qatar’s sovereignty over the 
islands of Al Ashat and Shara’iwah. 
 The boundary line is constituted by straight lines joining 4 points, A to D, 
except for a 15nm arc around the island of Dayyinah, in between points B and C 
which places it on Abu Dhabi’s side of the line. The arc apparently follows the 3nm 
territorial sea granted to Dayyinah. At the time of the agreement, both states 
adhered to a 3nm territorial sea, following the practice of Great Britain, with which 
                                                             
505 See Charney and Alexander, (1993) Vol II, at p. 1522 who state that “[T]he 1965 agreement 
[was]…a boundary that gave half-effect to Kharg. This half-effect line was subsequently modified in 
the 1968 agreement to equitably apportion a petroleum structure in the vicinity of the boundary. The 
result is a series of straight line segments that zigzag back and forth across the half-effect line”.  
506 The agreement is published at 16 (1974) U.N. Leg. Ser. 403 and in Limits in the Seas, No. 18, 
“Continental Shelf Boundary: Abu Dhabi-Qatar”, International Boundary Studies Series A (Office of 
the Geographer, US, May 29, 1970) pp. 2-3. For the text of the agreement and a diagram of the 
boundary line see Appendix, pp. 312-4. 
507 Limits in the Seas, No. 18 (1970), p. 3. 
508 Charney and Alexander, (1993) Vol II, at pp. 1542-3 state that “[t]he boundary, while not 
constructed as an equidistant line, nevertheless approximates such a line” and the use of equidistance 
is “selective”.  
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they were still in a relationship of protection. The Parties’ claim to a 3nm territorial 
sea is also relevant for the location of Point D, for which see below.   
The treatment of Dayyinah is similar to that of the islands of Farsi and Al 
‘Arabiyah in the Saudi Arabia-Iran agreement 1968 in that it was given a semi-
enclave. Dayyinah had no further effect on the continental shelf boundary. Therefore 
the line between Points B and C ignores Dayyinah, however it is equidistant along 
its traverse between the Qatar islands of Arzanah and Shara’iwah. 509 
 Shoals were used as basepoints for equidistant parts of the line in two respects. 
Firstly, Shoals close to the Abu Dhabi mainland were used in establishing Point A.510  
Further, it is apparent that that the line CD is apparently equidistant, at selected 
points, between shoals which are part of both states.511  
 Point A coincides with the southern terminus (point 6) of the continental shelf 
boundary in the 1969 Iran-Qatar agreement. It also coincides with point 1 of the Iran 
– Dubai boundary 1974.  Point A is also approximately equidistant from Abu Dhabi, 
Qatar, and Iran.512 It therefore forms a tri-point between Qatar, Iran and Abu Dhabi.  
 The agreement sets point B at the location of oil well No. 1 in the Al Bunduq 
oilfield. This is not an equidistant turning point, rather it was intended to be placed 
at the location of the oil well as part of the compromise and was selected 
independently of any consideration of the equidistance principle.513  However, it has 
been observed that that the coordinates in the agreement do not locate point B 
precisely on the oilfield, but rather 0.5nm south west.514  
 Point C is a negotiated turning point, with no apparent other rationale behind 
it.515 It marks the intersection of the lines from Point B and D, and is not equidistant 
from both States. 516 
                                                             
509 Limits in the Seas, No. 18 (1970), p.4. 
510 Ibid., p. 3, and Charney and Alexander, Vol. II (1993), p. 1543. 
511 Limits in the Seas, No. 18 (1970) p. 4 which further elaborates that at a point on line CD the shoal 
north of the island of Makhasib is 2.0nm from the boundary line, and at a different point on line CD, 
the south shoal of Fasht al Udayd is 2.0nm from the boundary.  
512 Limits in the Seas, No. 18 (1970), p. 3; Limits in the Seas, No. 94 (1981), p. 8. 
513 Limits in the Seas, No. 18 (1970), p. 4. 
514Limits in the Seas, No. 18 (1970), p. 2, adding that the discrepancy may be caused by map distortion. 
515Limits in the Seas, No. 94 (1981), p. 9. 
516 Limits in the Seas, No. 18 (1970), p. 4 
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 According to Paragraph 4(c) of the agreement, point D is where the 3nm 
territorial seas of Qatar and Abu Dhabi intersect.517 However, it has been noted that 
the coordinates referred to in Article 4(c) place point D 1.25nm inside the 3nm limit, 
and that the correct location of the point should be at D1.518 Point D lies at the mouth 
of the Khawr al-Udaid outlet.519 It is therefore an equidistant point.520 
 Paragraph 6 of the agreement states that both Parties have equal ownership 
rights of Al Bunduq oilfield. Paragraph 7 states that the oilfield is to be exploited by 
ADMA (Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Company, pursuant to a pre-existing concession 
with the Ruler of Abu Dhabi), and all revenues, profits and benefits from such 
exploitation is to be divided equally between both State Parties. This is reminiscent 
of the 1958 Saudi Arabia-Bahrain agreement which drew the boundary so as to place 
the Fasht Abu Safa oilfield under Saudi Arabian jurisdiction, with equal sharing of 
the profits received from it, although here the boundary line straddles Al Bunduq No. 
1 oil well.  
 Thus there are aspects of equidistance in this line. Further it is quite clear that 
economic considerations in the form of the location of oil well No. 1 of the Al 
Bunduq oil field directly influenced the line in that Point B was intended to be located 
on it, and this ended the Parties’ dispute to it. 521 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
517 Ibid., p. 4. 
518 Ibid, p. 4. See map in Appendix, p. 314. 
519 R.R. Bundy, “Maritime delimitation in the Gulf”, in Schofield, R. ed.,  Territorial foundations of 
the Gulf States (UCL Press, London, 1994), pp. 176-186, at p. 181. 
520 Charney and Alexander, Vol. II (1993), p. 1543.  
521 Saudi Arabia has protested against this agreement, stating, for example, that “it does not recognize 
this Agreement which purports to delimit a boundary in the maritime area extending from the coast of 
Saudi Arabia that lies between the neighbouring coasts of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Since 
1969, Saudi Arabia has protested this Agreement to the States concerned and their predecessor State, 
and continues to reject this Agreement today.” See Declaration regarding the Agreement between 
Qatar and the UAE on the 1969 agreement, transmitted through letter dated 11 April 2007 from the 
Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the Office of Legal Affairs of the U.N, translation at 64 (2007) 
LOSB, p.38.  
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8. 1969 Iran - Qatar 522 
(signed 20 Sep 1969, entered into force 10 May 1970). 
 
This continental shelf boundary agreement follows on from Iran’s agreement with 
Saudi Arabia in 1968, and Qatar’s agreement with the UAE (Abu Dhabi) in 1969. 
The Preamble of this agreement refers to both Parties wishing to establish the 
boundary in a “just, equitable and precise manner”, “in accordance with international 
law”, although with no specific reference to equidistance. These are states with coasts 
which are opposite to each other. The agreed boundary line is 131nm long. 523 
Article 1 refers to a boundary line consisting of straight line segments between 
6 points. The agreement is based on the principle of equidistance, using basepoints 
from each mainland, while ignoring islands on both sides of the boundary line.524 
The exact location of point 1, the terminal point in the northwest, was left 
undetermined, being dependent upon the resolution of the Qatar-Bahrain continental 
shelf boundary.525 Therefore the boundary between point 2 and what would be point 
1 was left undetermined. Point 6, the south eastern terminal point of the boundary 
line, coincides with Point A, the northern terminal point of the Qatar – UAE (Abu 
Dhabi) 1969 boundary.526 Point 6, approximately equidistant from the coasts of each 
state party as well as Abu Dhabi, is the tri-point between Iran, Qatar and Abu Dhabi. 
Article 2 of the agreement deals with the possible situation arising at a point in 
time after this agreement comes into force, of a single oilfield or other mineral deposit 
being found to straddle the agreed boundary line, and part of that oilfield or deposit 
can be exploited by directional drilling from the other side of the boundary. In that 
situation, it is clearly stated in Article 2(a) that no well shall be drilled on either side 
of the boundary so that any producing section of it is less than 125 metres from the 
boundary, except by mutual agreement between both States. Further, Article 2(b) 
                                                             
522 16 (1974) U.N. Leg. Ser. 416. For text of the agreement and map, see Appendix, pp. 315-8. 
523 Limits in the Seas, No. 25, “Continental Shelf Boundary: Iran-Qatar”, International Boundary 
Series A (Office of the Geographer, US, July 9, 1970), p. 4. 
524 Ibid., p. 3; Limits in the Seas, No. 94 (1981), p. 6, and Charney and Alexander, Vol. II (1993), p. 
1511. Cf R.R. Bundy, “Maritime delimitation in the Gulf”, in Schofield, R. ed.,  Territorial 
foundations of the Gulf States (UCL Press, London, 1994), pp. 176-186, at p. 182, who states that it 
is not clear if the Iranian islands of Lavan, Hendorabi or Qais have been given any effect. 
525 Eventually resolved by the ICJ in Qatar/Bahrain [2001] ICJ Rep 40.  
526 Limits in the Seas, No. 25 (1970), p. 4.  
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provides that both States shall endeavour to agree as to the manner in which 
operations on both sides of the boundary could be co-ordinated or unitized. 
Therefore an equidistance line was used drawn from the Parties’ mainlands and 
which was not modified by a nearby islands. Further, there was an economic 
motivation behind this agreement.527 However, there is no evidence that economic 
considerations had a direct bearing upon the final position of the boundary line.  
 
9.       1971  Bahrain - Iran 528 
(signed 17 June 1971, entered into force 14 May 1972). 
 
This continental shelf boundary agreement was reached very shortly after Iran 
decided to abandon its territorial claim to Bahrain. In 1970, Bahrain asserted its 
sovereignty, an assertion which was subsequently confirmed by a UN Security 
Council resolution, which was recognized by Iran in May 1971.529    
This is an agreement between states with coastlines opposite to each other. The 
boundary line is approximately 28nm long.530 It lies in between the Iran-Qatar 1969 
continental shelf boundary to the east, and the Iran-Saudi Arabia continental shelf 
boundary to the west agreed in 1968. The Preamble refers to the aim of establishing 
a boundary in a “just, equitable and precise manner”, “in accordance with 
international law” with no reference to equidistance or indeed any other method of 
delimitation. However, the line does seem to be based upon equidistance and this is 
appropriate in the light of their opposite coastlines. 
Article 1 sets out points 1-4 which are identified by geographical co-ordinates. 
There are two turning points, points 2 and 3, and two terminal points, points 1 and 4, 
                                                             
527 The Parties had already granted offshore oils concessions; Qatar to Continental Oil Co., Shell Co, 
of Qatar and Qatar Petroleum Co. Ltd., and Iran to Iranian Offshore Petroleum Co. and Lavan 
Petroleum Co. See Charney and Alexander, Vol. II (1993), p. 1512.  
528 Published at 16 U.N. Leg. Ser. (1974), p. 428 and Limits in the Seas No. 58, “Continental Shelf 
Boundary: Bahrain-Iran”, (Office of the Geographer, September 13, 1974), pp. 2-3. For text of the 
agreement and map of the boundary line see Appendix, pp. 319-22. 
529 Charney and Alexander, Vol. II (1993), p. 1482.  
530 It is referred to as 28.28nm in length in Limits in the Seas, No. 58 (1974), p. 3, and 28.3 nautical 
miles in length in Limits in the Seas, No. 94 (1981), p. 3. 
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eastern and western respectively. Geodetic straight lines connect the four points. 
Point 1 coincides with point 2 of the Iran-Qatar boundary agreed in 1969, and point 
4 coincides with point 1 of the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement 1968.531 Therefore these 
two points are not based on equidistance.532 Rather, their location is based upon the 
pre-existing delimitation agreements. Points 2 and 3 are nearly the same distance 
from Bahrain and Iran, and therefore it has been assumed that they are equidistant 
points, even though they are slightly nearer to Iran.533 Charney and Alexander state 
that the turning points 2 and 3 appear to have been set by the equidistance method. 
In this regard, the Iranian islands of Nakhilu and Jabrin were given full effect in the 
location of points 2 and 3 because the islands are within Iran’s straight baselines (and 
are marginally more than 3nm off the coast of the Iranian mainland).534 The Bahraini 
island of Jazirat Al-Muharraq which is connected to Bahrain by means of a causeway 
seems to have been considered as part of Bahrain’s mainland for the purposes of 
drawing the line.535  Iran’s claims to straight baselines did not have an impact on the 
location of points 2 and 3.536  This is because they are within Iran’s 12nm territorial 
sea, albeit that territorial sea is measured partly from straight baselines according to 
Iran’s national legislation.  
The eastern terminus of the Iran-Bahrain boundary, like the western terminus 
of the Iran-Qatar 1969 boundary, was left undetermined pending delimitation of the 
Bahrain-Qatar continental shelf boundary.537  
Article 2 is the same as Article 2 of Iran-Qatar agreement 1969. It deals with 
the possible situation arising at a point in time after this agreement comes into force, 
of a single oil field or other mineral deposit being found to straddle the agreed 
boundary line, and part of that oil field or deposit which is situated on one side of the 
                                                             
531 Charney and Alexander, Vol. II (1993), p. 1481, and see also Limits in the Seas, No. 58 (1974), p. 
4 where it is also stated that the northeasterly extension of the boundary line agreed in the Bahrain- 
Saudi Arabia 1958 agreement terminates in this tripoint.  
532 The eastern terminal point is approximately 10nm closer to Iran, and the western terminal point is 
approximately 5nm closer to Iran. See Charney and Alexander Vol. II (1993), p. 1481. 
533 See Limits in the Seas, No. 58 (1974), p. 3. The observation is phrased as an assumption because 
distance measurements on a hydrographic chart show that point 2 is one-half nautical mile closer to 
Iran than Bahrain and point 3 is 1.25nm nearer to Iran; it is said that the reason for these discrepancies 
may be the scale of the hydrographic chart, see ibid., p.4.  
534 See Charney and Alexander, Vol. II (1993), p. 1483.  
535 Ibid., p. 1483.  
536 Ibid., p. 1483.  
537 Both these terminal points in these two agreements are located on a defined azimuth but left 
undetermined. See Charney and Alexander, Vol. II (1993), p. 1482.  
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boundary can be exploited by directional drilling from the other side of the boundary. 
In that situation, it is clearly stated in Article 2(a) that no well shall be drilled on 
either side of the boundary so that any producing section of it is less than 125 metres 
from the boundary, except by mutual agreement between both states. Further, Article 
2(b) provides that both states shall endeavour to agree as to the manner in which 
operations on both sides of the boundary could be co-ordinated or unitized. Both 
Parties had granted offshore concessions prior to this agreement, although it cannot 
be said that economic considerations actively influenced the position of the boundary 
line.  
 It is notable that Article 4 of the agreement confirms that the superjacent waters 
or airspace above any part of the continental shelf are not affected by this agreement.  
  
 
10.        1974 Iran - Oman  538  
(signed 25 Jul 1974, entered into force 28 May 1975).  
 
This agreement delimits the continental shelf in the eastern part of the Gulf and the 
Strait of Hormuz, as well as in the Gulf of Oman, between states which have 
coastlines opposite to each other. A section of the boundary in the Gulf of Oman is 
yet to be agreed upon. 539 The agreed boundary line is approximately 124.85nm 
long.540 
The Preamble refers to the desire to establish a boundary in a “just, equitable 
and precise manner”, “in accordance with international law” with no reference to any 
specific method of delimitation. However, the boundary is in essence an equidistance 
line except for the part of it, at points 9 and 10, which follows the 12nm arcs of 
territorial sea drawn from the island of Larak.541 Article 1 sets out 22 points 
                                                             
538 Text published at 19 (1980) U.N. Leg. Ser. 450, and Limits in the Seas, No. 67, “Continental Shelf 
Boundary: Iran-Oman” (Office of the Geographer, US, January 1, 1976) pp. 2-4. For text of agreement 
and map of boundary line see Appendix, pp. 323-7. 
539 Limits in the Seas, No. 94 (1981), p. 4. 
540 Limits in the Seas, No. 67 (1976), p. 4. 
541 Limits in the Seas, No. 94 (1981), p. 5. 
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established by geographical co-ordinates and joined by geodetic lines. Points 1 and 
22, the terminal points, the most western and most southern points of the line 
respectively, are fixed with reference to the boundary lines between Oman and Ras 
Al Khaimah, and Oman and Sharjah respectively. These have not yet been agreed.   
Out of the 22 points, it is apparent that 7 are equidistant from one point on each 
coast, namely points 3,4,9,10,14, 15, 16, while the other turning points are closer to 
one state than the other.542 The line is therefore essentially an equidistance line, 
although it is not a strict equidistance line, there being some deviations.  
It is a particular feature of the coastlines in question that there are a number of 
islands in their vicinity, along the northern coast of Oman as well as along Iran’s 
coastline. These islands are also in the vicinity of the boundary line. They are not 
referred to in the agreement. It was agreed by both Parties that a number of small 
islands and islets were to be ignored in drawing the partly median line. However, 
some islands, islets and low-tide elevations were taken into account, for example, the 
island of Qeshm, which is very close to the Iranian mainland, and is the largest 
Iranian island in the Gulf, being 110km in length, with a maximum width of 35km, 
situated in the entrance of the Gulf.543 Iran’s island of Larak was also given a 12nm 
territorial sea, causing the line to deviate from a true median line, towards Oman, 
between points 9 and 10. With regard to Oman’s islands, there is a straight baseline 
connecting islands close to its mainland, namely Al-Ghanam, Al-Fayyarin, Lima, 
Great Quoin, Gap, and Musandam. They were treated as part of the mainland for the 
purpose of drawing the boundary line.544 Although both states have claimed elaborate 
systems of straight baselines as set out in Chapter 4, these claims do not seem to have 
had a material effect on the boundary. 545 
Article 2 is the same as Article 2 of the 1969 Iran-Qatar and 1971 Bahrain-Iran 
agreements. Article 4 states, as did Article 4 of Bahrain-Iran 1971, that nothing in 
                                                             
542 Limits in the Seas, No. 67 (1976), p.5. 
543 Razavi (1997), p. 182, n. 227.  
544 Limits in the Seas, No. 67 (1976), pp. 5-6. According to L. Legault and B. Hankey, “Method, 
Oppositeness and Adjacency, and Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation”, in Charney, 
and Alexander, Vol I (1993), pp. 203-241, at p. 209, the island of Umm al Fayarin was given half 
effect for turning point 19, but was ignored for turning point 18. 
545 Charney and Alexander, Vol. II (1992) p. 1505.  
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this agreement shall affect the status of the superjacent waters above any part of the 
continental shelf.  
It is to be noted that the IMCO (Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization) Strait of Hormuz traffic separation lanes were placed on Oman’s side 
of the boundary, and the water depths in the region of the boundary range between 
30 and 55 fathoms (180-330 feet). 546 
A motivation for entering into this agreement was economic in that the desire 
was to provide stability for future oil exploration. It is of note that significant 
discoveries of oil and gas were made at Henjam in the Strait of Hormuz not long after 
this agreement was reached. 547 However, economic considerations did not 
particularly influence the position of the boundary line, the line as agreed being 
essentially an equidistance line. Further, a desire to ensure security in the Strait of 
Hormuz was another motivation for entering into this agreement, and prior to signing 
it, both states issued a joint communiqué which stated a desire for agreements which 
had as their goal both regional stability and freedom of passage through the Strait of 
Hormuz.548 
 
11.          1974  Saudi Arabia – UAE 549 
(Signed 21 August 1974, entered into force on same date). 
 
This agreement remained unpublished until 1994 when Saudi Arabia registered it 
with the Secretariat of the UN pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. It delimited the land boundary between the states. Article 5(1) states that the 
UAE recognizes the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia over Huwaysat Island, and Saudi 
Arabia recognises the UAE’s sovereignty over all the other islands opposite its coast 
in the Gulf.  With regard to continental shelf delimitation, this agreement is different 
from the other agreements examined in this chapter, in that it only provides for the 
                                                             
546 Limits in the Seas, No. 94 (1981), p. 5. 
547 Charney and Alexander, Vol. II, p. 1504.  
548 Ibid., p.1504.   
549 United Nations Treaty Series Vol. 1733 I-30250. For the text of the agreement and Exchange of 
Letters, see Appendix pp. 331-37. 
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offshore boundary between the Parties to be delimited by way of further agreement. 
Article 5(3) provides that this is to be done: 
 
on such a basis of equity as will ensure free and direct access to the high seas 
from the territorial waters of that part of the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia adjacent to the territory of the United Arab Emirates and from the 
territorial waters of Huwaysat island…and in such manner as to take account 
of suitability for deep-water navigation between the high seas and that part of 
the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia indicated above. The High 
Contracting Parties shall have joint sovereignty over the entire area linking the 
territorial waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the high seas, in 
accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. 
 
No more is said in relation to the basis upon which the agreed delimitation is to 
occur.550 It is apparent from Article 5(3) and a cursory look at the part of the coastline 
of Saudi Arabia sandwiched in between that of Qatar to the west and the UAE in the 
east, that Saudi Arabia’s territorial sea would be blocked by the UAE’s maritime 
zones, and therefore the joint sovereignty zone would afford navigational rights to 
Saudi Arabia to enable its vessels to have direct access to deep waters in the middle 
of the Gulf. Although the provision above refers to “the high seas”, there are no high 
seas in the Gulf, and the reference can only be to the waters beyond the Parties’ 
territorial seas, for example the EFZ of Saudi Arabia which it claimed in 1974. Thus 
it is envisaged that navigational interests will play a large part in influencing the 
location of the boundary line.  
 
 
 
                                                             
550 No further agreement on delimitation has taken place to the knowledge of the author. The 
agreement has been beset by issues between the Parties, in particular, the UAE has expressed 
dissatisfaction with the agreement over a number of years since it was signed. For example, following 
Saudi Arabia’s registration of the agreement with the UN in 1994, the UAE registered a statement on 
20 April 1994 with the UN stating that since 1975 the UAE has repeatedly notified Saudi Arabia that 
the agreement conflicts with two agreements between Abu Dhabi and Oman in 1959 and 1960 
delimiting the territorial boundary between them. Once these points of conflict were eliminated by the 
territorial boundary agreement between Saudi Arabia and Oman on 21 March 1990, the UAE has 
desired the 1974 agreement to be amended to bring it in line with the 1990 agreement. The UAE’s 
statement is published at United Nations Treaty Series Vol. 1774, A-30250.  
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12.        1974 Iran – UAE (Dubai) 551 
(signed 31 Aug 1974, ratified 15 March 1975 by Iran only) 
 
Unlike Iran, the UAE has not yet ratified this agreement. 552 Therefore it is not in 
force between the Parties.  
The continental shelf boundary line as agreed is 39.25nm in length.553 It is 
made up of five points, with points 1 and 5 being the terminal points. As is a feature 
of delimitation agreements involving Iran, the Preamble states that the desire is to 
establish a boundary in a “just, equitable and precise manner”, and “in accordance 
with international law”. The boundary seems to be equidistant from each mainland 
coast, ignoring islands. 554  Between points 3-4 the shelf boundary coincides with the 
12nm arc drawn from the Iranian island of Sirri. Thus it is semi-enclaved.  
 Article 2 of the Iran-UAE (Dubai) 1974 draft agreement contains the same 
provision as Iran-Qatar 1969, Bahrain-Iran 1971, and Iran-Oman 1974 with regard 
to any future oil or gas field being discovered to be straddling the boundary. Article 
4 is in the same terms as Article 4 of Bahrain-Iran 1971 and Iran-Oman 1974 in 
making clear that the agreement does not affect the superjacent waters or airspace 
above the continental shelf.  
The starting point of the intended boundary depends upon the point of 
intersection with the Abu Dhabi-Dubai boundary. 555 The boundary is only one 
segment of the boundary between Iran and UAE which is yet to be fully delineated. 
However, the problem with extending to the east is the dispute between Iran and UAE 
                                                             
551 Published in Limits in the Seas, No. 63, “Continental Shelf Boundary: Iran-United Arab Emirates 
(Dubai)” (Office of the Geographer, US, September 30, 1975), pp. 2-3. For text of the agreement and 
map see Appendix, pp.328-30. 
552 Limits in the Seas, No 63 (1975), p. 2. 
553 Ibid., p. 3.  
554 See Charney and Alexander, Vol. II (1993), p. 1533, Razavi (1997), p.156 and El-Hakim (1979), 
p. 103. It is of note that Limits in the Seas, No. 63 (1975) states at p.3 that “[t]he boundary is not based 
on the equidistance principle; from four of the five turning or terminal points the boundary is nearer 
to the Iranian Island of Sirri than to any UAE territory.” However, in Limits in the Seas, No. 94 (1981), 
p.8 it is stated that the boundary “appears to be equidistant from the respective mainlands and ignores 
the influence of islands”.  
555 Bundy, R.R., “Maritime delimitation in the Gulf”, in Schofield, R. ed.,  Territorial foundations of 
the Gulf States (UCL Press, 1994), pp. 176-186, at p. 183. 
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over the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs.556 The island of Abu 
Musa, closest to points 3, 4, and 5, and remains in dispute between Iran and 
Sharjah.557 
 Economic considerations were a motivation for drafting the agreement 
although they did not play a part in the location of the line.558 
  
13.  1981  Dubai - Sharjah 559 
(Arbitration) 
 
The Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah are adjacent to each other along a more or less 
straight coastline. While the Arbitral Tribunal decided upon both land and maritime 
boundaries between them, only the aspects of the Award relating to the maritime 
boundaries will be considered here.  
In their arguments before the Tribunal both Dubai and Sharjah invoked equitable 
principles, although they differed as to how they might be applied.  It is of interest that 
both Parties agreed that international law was applicable to their dispute. 560 They also 
both argued that according to customary international law, an equidistance line was 
appropriate, although they presented different arguments as to how this should be 
drawn.561 There were two interesting aspects of the case which had a material effect 
upon the decision.  Firstly, although the coastline was more or less straight, Dubai had 
harbour works which extended seawards three times farther than Sharjah’s. Dubai 
referred to Articles 3 and 8 CSC 1958 as part of the arguments that the outer-most 
harbour works of both Dubai and Sharjah should be used as basepoints for drawing an 
equidistance line.562 The effect of this would be to move the line further towards 
Sharjah giving Dubai a larger area. Sharjah argued that this was inequitable. The 
                                                             
556 For a view of how the boundary relates to other boundaries in its vicinity, see map of all boundaries 
in the Gulf as at July 1981, Appendix, p. 350. 
557 Limits in the Seas, No. 63 (1975), p. 4.  
558 Charney and Alexander state that subsequent to the agreement, several oil platforms were 
constructed in the vicinity of the boundary. See Vol. II (1993), p. 1534.  
559 Dubai/Sharjah Border Arbitration, Arbitral Award of 19 October 1981. The award remained 
unpublished until 1993, see (1993) 91 ILR 543. For map of the line drawn see Appendix, p. 351. 
560 Ibid., p. 586. The Tribunal agreed at p. 587.  
561 See ibid., pp. 555 and 557.  
562 Ibid., p. 555. These provisions are referred to in Chapter 2.  
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second interesting aspect was how the island of Abu Musa was dealt with. There is a 
continuing territorial dispute over Abu Musa between Sharjah and Iran, although the 
Parties have come to a special agreement over the island.563 Abu Musa lies 
approximately 35 miles off the coast of Sharjah. Sharjah claimed half-effect for it. 564 
However, the effect of such a claim would cause the equidistance line to cut across the 
front of Dubai’s coast. Dubai argued that there was a territorial dispute over Abu Musa 
between Sharjah and Iran, and that the use of half-effect was therefore inappropriate. 
Further, the resulting line would breach the principle of “non-encroachment” 
enshrined in the North Sea Continental Shelf (1969) cases. Dubai also argued that since 
1964 it had been agreed between Sharjah, the UK, and Umm al Qaywayn that Abu 
Musa would only have a 3 mile territorial sea, and therefore on that basis, the island 
would have no effect on the equidistance line, so the equidistance line could be drawn 
without taking it into effect. Dubai also argued that the line produced by giving Abu 
Musa half effect would be incompatible with the UAE-Iran 1974 Agreement. 565 
 The Tribunal stated that it took into account customary international law, and 
developments in UNCLOS III up to the date of August 1980, as well as state practice 
in the Gulf region as well and elsewhere. It sought to ensure the boundary line 
conformed with equitable principles, and produced a result which “allows, in equity, 
a proportionate influence to the existence of “special circumstances” or “special and 
unusual features” which call for special treatment.”566 The Tribunal held that both state 
practice and conventional law promoted the using of harbour works for the definition 
of an equidistance line, and allowing this, although more favourable to Dubai, was not 
inequitable. 567 The Tribunal also decided that the appropriate method of delimitation 
                                                             
563 This is the “Memorandum of Understanding” between Iran and Sharjah of November 1971, which 
is reproduced in A.A. El-Hakim, The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1979) at Appendix VII, p. 208. In this agreement, both States announced 
that neither will renounce its claim to Abu Musa or recognise the other’s claim. When the UK withdrew 
from the Gulf, Sharjah and Umm al Qaywayn divided the ownership of the petroleum resources of Abu 
Musa between them. As a result of the Memorandum, Iran obtained a 50% share in the resources of the 
Mubarak field, Sharjah obtained 35%, and Umm al Qaywayn the remainder. Exploitation of the island’s 
petroleum resources was to be conducted under existing arrangements, with an agreed share of 
government oil revenues. Both Parties also agreed, inter alia to recognise a 12nm territorial sea around 
the island and equal fishing rights. See Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas. A Model Agreement 
for States for Joint Development with Explanatory Commentary Vol I (British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law, 1989), p. 56.  
564 P. 557.  
565 See the ‘summary’ at p.546.  
566 P. 654.  
567 Pp. 655-63. 
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was equidistance, and the only “special circumstance” was the island of Abu Musa. 
The Tribunal held that to give Abu Musa half-effect would be disproportionate and 
inequitable. Abu Musa was entitled to a 12nm territorial sea and therefore the equitable 
boundary was an equidistance line which at the point at which it met the 12nm 
territorial sea of Abu Musa, would follow the arc of the territorial sea around Abu 
Musa and the low tide elevations in its vicinity, until the line intersects the boundary 
between Iran and the UAE568 As in the Sharjah – Umm Al Qaywayn boundary, the 
island of Abu Musa which is approximately 35nm offshore, and which is in dispute 
between Sharjah and Iran, added complexity to the boundary situation. Abu Musa 
which was treated as the territory of Sharjah for the purpose of the Arbitration, was 
given a 12nm belt in a semi-enclaving effect.    
 
 
14.         2000 Saudi Arabia – Kuwait 569 
(Signed 2 July 2000, in force 30 January 2001). 
 
This agreement concerned delimitation of the offshore areas of the Neutral Zone off 
the coast from the Partitioned Zone (the land part of the Neutral Zone), which as seen 
above, was divided by agreement between the Parties, which are adjacent to each 
other, in 1965. The maritime area which is offshore from the Partitioned Zone had 
for many years been exploited for the production of petroleum. However, except for 
its southern boundary which was agreed in 1963 and which divided the Offshore 
Neutral Zone from Saudi Arabia’s offshore area, the other boundaries of the Offshore 
Neutral Zone were not resolved.570 As has been seen already, it was also agreed prior 
                                                             
568 Pp. 673-8. 
569 Published at 46 (2001) LOSB, pp. 84-6. For text of agreement and map see Appendix, pp. 338-41. 
570 Charney and Alexander, Vol. IV (2002), p. 2825. The resolution of the southern limit was dealt 
with prior to the Saudi Arabia-Iran 1968 continental shelf agreement. Resolution of the southern limit 
was motivated by the discovery of the Safanya oil field offshore from Saudi Arabia, and the need to 
define the northern limit to which Aramco would conduct operations on the Saudi continental shelf, 
and the southern limit of the Offshore Neutral Zone where the Arabian Oil Company consortium 
would operate. See Charney and Alexander, Vol. IV (2002), p. 2827.  
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to this agreement, that the resources of the Neutral Zone and the Offshore Neutral 
Zone were owned in common.   
 Article 1 establishes a line which divides the Offshore Neutral Zone into two 
sections. Article 2 establishes a northern boundary which reflects past Saudi positions 
as to its location, and Article 3 then adjusts the northern boundary so that it reflects 
Kuwaiti positions.571  Annex 1 of the agreement states that the natural resources in 
the continental shelf adjacent to the divided zone shall be owned in common, 
including the islands of Qaruh and Umm al-Maradim which are within the Offshore 
Neutral Zone.  
 In general the lines established by the agreement are based on equidistance, but 
in some parts they are simplified equidistance lines, and in other part are equidistant 
lines from only selected basepoints. The low-water line along the mainland is the 
baseline. In general, small offshore islands have been ignored. For example the 
Kuwaiti islands of Kubbar, located outside the Offshore Neutral Zone, would 
potentially have an effect on any equidistance line used for the northern limit, and 
Qaru and Umm al-Maradim could affect an equidistance line used for the line 
partitioning the Offshore Neutral Zone. However, they have been disregarded as 
basepoints for the purposes of equidistance, as have low-tide elevations.572 Looking 
at the southern limit line which was established in 1963, it is an approximate 
simplified equidistance line, based on the low-water line, utilising neither islands nor 
low-tide elevations as basepoints.573   
However, in the 2000 agreement, Kuwait’s Failaka island was used as a 
basepoint for equidistance. The circumstance of how Failaka island was dealt with is 
of interest. Kuwait’s position was that it should be used as a basepoint, but Saudi 
Arabia rejected this. This dispute was an obstacle to reaching an overall agreement. 
Rather than solving this dispute by granting Falaika only half-effect, the resolution 
of this dispute was that the northern limit was established by using Failaka as a 
basepoint (see Article 3), in accordance with Kuwait’s position, but pursuant to 
Article 2 and the Annex, Saudi Arabia has an equal share in the resources in the 
                                                             
571 Charney and Alexander, Vol. IV (2002), p. 2829. See map at Appendix, p. 341 for the three separate 
lines referred to in the agreement.  
572 Charney and Alexander, Vol. IV (2002), p. 2830.  
573 Ibid., p. 2832. 
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northern area, with a northern limit created without using Failaka as a basepoint.574  
The area between the line not using Failaka as a basepoint (Article 2) and the line 
using Failaka (Article 3) is outside the Offshore Neutral Zone, but it is included in 
the arrangements for sharing resources.575  
 The agreement grants sovereignty of the islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim 
to Kuwait, and the line which divides the Offshore Netural Zone places them on 
Kuwait’s side of the line. The southern limit of the Offshore Neutral Zone ties on to 
the northern end of the Iran-Saudi Arabia 1968 boundary.  
  It is clear that economic considerations were the motivating factor in finalising 
this agreement, although they did not influence the actual position of the line. The 
agreement is of significance, because it opens the way for delimitation between Iran 
and the Offshore Neutral Zone, and possibly even between Iran and Kuwait, whose 
maritime boundary is still undefined. 576 
 
 
15.       2001    Qatar v Bahrain 577 
(Judgment of the ICJ) 
 
The geographical features of the vicinity of the states of Qatar and Bahrain merits some 
consideration. Bahrain is an island state and Qatar constitutes a peninsula east of 
Bahrain. Qatar and Bahrain’s relationship may be characterised as one which involves 
both oppositeness and adjacency. The ICJ determined a number of questions of 
                                                             
574 Ibid., p. 2830, where the point is also made that Iran’s Kharg island, which of course has not had 
any effect on the boundary line, is a feature which Iran is likely to wish to be given effect to in a 
similar way to Failaka, in any delimitation between Iran and the Offshore Neutral Zone, or between 
Iran and Kuwait. It is suggested at p. 2831 that this likely position to be taken by Iran is a reason why 
half-effect was not given to Falaika, with the resource-sharing arrangement being utilised instead.  
575 Ibid., p. 2831.  
576 Iran has protested against the agreement, stating, inter alia, that Article 1 of the agreement “grossly 
and unjustly extends that line towards point 4 and, as a consequence, encroaches the natural 
prolongation of the continental shelf of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the respective area”. See note 
verbale dated 23 January 2002 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran to the Embassies of Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait at Tehran, 49 LOSB 2002 pp.68-69. 
577 [2001] ICJ Rep 40. For map showing the line drawn by the ICJ, as well as the geographical features 
referred to in this section, see Appendix, p. 352. 
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territorial sovereignty between the Parties, as well as determining the maritime 
boundary between them.  
The territorial disputes are not dealt in any detail here. However, in summary, 
there were three main points of contention. In between Bahrain and Qatar, and 
sometimes within 1nm of the western Qatari mainland, are the Hawar Islands which 
were in dispute between the Parties. The ICJ awarded them to Bahrain. Another area 
of territorial dispute was an area in the northwest of the Qatari mainland known as 
Zubarah. This was awarded to Qatar.  Janan Island and Hadd Janan, a small 
uninhabited island and shoal south of the Hawar islands was awarded to Qatar.  
 The ICJ drew a single maritime boundary made up of 42 points delimiting the 
Parties’ territorial seas, continental shelf and EEZs. Bahrain had ratified LOSC 1982 
while Qatar had not. Therefore, customary international law was applicable, and both 
Parties agreed that most of the provisions of the 1982 Convention which were relevant 
for the case reflected customary law.578 Further, the ICJ observed that the concept of a 
single maritime boundary does not stem from conventional law, but from state 
practice.579  
The boundary was divided into two sectors, the northern and southern sectors. 
The southern sector is where the coasts were seen as opposite each other, and not more 
than 24nm from each other. The northern sector is where the coasts were comparable 
to those of adjacent states, extending towards the open waters of the Gulf and beyond 
the overlapping territorial seas of the states. The ICJ referred to the line which it drew 
as an “adjusted equidistant line”.580 In the vicinity of the boundary are a number of 
small islands and low-tide elevations and the manner in which the ICJ dealt with 
islands and low-tide elevations is of particular interest in the case.581  
 
                                                             
578 Para. 167. Although the Judgment does not articulate which, these would undoubtedly include 
Articles 15 (delimitation of the territorial sea), 74(1) and 83(1) (delimitation of the EEZ and continental 
shelf respectively).  
579 Para. 173.  
580 For example at para. 220. 
581 In J.I. Charney and R.W. Smith R.W. (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries Vol. IV, (Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, 2002), at p. 2842 it is stated that “For many of these features, there is a question 
whether they are in fact islands or free-standing low-tide elevations. For example, British and US 
nautical charts differ in a number of instances. It is not clear what data the Court used for its 
determinations.” 
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a. The southern sector 
 
In this sector the distance between the coastlines of both states was not more than 24nm 
and consisted exclusively of the territorial seas of both Parties which partially 
overlapped.582 Therefore the delimitation was exclusively of the territorial sea 
boundary between the opposite coastlines of the states.  
In applying the customary international law of delimitation of the territorial sea, 
the ICJ also took into account that its ultimate task was to draw a single maritime 
boundary that serves other purposes as well.583 The ICJ noted that both Parties agreed 
that Article 15 LOSC 1982 governing delimitation of the territorial sea was part of 
customary international law.584 The ICJ stated that:  
 
The most logical and widely practised approach is first to draw provisionally an 
equidistance line and then to consider whether that line must be adjusted in the 
light of the existence of special circumstances.585  
 
The ICJ reiterated the general principle that the equidistance line would be every point 
of which is equidistant from the nearest point on the baselines from which the breadth 
of the territorial sea is measured. In considering the baselines, it was of relevance to 
the ICJ that neither Qatar nor Bahrain had specified the baselines to be used to establish 
the breadth of their territorial seas by way of official charts, nor had they published 
straight baselines.586 Only during the proceedings did they provide the ICJ with 
approximate basepoints which in their view could be used for the determination of the 
maritime boundary.  
                                                             
582 See para. 169. As set out in Chapter 4, by a Decree of 16 April 1992, Qatar established the breadth 
of its territorial sea to be 12nm; Bahrain did likewise by a Decree of 20 April 1993. 
583 Para. 174.  
584 Para. 175.  
585 Para. 176.  
586 Para. 177. For example, if a state wishes to claim a straight baseline system, it is to publish charts or 
lists of geographical coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations pursuant to Article 16(2) LOSC 1982. 
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Qatar argued that the ICJ should determine the equidistance line using the “mainland-
to-mainland method”, this method applying to firstly the Qatari peninsula, which 
should be understood as including the main Hawar Island, and secondly to Bahrain, of 
which the islands to be taken into consideration were al-Awal (also called Bahrain 
Island), together with al-Muharraq and Sitrah. Qatar’s method would take no account 
of the islands (except for the abovementioned islands, Hawar on the Qatar side and al-
Awal, al-Muharraq and Sitrah on the Bahrain side), islets, rocks, reefs or low-tide 
elevations lying in the relevant area. The ICJ stated that according to Qatar, the 
delimitation area contains "[a] multitude of island, rock, coral or sand formations". 
These features are said to be of little significance “because of their small size, their 
location and in the case of the low-tide elevations, their legal characterization”. Qatar 
submitted that the majority of these features are very small, uninhabited islands, or 
even simply rocks that are quite uninhabitable, and correspond in reality to what are 
often referred to in international case law as “minor geographical features”.587 Qatar 
also submitted that the application of the mainland-to-mainland method of calculation 
would mean that the equidistance line had to be constructed by reference to the high-
water line.  
Bahrain argued that it is an archipelagic state pursuant to Part IV of LOSC 1982 
and therefore entitled to draw the baselines of Article 47, namely “straight archipelagic 
baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the 
archipelago.” In rejecting this claim the ICJ observed that Bahrain had not made this 
claim one of its formal submissions.588 Further, in a later part of the Judgment, the ICJ 
rejected Bahrain’s submission that it was entitled to claim straight baselines, on the 
basis that the maritime features off the coast of the main islands may be assimilated to 
a fringe of islands which constitute a whole with the mainland.589 The ICJ stated the 
requirements as contained in Article 4 TSCZ 1958 or Article 7 LOSC1982 are not met 
in that there was no fringe of islands, the islands concerned being relatively small in 
number. Moreover, the ICJ stated that it was only possible to speak of a “cluster of 
islands” or an “island system” if Bahrain's main islands were included in that concept. 
In such a situation, the method of straight baselines was applicable only if the State 
                                                             
587 Para. 179. 
588 Para. 183 
589 Para. 214.  
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has declared itself to be an archipelagic State under Part IV of LOSC 1982. The ICJ 
concluded that Bahrain was not entitled to apply the method of straight baselines.590 
The ICJ therefore ignored both Parties’ submissions on the issue of the pertinent 
basepoints from which to draw the equidistance line and decided that the low-water 
line would be used, which is the normal baseline pursuant to the general rule in Article 
5 LOSC 1982.591 As a result, in all cases where the ICJ used a basepoint, including, 
for example, islands, it used the low-water line to identify the basepoint. 592 
With regard to islands, with one exception in the form of Qit’at Jaradah, the ICJ 
gave full effect to all islands, regardless of how small they were. 593 Qit’at Jaradah, a 
small uninhabited Bahraini island within the Parties’ overlapping territorial seas, was 
determined by the ICJ to be under Bahrain’s sovereignty, but was not used as a 
basepoint. 594 This was on the basis that if it was used as a basepoint  
 
a disproportionate effect would be given to an insignificant maritime feature… 
The Court thus finds that there is a special circumstance in this case warranting 
the choice of a delimitation line passing immediately to the east of Qit'at 
Jaradah.595 
 
The ICJ stated that when a low-tide elevation is situated in the overlapping area of the 
territorial sea of two States, whether with opposite or with adjacent coastlines, both 
states in principle are entitled to use the low-water line of the low-tide elevation for 
the measuring of the breadth of their territorial seas. The same low-tide elevation then 
forms part of the coastal configuration of the two States. That is so even if the low-tide 
elevation is nearer to the coast of one State than that of the other, or nearer to an island 
belonging to one party than it is to the mainland coast of the other. However, the ICJ 
did not use low-tide elevations located within the areas of overlapping 12nm territorial 
                                                             
590 Paras. 214-5.  
591 Para. 184.  
592 Charney and Smith, Vol IV (2002), p. 2847. 
593 Ibid., p. 2848. This statement is subject to one qualification in that while the ICJ decided that the 
feature known as Umm Jalid, south of Fasht al Azm was a Bahraini island, and would therefore qualify 
as a Bahraini basepoint for the equidistance line, in the final delimitation, the potential influence of 
Umm Jalid on the equidistance line was superseded by special circumstances related to Fasht al Azm, 
and it was not utilized as a basepoint; see ibid., at p. 2848. 
594 Ibid., p. 2843. 
595 Para. 219.  
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seas as basepoints.596 In this particular case, it was found that the competing rights 
derived by both states from the relevant provisions of the law of the sea would by 
necessity seem to neutralize each other.597  
 
b. The northern sector 
 
In this sector, the ICJ delimited the continental shelf and EEZ boundary between the 
two states by way of a single maritime boundary. The ICJ referred to the approach 
taken in Greenland v Jan Mayen (1993), in which the ICJ was also asked to draw a 
single maritime boundary. In that earlier case, the ICJ referred to Gulf of Maine (1984) 
and Libya/Malta (1985) and stated that with regard to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf: 
 
even if it were appropriate to apply ...customary law concerning the continental 
shelf as developed in the decided cases, it is in accord with precedents to begin 
with the median line as a provisional line and then to ask whether “special 
circumstances”  require any adjustment or shifting of that line.598  
 
The ICJ in Qatar/Bahrain also noted that in Greenland v Jan Mayen (1993) the ICJ 
came to a similar conclusion with regard to the fishery zones.599 The ICJ in 
Qatar/Bahrain followed the same approach, stating that for the delimitation of the 
maritime zones beyond the 12nm zone it will first provisionally draw an equidistance 
line and then consider whether there are circumstances which must lead to an 
adjustment of that line.600 The ICJ further noted that the equidistance/special 
                                                             
596 Para. 215. There is one possible exception in the form of Fasht al Azm, an extensive area of drying 
shoals which extend east from the Bahrain towards Qatar; it appears that for point 33 of the boundary, 
this feature was used as a basepoint; see Charney and Smith, Vol IV (2002), pp. 2843 and 2847. Another 
point of interest identified in Charney and Smith, Vol IV (2002) at p. 2848 is al-Hul, a Bahraini feature 
which is approximately 4nm long and south of Ras al Barr on al- Awal. It was given effect, however it 
does not fall within the overlapping territorial seas and it is not clear whether it is a low-tide elevation 
(as shown by US charts) or an island (British charts indicate that a small part of it dries at high tide).  
597 Para. 202.  
598 Greenland and Jan Mayen (1993), para. 51. The term “special circumstances” was taken from Article 
6 CSC 1958, which was the applicable law in the case. 
599 Para. 228. 
600 Para. 230.  
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circumstances rule, which is applicable in particular to the delimitation of the territorial 
sea, and the equitable principles/relevant circumstances rule, as it has been developed 
since 1958 in case law and state practice in relation to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, are closely interrelated.601  
The ICJ then examined whether there were circumstances which might make it 
necessary to adjust the equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result. Bahrain 
claimed that there were a significant number of pearling banks, many of which are 
situated to the north of the Qatar peninsula, which have appertained to Bahrain since 
time immemorial and that they constitute a special circumstance which must be taken 
into consideration in carrying out the delimitation, namely to shift the equidistance line 
eastwards. The ICJ rejected this argument, noting that the pearling industry effectively 
ceased to exist a considerable time ago, and that, on the basis of the evidence before 
it, pearl diving in the Gulf area traditionally was considered as a right which was 
common to the general coastal population. Moreover, even if it were established that 
pearling had been carried out by a group of fishermen from one state only, this activity 
seemed in any event never to have led to the recognition of an exclusive quasi-
territorial right to the fishing grounds themselves or to the superjacent waters.602  
The ICJ also rejected Qatar’s submission that it should take into account a 
boundary line used by Britain in 1947 which neither party had previously accepted as 
having binding force.603  
Qatar also unsuccessfully argued that the ratio of relevant coastal lengths, which 
it argued was 1.59:1 should be reflected, to its advantage, in the drawing of the line. 
However it is apparent that this argument was on the basis that the Hawar islands were 
under its sovereignty. The ICJ took into account the fact that it had decided that 
Bahrain had sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, and found that the disparity in length 
of the coastal fronts of the Parties could not be considered such as to necessitate an 
adjustment of the equidistance line.604 
                                                             
601 Para. 231.  
602 See paras. 235-7. 
603 Paras. 237-40. 
604 Paras. 241-3. 
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The ICJ did however find a relevant circumstance in the form of Fasht al Jarim, a low-
tide elevation north of Bahrain and partially located in Bahrain’s territorial sea. It 
decided that this “remote projection of Bahrain’s coastline” should not be used as a 
basepoint for the equidistance line, because it would have a disproportionate effect, 
and that “such a distortion, due to a maritime feature located well out to sea and of 
which at most a minute part is above water at high tide, would not lead to an equitable 
solution”. 605 
 
16.      2008 Saudi Arabia – Qatar 606 
(Signed 5 July 2008, in force 16 December 2008). 
 
This agreement is in the form of Joint Minutes on the land and maritime boundaries 
agreed in the Qatar- Saudi Arabia 1965 agreement and resolves outstanding issues 
regarding those boundaries.  The agreement delimits the territorial sea seaward from 
Khawr al-Udaid, and the waters seaward to the boundary between Iran and Qatar for 
approximately 115nm, and is comprised of 9 points.607 It essentially establishes a 
3nm wide corridor, with the northern limit of this corridor constituting the Qatar- 
Saudi Arabia line, and the southern limit corresponding with the Qatar-Abu Dhabi 
(1969) boundary, with which the Qatar -Saudi Arabia line is parallel.  It is understood 
that the purpose of this boundary is to provide Saudi Arabia with a corridor between 
Qatar and the UAE to enable shipping from Saudi Arabia’s territorial sea to access 
deep water in the centre of the Gulf north of the Qatar -Abu Dhabi boundary, without 
entering UAE waters.608Article 2 confirms that the resources under the seabed in this 
corridor remain in the ownership of Qatar.  Therefore, the agreement is motivated by 
the furtherance of Saudi Arabia’s navigational interests. 609 
                                                             
605 Paras. 247 and 248. 
606 Translation published at 70 (2009) LOSB, pp. 45-51. For text of the agreement and map see 
Appendix, pp 342-9.  
607 D.A Colson and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries Vol. VI (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Leiden, 2011), pp. 4417, 4420.  
608Colson and Smith, Vol VI (2011), pp. 4417, 4420.  
609 The UAE has protested against the agreement, stating, inter alia, that it “violates the sovereignty 
of the United Arab Emirates over Dayyinah Island and its territorial sea and a part of the territorial 
sea of Makasib Island”. See Note transmitted to the Officer-in Charge of the Division for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea by a letter from the Permanent Representative of the UAE to the U.N. 
dated 16 June 2009, translation in 70 LOSB (2009) p. 60.  
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General observations on the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Gulf 
 
While Chapter 7 of this thesis will look at Gulf State practice as a whole in the context 
of international law, it is appropriate at this point to consider in general the 
delimitation of boundaries which have taken place in the Gulf, the majority of which 
have been continental shelf boundaries, and the trends which may be identified.  
 
i. Equidistance 
 
The principle of equidistance has played a major role in delimitation in the Gulf. 
Most often lines are drawn according to modified equidistance rather than strict 
equidistance. As has been seen, some boundary lines are partly strictly equidistance, 
and partly modified equidistance lines. Factors which have caused the modification 
to equidistance have ranged from the line being drawn according to predetermined 
landmarks as part of an agreed position, to account being taken of islands.610 drawing 
of the line, such as islands, islets and shoals.  
 Iran has been active in seeking agreements with the Arab states on the opposite 
side of the Gulf, and there are common trends found in Iran’s Agreements with the 
Arab states, namely Saudi Arabia - Iran 1968, Iran - Qatar 1969, Bahrain-Iran 1971, 
Iran-Oman 1974, and Iran-UAE (Dubai) 1974. With the exception of Saudi Arabia-
Iran 1968, the Preamble of all these agreements refers to the desire to delimit the 
boundary in a “just, equitable and precise manner” and “in accordance with 
international law”. Every agreement entered into by Iran with an Arab state has been 
                                                             
610 The importance given to equidistance in the Gulf agreements has been observed in a general sense 
by some commentators in what is now somewhat dated writing. For example, S.H. Amin expressed 
the view a number of years ago that “[t]he median line norm has been universally applied in the Gulf 
for continental shelf delimitation, but frequently with modifications. Such modifications have been 
inevitable as a result of the obvious special circumstances which exist in the Gulf. The most important 
occurrences of partial departure from the median line are due to the presence of islands and the unity 
of deposits, as well as political, economic, and strategic considerations”, see International Legal 
Problems of the Gulf (Middle East and North African Studies Press Ltd., London, 1981), at p. 143. 
Chapter 7 of this thesis will examine the use of the equidistance line in the bilateral agreements as 
well as the provision for equidistance in the Gulf national legislation, presenting a more up to date 
analysis in the light of present international law.  
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based on equidistance. This is foreseeable on the basis that the agreements are 
between states with opposite coastlines. The boundary lines drawn are based upon 
equidistance although there is no actual reference to equidistance. It is quite clear that 
the aim expressed in many of the agreements is to achieve an equitable solution, and 
in reality, this aim is effected by a modified equidistance line.  
A similar approach was taken in the Dubai/ Sharjah Arbitration (1981).  The 
essential reasoning behind the drawing of the boundary was that it should conform 
with equitable principles, and that an equidistance line was the appropriate line to 
take into account such equitable principles. The Tribunal also found that a special 
circumstance existed in the form of Abu Musa island. The decision of the ICJ in  
Qatar v Bahrain (2001) is significant in this context because it is primarily an 
example of the approach within recent case law of using a provisional equidistance 
line as a starting point, which is then adjusted, if necessary, to avoid the effect of 
geographical features on the equidistance line. Secondarily, it restates that the aim of 
delimitation is to reach an “equitable solution”, which reiterates the reference to such 
a solution in Articles 74(1) and 83(1) LOSC 1982 on delimitation of the EEZ and 
continental shelf respectively. 
 
ii. Islands as relevant circumstances 
 
It is quite clear that islands have played an important part in the considerations 
relating to delimitation in the Gulf, particularly because of their sheer number and 
position, particularly on the Arab side of the Gulf. In a number of instances they have 
been viewed as relevant circumstances which have had a clear effect on the 
equidistance line, in accordance with the techniques utilised in international case law. 
Thus, it is apparent that half-effect was given to Iran’s Kharg island in Saudi Arabia 
– Iran 1968, and in the same agreement, the Iranian islands of Nakhilu and the Saudi 
Arabian island of Abu Ali were also given partial effect. Another method utilised in 
the international law case law which was given effect to in the Gulf is the granting 
of an island’s territorial sea by way of a semi-enclave, for example Abu Musa was 
 
 
236 
granted a 12nm territorial sea in the Dubai/ Sharjah Arbitration (1981) and the island 
of Dayyinha in Qatar – UAE (Abu Dhabi) 1969 was granted a 3nm territorial sea.  
Delimitation in the Gulf however also ignores certain islands. This is consistent 
with trends in international case law so as not to create a disproportionate effect on 
an equidistance line. Qatar v Bahrain  (2001) is an example of how the extent to 
whether geographical features such as islands are ignored when drawing a boundary 
line is case-specific and depends on the individual features of each case. The 
approach of the ICJ in that case was to give effect to all minor islands except one, 
while in other cases, such as for example, Gulf of Maine (1984), the ICJ highlighted 
the disadvantages of allowing minor geographical features including small islands to 
be used as basepoints. The delimitation in the Gulf shows a significant degree of 
pragmatism in this respect. It is also clear that in respect of the treatment of islands, 
the delimitation in the Gulf benefits from, and is quite consistent with, international 
law.   
  
 
a. The existence of oil and gas fields in the continental shelf as relevant 
circumstances 
 
The motivation for entering the agreements has been largely related to the need to 
establish boundaries for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of oil and gas 
fields, whether already known, and subject to disputes between the parties, or in order 
to prepare for future discovery of oil and gas in the vicinity of the boundary line to 
be agreed.  
Also as seen above, Article 2 of the following agreements between Iran and 
Arab states: Iran - Qatar 1969, Bahrain-Iran 1971, Iran-Oman 1974 and Iran-UAE 
(Dubai) 1974 are identical, and are very similar to Article 4 of Saudi Arabia-Iran 
1968. In anticipation of existence of oil structures across maritime boundaries, Iran 
decided to include a provision in her continental shelf agreements with the Arab 
states on the opposite side of the Gulf preventing inappropriate exploitation of such 
structures. According to this provision, which appears in all continental shelf 
boundary agreements, if a petroleum structure extends across the boundary and could 
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be exploited from the other side, there should be no sub-surface well completion 
within a set distance without the mutual agreement of the two parties. These clauses 
may be described as “resource deposit clauses”, which give effect to a cooperation 
arrangement between states where a single resource extends across a boundary, with 
part of the resource being exploitable from the other side of the boundary.611  A well-
known example of such a clause is in the UK – Norway Agreement of 10 March 1965 
delimiting the continental shelf boundary between both countries.612  The Gulf 
delimitation agreements which contain the resource deposit clause seem to be 
modelled on the UK – Norway 1965 agreement.613 Other agreements in the Gulf 
incorporate joint development, which may be defined as “an agreement between two 
States to develop so as to share jointly in agreed proportions by inter-State 
cooperation and national measures the offshore oil and gas in a designated zone of 
the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf to which both or either of the 
participating States are entitled in international law.”614 Examples of joint 
                                                             
611 B. Kwiatkowska, “Economic and Environmental Consideration in Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation”, in Charney, J.I., and Alexander, L.M., (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries 
(Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993), Vol I, pp. 75-113, p. 86. 
612 “If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum field, or any single geological structure 
or field of any other mineral deposit, including sand or gravel, extends across the dividing line and the 
part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of the dividing line is   exploitable, wholly 
or in any part, from the other side of the dividing line, the Contracting Parties shall, in consultation 
with the licensees, if any, seek to reach agreement as to the manner in which the structure or field hall 
be most effectively exploited and the manner in which the proceeds deriving therefrom, shall be 
apportioned.” (Article 4), agreement published at UK Treaty Series No. 71 (1965), Cmnd 2757.  
613 See Kwiatkowska, Vol I (1993), p. 87. 
614 Definition adopted by the research team in Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas. A Model 
Agreement for States for Joint Development with Explanatory Commentary Vol I (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 1989), see p. 45. This definition is based upon the definition 
adopted by R. Lagoni, Rapporteur to the EEZ Committee of the International Law Association; in his 
articles, and in his report on joint development which was adopted at the 1988 Warsaw meeting, he 
defined joint development as “a concept of international law based on agreement between States”, 
referred to in Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas. A Model Agreement for States for Joint 
Development with Explanatory Commentary Vol I, at p. 44. For Lagoni’s contributions, see “Oil and 
Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers” 73 (1979) AJIL 215; International Law Association Warsaw 
Conference (1988), International Committee on the Exclusive Economic Zone: Report on Joint 
Development of  Non-Living Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone (unpublished), referred to 
in Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas. A Model Agreement for States for Joint Development 
with Explanatory Commentary Vol I, at p. 52, n. 4. Thus Lagoni’s definition excludes contractual 
cooperation such as unitisation between licensee or concessionaires of a field straddling the dividing 
line between concession areas, ibid., p. 44. For a discussion of an example of unitisation in the form 
of the UK-Norway agreement of May 1976 relating to the joint exploitation of the Frigg Gas Field in 
the North Sea, see Woodliffe, J.C., ‘International Unitisation of an Offshore Gas Field’, 26 ICLQ 
(1977), pp. 338-353. 
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development schemes in the Gulf are Bahrain -Saudi Arabia 1958 (Second Clause), 
Kuwait - Saudi Arabia 1965 and Qatar - UAE (Abu Dhabi) 1969 (paras. 6 and 7).615 
Out of the 13 agreements examined above, four agreements may be said to 
have considered mineral deposits as a relevant factor having a direct impact on the 
position of the boundary line. These agreements are Saudi Arabia-Bahrain 1958, Abu 
Dhabi-Dubai 1968, Iran-Saudi Arabia 1968 and Qatar-UAE (Abu Dhabi) 1969. It is 
in this respect that it may be said that Gulf delimitation shows quite a blatant regard 
for mineral resources as highly relevant to the drawing of the delimitation line, and 
this is not consistent with the decisions of the ICJ and tribunals in the case law as 
referred to in Chapter 3 of this thesis where, it has been seen, there is an obvious 
reluctance to explicitly find that oil and gas resources (or indeed other resources such 
as fisheries) are relevant circumstances which may affect the placement of an 
equidistance line.  As suggested in Chapter 3, such a reticence and indeed on occasion 
silence in the case law is despite the fact that very often the cases were in fact brought 
primarily because of the existence or anticipated existence of oil and gas resources 
in the continental shelf, and the need to obtain a third party decision on delimitation 
in order so that they could be legitimately exploited without dispute between the 
parties.  In this regard, it is useful to recall Qatar v Bahrain (2001) where economic 
considerations had no explicit bearing on the ICJ’s Judgment, with the ICJ making 
no reference to oil and gas concessions which were raised by the Parties as part of 
the background to the dispute. The notable absence of any reference in the judgment 
to these obviously crucial and pressing matters inevitably creates the impression that 
any express comment on their relevance is being studiously avoided. 
 In actively and openly allowing the oil and gas resources to be a determinative 
factor on the boundaries in the Gulf agreements, the Gulf States are acting 
innovatively in comparison with international case law. They freely express what is 
of real importance to them, and use delimitation to give effect to those crucial 
concerns.   
 
                                                             
615 See Kwiatkowska, Vol I (1993), p. 88 and Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas. A Model 
Agreement for States for Joint Development with Explanatory Commentary Vol I (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 1989), pp. 54-6. 
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b. Navigation as a relevant circumstance 
 
 
The navigational interests of Saudi Arabia were a factor directly influencing the 
position of the boundary line in Saudi Arabia - Qatar 2008, with the boundary drawn 
so as to allow Saudi Arabia the passage of ships from its territorial sea to access deep 
water in the centre of the Gulf via a corridor between Qatar and the UAE, without 
entering the UAE’s territorial sea. The agreement confirms that the resources under 
the seabed in this corridor remain in Qatar’s ownership. The importance of 
navigational interests for Saudi Arabia which is apparent in this boundary with Qatar 
is reminiscent of the Saudi Arabia – UAE 1974 agreement in which the continental 
shelf boundary lying offshore the short part of Saudi Arabia’ coastline in between 
Qatar to the west and the UAE to the east, was envisaged to be agreed upon in the 
future so as to allow Saudi Arabia “free and direct access to the high seas” from its 
territorial waters to the deep waters in the Gulf, allowing Saudi Arabia the 
opportunity for deep-water navigation.  
 As discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, matters of navigation have not been 
adjudged in the case law to be a relevant circumstance which has operated to alter 
the course of an equidistance line delimiting the continental shelf boundaries between 
states. In this regard, the delimitation agreements referred to above, go beyond the 
confines of international case law, and give expression to the need to protect 
navigational interests, which is particularly pressing in a relatively overcrowded, 
narrow and shallow semi-enclosed sea such as the Gulf. As such, these agreements 
are innovative in allowing navigation concerns to be an important factor which 
affects the boundary line drawn.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf: Gulf State Practice in the 
context of International Law 
 
The Gulf as a region 
 
The Gulf is a region in a geographical sense. It is a shallow semi-enclosed sea with 
particular characteristics which distinguish it from other marine areas of the world. 
There is no true continental shelf in the geological sense. Apart from Iraq, all the 
Gulf States have opposite coastlines with Iran which stretches along the whole of the 
northern side of the Gulf. There is a proliferation of islands along the southern Arab 
side of the Gulf. The sub-sea region is rich in oil and gas and the continental shelf 
which each State in the Gulf is entitled to claim overlaps with its neighbours. 
Proliferation of low tide elevtions, shoals and reefs in the southern side of the Gulf.  
  A semi-enclosed sea is an example of a network of states bound by common 
interests and concerns.616 Such an arrangement may additionally be a source of 
conflict. Due to the physical proximity of these States, the actions of one State have 
an immediate impact on those of the others as all are littoral States in a semi-enclosed 
sea.617 This effect has already been set out in the preceding chapters. The 
promulgation of national legislation by one Gulf State has precipitated that of others. 
For example, as has been seen, Saudi Arabia’s early legislation claiming a continental 
shelf was quickly followed by other Gulf States. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s legislation 
increasing its territorial sea limit to 12nm was followed by Iran’s legislation to the 
same effect. Furthermore, once the breadth of Saudi Arabia’s territorial sea was 
                                                             
616 As stated by L.M. Alexander in “Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: The Case of Semi-
enclosed Seas”, (1974) 2 Ocean Development and International Law 151, at 154, a semi-enclosed 
sea is one type of “complimentary-use region”, the latter being based upon “mutual needs and 
interests resulting from geographic proximity”. 
617 Ibid., p. 155. 
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established, this also opened the way for the Saudi Arabia-Bahrain 1958 Agreement 
to be reached.  
 Given the interconnections of the region, and the possibilities for conflict, it is 
remarkable that most of the boundaries between the States have been resolved in an 
amicable fashion. Iran has concluded agreements with most of its Arab neighbours 
and the immense political and ideological differences between them have not created 
obstacles to such progress. It can be said that there has been a culture of agreement 
within the Gulf where at all possible. This is partly explicable on the basis of the 
pragmatic need to resolve boundaries so as to facilitate exploration and exploitation 
of oil and gas resources in the continental shelf and this explains why the agreements 
are almost all in relation to the continental shelf rather than in respect of any other 
zone.618 As has been seen from the overview of the Gulf laws and delimitation 
agreements, there are also a number of common regional interests in the Gulf other 
than the exploration and exploitation of offshore resources. These are mainly 
fisheries and security interests, with some navigational interests. All these interests 
have in fact contributed to the law and state practice of the Gulf States.  
 
Declarations of the right to exploit the continental shelf 
 
Saudi Arabia was the first Gulf State to declare its rights with regard to the 
continental shelf. 619 Saudi Arabia was not in the protection of Britain, and therefore 
was not subject to any fetter on its ability to legislate. Further, being a State with a 
relatively long coastline, which fronts not only the Gulf but also the Red Sea, there 
was the need to begin to assert its rights as soon as possible so as to add formality to 
any arrangements it already had with outside agencies to explore oil and gas in its 
continental shelf. Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the Gulf Sheikhdoms followed Saudi 
                                                             
618 As noted by Francx in respect of the North Sea, another semi-enclosed sea, such a high degree of 
delimitation settlement in respect of the continental shelf in the North Sea is not matched by the 
delimitation of other maritime zones, and is explained by “an ad hoc co-operation between countries 
with a well-defined common goal: divide the area without delay in order to allow exploratory 
drilling.” See E. Franckx, “Maritime Boundaries and Regional Co-operation”, (1990) 5 
International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law p. 215-227 at p. 226. 
619 As seen in Chapter 5, Iran issued a bill of 19 May 1949 relating to the resources of the seabed, 
but did not promulgate its first Act on the continental shelf until 1955. 
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Arabia’s lead (through the control of Britain) with Iran following in 1955 and Iraq in 
1957, by this time, an independent state.  
As seen in Chapter 5, all the Proclamations, with the exception of the 
legislation of Iran, refer to the subsoil and seabed in the areas contiguous to the coast 
rather than referring to the “continental shelf” explicitly, because of the concern at 
the time, which was yet to be resolved at an international level, that there was in fact 
no physical continental shelf in the Gulf. By the time of Iran’s Act of 1955, this issue 
had been resolved on an international level, on the basis that there was a legal 
continental shelf in the Gulf for the purpose of what was to become Article 1 of CSC 
1958. It is of note that Iraq’s Proclamation of 1957 also did not refer to the 
“continental shelf” as such, although by that time, it was open to it to do so in line 
with international standards. However, as has been seen, Iraq declared the sole 
purpose of its Proclamation as being to exercise rights established by international 
practice, and there is nothing to suggest that Iraq was not acting in line with such 
practice.  
It will be remembered from Chapter 5 that there is a difference between the 
wording in all these Proclamations and that in the Truman Proclamation in that while 
the latter made clear that the natural resources of the continental shelf were subject 
to the jurisdiction and control of the US, the Gulf legislation states that the continental 
shelf as well as the resources within it “belong” or “appertain” to the Gulf states. It 
is unlikely that this denotes any real substantive difference because any control of 
the resources in the continental shelf will entail control of the continental shelf itself. 
Thus it may be concluded that the Gulf claims to the continental shelf were 
made in the context of a desire to follow the Truman Proclamation, and indeed 
customary law, with regard to rights in the continental shelf.  
As was seen in Chapter 5, subsequent to the 1950s, further legislation was 
promulgated with regard to rights over the continental shelf by Oman in 1972 and 
1981, Qatar in 1974, the UAE in 1993, Saudi Arabia in 2012 and Kuwait in 2014.  
This legislation reflects the wording contained in Article 2(1) CSC 1958 and Article 
77(1) LOSC 1982 whereby it confirms that the States exercise sovereign rights over 
the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural 
resources. Iran however departed from such provisions by applying its provisions on 
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its rights in the EEZ to the continental shelf in a way not provided for by international 
law. 
 
 The safeguarding of navigation and security in the contiguous zone and EEZ 
  
As set out in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE have 
gone beyond the provisions in TSCZ 1958 and LOSC 1982 by supplementing their 
legislation with protection of matters relating to security and navigation in their 
contiguous zones and EEZs.  
Thus,  in its 1949 and 1958 Decrees as well as its 2012 Statute, Saudi Arabia 
stated that the purposes of its contiguous zone was to ensure the prevention of 
infringement of law relating to, inter alia, security and navigation. In its 1993 Act, 
Iran established its contiguous zone in order to take meaures to prevent infringement 
of inter alia, security laws. Similarly, the UAE in its 1993 Law stated that the 
purpose of its contiguous zone is to exercise supervision and control to prevent 
infringement of, inter alia, its security laws.  
With regard to the EEZ, in its 2012 Statute, Saudi Arabia added “security” to 
the list of matters which it has jurisdiction over in relation to artificial islands, 
installations and structures in the EEZ.  It will also be recalled that in its 1993 Act, 
Iran provided for security zones in its EEZ, and in response to the US objection about 
it stated that security zones are essential in light of the installations which exist for 
oil exploration in its EEZ as well as for navigation.  
In these respects, these Gulf States have gone beyond the limits in international 
law. It is of note that both Saudi Arabia in its legislation on the contiguous zone, and 
Iran in its reponse to US criticism couple both security and navigation. Indeed, they 
may be said to be interlinked. The significance for delimitation in the Gulf will be 
considered later in this chapter.  
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Delimitation of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone 
 
As has already been shown, the Gulf States in general have legislated for delimitation 
of their territorial sea by way of the median line.620  In fact, delimitation of the 
territorial sea by way of the median line in respect of both opposite and adjacent 
coasts had already become customary international law by the time the Gulf States 
legislated in this respect. The median line to delimit the territorial sea was also 
provided for in Article 12 TSCZ 1958 which evolved into Article 15 LOSC 1982.  
A number of the Gulf States have claimed a contiguous zone in line with 
international law. However, Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have claimed additional 
jurisdiction over security matters in the zone, which is not provided for the LOSC 
1982. The US has opposed such claims, a reflection of the concern of global Maritime 
Powers that freedom of navigation be preserved.621 
While the vast majority of the Gulf agreements have been shown to be 
continental shelf delimitations, two Gulf agreements delimited the territorial sea 
boundary. The first, the Saudi Arabia–Qatar 1965 agreement, adopted the median 
line for the delimitation of the territorial sea, although this agreement is not yet in 
force. It should be noted that Qatar at the time of entering this agreement was subject 
to the protection of Britain, and therefore was under Britain’s influence in coming to 
this draft agreement. Nonetheless, it is useful to note the intended utilization of the 
median line in delimiting the territorial sea as reflective of TSCZ 1958 and indeed 
customary international law at the time. Secondly, the Saudi Arabia-Qatar 2008 
agreement is somewhat different in that a territorial sea corridor was established with 
the northern limit of that corridor (the actual line established by the agreement), being 
parallel to the boundary established in the Qatar-Abu Dhabi 1969 agreement. The 
line drawn by the agreement is therefore not equidistant between Qatar and Saudi 
                                                             
620 For example, Kuwait’s 1967 Decree Article 4; Oman’s 1972 Decree, Article 7; Iran’s 1993 Act, 
Article 4; the UAE’s 1993 Law, Article 23(1). 
621 The US has opposed a number of states’ claims to jurisdiction over security matters in the 
contiguous zone, including those of Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. See J.A Roach and R.W. Smith, 
Excessive Maritime Claims (3rd ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden; Boston, 2012), at p. 157 
who demonstrate that the US has protested against countries such as Egypt, India, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka amongst others, in this regard.  
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Arabia. Rather, it is parallel to a previous boundary which was partly based on 
equidistance.   
 
Delimitation of the continental shelf in the Gulf 
 
i. Baselines 
 
As has been demonstrated in Chapter 4 a number of Gulf States have claimed straight 
baselines which were not in accordance with either the Conventions on the law of the 
sea or case law. As such, there were departures from international law and this 
continued over a number of decades, for example, the Saudi legislation in 1958, the 
Omani legislation in 1972 and Iranian legislation in 1973 and 1993. Such departures 
however resulted in a number of protests, for example from the US in relation to 
Iran’s straight baselines in its 1973 and 1993 legislation.  
 Despite these claims, it is of note that they have not had any effect on the 
continental shelf boundaries as agreed in the Gulf with the boundaries relying instead 
on agreed basepoints. Evans makes the point that “contentious baselines rarely 
influence the ultimate line”, and refers to the ICJ in Romania v Ukraine (2009) which 
stated that:  
 
[T]he issue of determining the baselines for the purpose of measuring the 
breadth of the continental shelf and the EEZ and the issue of identifying base 
points for drawing an equidistance/median line for the purpose of delimiting the 
continental shelf and the EEZ between adjacent/opposite States are two different 
issues.622  
 
 
                                                             
622 Judgment [2009] ICJ Rep 62, para. 137, referred to in M.D. Evans, “Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation” in Rothwell, D.R., Oude Elferink, A.G., Scott, T., and Stephens, T., eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015), p. 254 at p. 262. 
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ii. Equitable principles and equidistance 
 
This section summarizes Gulf state practice in the form of national legislation and 
bilateral agreements and considers them in the context of international law. In this 
regard it is useful to consider delimitation of all zones in general in order to gain a 
fuller contextual picture. The early Proclamations in the 1940s by Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, Kuwait, and the Gulf Sheikhdoms referred to the delimitation of the boundary 
between their seabed and subsoil areas and those of another state as being in 
accordance with equitable principles and by agreement with the other state, reflecting 
the Truman Proclamation of 1945. Bahrain refers in its early legislation to “just” 
principles, although this is another way of referring to equitable principles (with 
Britain at this time controlling Bahrain’s legislation as it was controlling that of the 
other Gulf States under its protection). Similarly, but in respect of delimitation of its 
territorial sea, Saudi Arabia provided for this to be done in accordance with equitable 
principles in 1949 and 1958. In its 1955 Act, Iran provided that its continental shelf 
boundary shall be resolved according to “equity”, but in its 1956 legislation provided 
that the territorial sea boundary was to be delimited in accordance with the 
“recognised rules of international law”.   
There was then a shift within the national legislation from the late 1950s 
onwards to references to equidistance. The first Gulf State to exhibit this approach 
was Iraq which in in its Proclamation of 19 April 1958 referred to Iraq’s “adherence 
to international practice…and to the principle of equidistance” although there is no 
specific reference to delimitation of the continental shelf specifically by way of the 
application of the principle of equidistance. In 1959, Iran provided for delimitation 
of the territorial sea by the median line. In 1967, Kuwait legislated for the 
delimitation of its territorial sea to be in accordance with Article 12 TSCZ 1958, 
namely, in the absence of agreement, by way of the median line, unless there were 
matters of historic title or other special circumstances which militated against 
equidistance. Kuwait issued a note verbale of 12 July 1971 to the UN stating that 
although it was not a party to CSC 1958 it was aware of its provisions, and that it had 
adopted the median line in delimiting the boundary of its continental shelf with its 
neighbours.  
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In 1972, Oman legislated for delimitation of the territorial sea, the continental shelf 
and the EFZ by the median line, and again in 1977 in respect of the EFZ. In 1973, 
Iran legislated for the outer limit of its EFZ to be the same as the outer limit of its 
continental shelf where the latter was delimited by bilateral agreement with other 
states, otherwise where such delimitation of the continental shelf had not occurred, 
the EFZ was to be delimited by the equidistance line. This was also provided for by 
the UAE in 1980 in respect of its EEZ. Saudi Arabia legislated for delimitation of its 
EFZ by way of an equidistance line in 1974, as did Qatar in 1974 in respect of its 
EFZ and continental shelf. In 1981, Oman legislation provided for the limits of its 
territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf to be delimited by the equidistance line. In 
1993 Iran provided that this was the case in relation to the territorial sea unless 
otherwise agreed, as well as in respect of the EEZ and continental shelf, unless 
otherwise determined in accordance with bilateral agreements.  In 1993, the UAE 
provided that delimitation of the territorial sea was to be by way of a median line. It 
also provided the same in respect of the contiguous zone in the absence of agreement. 
It further provided for delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf by an 
equidistance line unless otherwise determined in accordance with bilateral 
agreements, thus reflecting the wording of Iran’s Act of the same year. Most recently 
in 2014 Kuwait legislated that delimitation of its territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ 
and continental shelf shall be by way of an equidistance line. This most recent 
legislation confirms this latest trend in the Gulf. Thus the Gulf States, taken as a 
whole, began by referring to the delimitation of their continental shelf by way of 
equitable principles, and then moved, in time, to specifically referring to delimitation 
by way of the equidistance line in their national legislation.  
In considering how far the national legislation and bilateral agreements reflect 
international law on continental shelf delimitation, it has already been seen that the 
Gulf States followed the wording of the Truman Proclamation in their early 
legislation. Towards the end of the 1950s, the reference to equidistance began in the 
national legislation, in relation to the territorial sea, the EFZ/EEZ as well as the 
continental shelf and this clearly coincided with the discussions regarding 
equidistance in UNCLOS I and which eventually became enshrined in Article 12 
TSCZ 1958 and Article 6 CSC 1958. Only Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq attended 
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UNCLOS I and II.623 This is because they were the only independent Gulf States at 
that time, and this attendance explains why Iraq and Iran expressly referred to the 
principle of equidistance in their legislation of 1958 and 1959 respectively. As has 
already been seen above in this chapter, such references were not directly in relation 
to delimitation of the continental shelf; the Iraqi legislation referred to equidistance 
in general without reference to delimitation of any specific zone, and Iran’s 
legislation referred to delimitation of the territorial sea rather than the continental 
shelf by a median line. It is of note that Saudi Arabia did not promulgate similar 
legislation in the late 1950s. Its legislation of 1958 referred to delimitation of the 
territorial sea by equity, and Saudi Arabia did not update this position in the 1950s. 
The only Saudi legislation to specifically refer to delimitation by a median line is the 
1974 law relating to delimitation of the EFZ. However, the bilateral delimitation 
agreements entered into by Saudi Arabia clearly demonstrate its approval of 
equidistance. Clearly, the remaining Gulf States, on obtaining independence, jumped 
on the band wagon of using the equidistance principle in relation to continental shelf 
delimitation. This was despite the fact that none of the Gulf States were parties to 
CSC 1958. All the Gulf States however participated in UNCLOS III and in general 
they supported the principle of equidistance as the principle governing continental 
shelf delimitation for both opposite and adjacent states.624 While their legislation 
refers to equidistance in relation to delimitation of the continental shelf, it does not 
mirror Article 6 CSC 1958. For example, as has been seen, it does not refer to 
“specific circumstances”. 
The examination of the bilateral delimitation agreements in the Gulf in Chapter 
6 demonstrates that the principle of equidistance has played a major role in 
delimitation, although a strict application of equidistance has often given way to a 
modified equidistance line. Historically, equidistance has played an important part in 
maritime delimitation in the Gulf, influenced by Britain when it was still in its 
Protective role in the region. Thus, during the 1960s, there took place a series of 
meetings between Britain, on behalf of the protected Gulf States, and Iran, over the 
                                                             
623 A. Razavi, Continental Shelf Delimitation and Related Maritime Issues in the Persian Gulf 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1997), pp. 19-22. Iran was the only Gulf State which 
attended the Hague Conference of 1930, ibid., p.19. 
624 See, for example, A.A. El-Hakim, The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1979), p. 63. 
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settlement of continental shelf boundaries between those States. The equidistance 
line was accepted as the basic means of delimitation.625 This laid the foundation for 
the delimitation between Iran and the Arab states. As seen in Chapter 6, agreements 
between Iran and other Gulf states refer in their Preambles to a desire to delimit the 
boundary in a just and equitable manner. Those same agreements then utilize a 
modified equidistance line in order to effect the continental shelf boundary 
delimitation.  
It should be noted at this juncture that while in general there is extensive use 
of a modified equidistance in the bilateral agreements in the Gulf, as these are 
negotiated agreements it is often very difficult to understand precisely why certain 
coordinates were agreed upon rather than others without any reference to any 
justification of law or objective principle. Further, as was set out in Chapter 3, 
proportionality considerations have played a major role in the international case law 
in relation to a consideration of the relationship between the length of the parties’ 
coastlines and the continental shelf appertaining to the parties. However, none of the 
delimitation agreements makes any specific reference to proportionality and so it is 
difficult to ascertain the exact role which the concept of proportionality has played 
in the agreements.  
It is also important to distinguish between law in the form of national 
legislation, and state practice in the form of the bilateral agreements which are ad 
hoc negotiated compromises. It is with this in mind that it is difficult to accept El-
Hakim’s conclusion that:  
 
the principles followed in the agreements parallel the [CSC 1958] convention’s 
guidelines with respect to jurisdiction and delimitation of boundary. It might 
even be suggested that a regional customary rule has come into existence on the 
three-point rule expressed in Article 6 of the Geneva convention. 626 
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude that the agreements in general demonstrate 
the Gulf States’ understanding that modified equidistance is a manifestation of a just 
                                                             
625 See Amin, S.H., “Customary Rules of Delimitation of the Continental Shelf: The Gulf States 
Practice”, (1979-80) 11 J. Mar.L.&Com. 509,  at p. 520.  
626 See A.A. El-Hakim, (1979), p. 130. 
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and equitable solution.627 On this basis, it is arguable that they are in accordance with 
Article 6 CSC 1958 to a degree, in that they rely on equidistance which is modified 
as a result of relevant circumstances, and such relevant circumstances as they have 
operated in the Gulf will be dealt with below. Not being bound by Article 6 CSC 
1958, as they were not parties to it, they were governed by customary international 
law. As has already been seen in Chapter 3, customary international law was stated 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) to be delimitation by agreement in 
accordance with equitable principles to achieve an equitable result. Gradually, it 
became clear through the case law that the customary law and Article 6 became the 
same route to an equitable solution. Therefore the promotion of equidistance at a 
regional level in the Gulf both in the national legislation and the bilateral agreements 
is in line with the international case law which fostered this connection between 
Article 6 and customary law, as well as being in line with the trend in the recent case 
law to start a delimitation with a provisional equidistance line. It will, however, be 
remembered that the most recent case law, which post-dates the delimitation 
agreements has cast doubt upon the dominant role of equidistance, suggesting that 
the importance of the equitable solution may again be coming to the fore. This study 
contends that Gulf state practice is not inconsistent with such a trend in the case law.  
Articles 74(1) and 83(1) LOSC 1982, provide that delimitation is to be effected 
by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the ICJ, in order to achieve an equitable solution. It binds all of the Gulf 
States except for Iran and the UAE628 However, the international law applicable to 
the Gulf States, including Iran and the UAE, is effectively customary international 
law and the obligation is to reach agreement on the basis of it. As has already been 
seen, international case law in the field of maritime delimitation essentially has 
established what customary international law is in this area, and which in general is 
that the use of the equidistance line is the provisional starting point in cases of both 
adjacent and opposite coastlines.  
                                                             
627 A. A. El-Hakim (1979) at p. 130 concluded that “the offshore boundary agreements so far reached 
in that area seem to have achieved their aim of ‘just’ and ‘equitable’ solutions.”  
628 Iran and UAE’s refusal to ratify LOSC 1982 does not prevent this thesis drawing conclusions 
about their relationship with international law collectively with the other Gulf States for the purpose 
of these conclusions; their essentially political reasons for refusal to ratify are effectively irrelevant 
to the conclusions drawn here. 
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Additionally, it is possible to conclude that in the Gulf, the national legislation 
and the bilateral agreements suggest that the starting point of continental shelf, and 
also EEZ, delimitation in the Gulf, is the equidistance line, both in respect of adjacent 
and opposite coastlines, which leads to an equitable solution. This accords with 
customary international law and Articles 74(1) and 83(1).   
It is apparent from the bilateral agreements in the Gulf that the principle of 
equidistance, modified according to relevant circumstances, provides a useful and 
pragmatic solution. As has been seen in the context of international case law, it is far 
more conducive to certainty to have as a starting point a provisional equidistance 
line, subsequently modified, than relying merely on a nebulous concept of the 
application of equitable principles. Such an approach also allows a degree of 
flexibility, particularly in the context of bilateral agreements which are the result of 
compromise. Further, it ameliorates the possible distorting effect a strict equidistance 
line may have when faced with certain geographical features, such as the presence of 
islands. 
It is now useful to put Gulf State practice in context by looking at state practice 
more widely. An extremely comprehensive and authoritative source of state practice 
of states across the world is contained in the maritime boundary research project 
carried out under the auspices of the American Society of International Law (“the 
Maritime Boundary Project”), which has analysed all known maritime boundary 
agreements.629 Most maritime boundary delimitations which have taken place across 
the globe have in fact been by way of settlement.630 This has provided the Maritime 
Boundary Project with a huge body of international state practice to examine. In 1993 
Charney concluded that according to the research carried out by the Maritime 
Boundary Project,  international state practice showed that the equidistance line had 
played a major role in delimitation agreements, both in relation to boundaries 
between opposite and adjacent coastline. Charney went on to state as follows: 
                                                             
629 The results are published in  J.I Charney and L.M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime 
Boundaries Vols I, II (Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993), Vol. III, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1998); J.I. 
Charney and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries Vol. IV, (Martinus Nijhoff, The 
Hague, 2002); D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries Vol. V 
(Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2005), Vol. VI (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2011).   
630 These numbered over 130 in 1993, when the Boundary Project first published Vol 1 of its multi-
volume work. See J.I  Charney and L.M. Alexander  (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries Vol I 
(Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993), pp. xxvii, xxix. 
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In the vast preponderance of the boundary agreements studied, equidistance had 
some role in the development of the line and/or the location of the line that was 
established…If state practice has any influence on the positive law for maritime 
boundary delimitations, equidistance must have a place.631 
 
Therefore, the reliance on equidistance to such a great extent in Gulf State practice, 
is not an isolated phenomenon. Equidistance has the advantage of providing 
predictability, but is also malleable in the sense that it can be simplified, modified to 
take into account of relevant circumstances, or even departed from and then re-
utilized at another point in the same boundary. It offers a pragmatic initial solution 
for negotiated compromises where states are negotiating difficult maritime boundary 
questions based on the complexity of the geographical situation, while seeking to 
retain as much control as possible over the final resulting boundary line.632 
Charney drew another important conclusion in 1993, namely that examination 
of international state practice in the form of maritime boundary agreements:  
 
support[s] the conclusion that no normative principle  of international law has 
developed that would mandate the specific location of any maritime boundary 
line. The state practice varies substantially. Due to the unlimited geographic and 
other circumstances that influence the settlements, no binding rule that would 
be sufficiently determinative to enable one to predict the location of a maritime 
boundary with any degree of precision is likely to evolve in the near 
future…Furthermore, an opinio juris supporting a definitive norm certainly is 
absent.633 
 
Charney echoed these observations a number of years later in 2002 by stating in that 
“an overall mandatory rule of international law cannot be pronounced” from a 
consideration of the most recent state practice.634 There is nothing to suggest that 
                                                             
631 Ibid., p. xlii. 
632 It is important to note that some relatively recent agreements refer to the parties’ desire to reach an 
equitable solution, such as the Belgium – France territorial sea and continental shelf boundary 
agreements of 1990, see R.R. Churchill and A.V Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed., Juris Publishing, 
Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 197. 
633 Charney and Alexander Vol I (1993), p. xlii. 
634 Charney and Smith Vol IV (2002), p. xxii. 
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there is any reason to believe that this view is undermined by state practice at the 
present time.  
 
The single maritime boundary in the Gulf 
 
Since the late 1970s the trend, particularly outside Europe, has been to reach 
agreements on single maritime boundaries for all zones. Many of the single maritime 
boundaries, particularly in the case of opposite coasts, have been based on the 
equidistance principle, sometimes modified for simplicity or to take account of 
special circumstances.635  A single maritime boundary between Qatar and Bahrain 
was decided in the Qatar/Bahrain (2001) case by the ICJ. None of the bilateral 
agreements in the Gulf however has established a single maritime boundary.  
As has been seen in the legislation of the Gulf States the enthusiasm for the 
principle of equidistance has extended to the EEZ/EFZ; therefore, this lays the 
potential ground for a single maritime boundary. The single maritime boundary 
concept has also been acknowledged in the legislation of Oman, Iran, Qatar and the 
UAE since the 1970s. This has occurred in two ways.  Firstly, in the earlier legislation 
of Iran in 1973, it was provided that the limit of the EFZ was to be the same as the 
limit of the continental shelf where the latter had been delimited by a delimitation 
agreement, and where it had not, it would be delimited by way of the median line. In 
1980 the UAE provided for the same in relation to its EEZ. Thus, there was the 
attempt to make both boundaries the same where the continental shelf boundary had 
already been agreed. To put this in context, in many cases within Europe, existing 
continental shelf boundaries agreed in the 1960s and early 1970s have been treated 
as de facto boundaries for the EEZ/EFZ.636 Secondly, the recognition of the concept 
of the single maritime boundary is seen in legislation which has established the 
equidistance line to delimit multiple zones, namely the territorial sea, the continental 
                                                             
635 A few seem to be based on equitable principles, and in two agreements, Colombia–Ecuador 1975, 
and Gambia–Senegal 1975, the  boundary was the line of latitude extending from the terminus of the 
land boundary which seems to have been a solution based upon a desire for simplicity, see Churchill 
and Lowe (1999), p. 197-8.  
636 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 197. 
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shelf and the EEZ. This is seen in Oman’s legislation of 1972, 1977 and 1981; in 
Qatar’s legislation of 1974 in relation to the continental shelf and EFZ; in Iran and 
the UAE’s legislation of 1993 in respect of the territorial sea, the continental shelf 
and the EEZ, and, additionally in the case of the UAE in 1993, the contiguous zone. 
As has been seen earlier, when applying an equidistance line to the boundary of both 
the continental shelf and the EEZ, the relevant circumstances which may apply to 
modify a strict equidistance line may well be different in relation to each zone, and 
the need to utilize only those which are common to both, mainly geographical factors 
as seen in the case law, is an important issue. 
 
Relevant circumstances 
 
Relevant/special circumstances have been extensively considered in the international 
case law on delimitation. It is important to remember at this juncture, that while Gulf 
national legislation refers to equidistance, it does not make reference to special 
circumstances which may militate against the use of equidistance.  
What follows sets out the relevant circumstances which, as evidenced by the 
delimitation agreements, have been taken into account and have been a reason for a 
true equidistance line to be modified to a line which is not strictly equidistant. It 
should be noted that the bilateral agreements do not set out to rationalise why the 
lines have been drawn as they have, for example, which features were considered to 
be relevant so that they modified an otherwise equidistance line. It is therefore a 
matter of analysing the lines in each case in order to ascertain what factors were 
considered relevant as far as is possible.  
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i. Islands 
 
As set out in the international case law, islands fall into the category of relevant 
circumstances, although minor projections and low elevations have often been 
disregarded. Islands are crucial to questions of delimitation in the Gulf because of 
their proliferation particularly on its Arab side.  
There are difficulties when it comes to analysing the treatment of islands in the 
delimitation agreements, because often it is unclear whether islands have been given 
any effect. The agreements themselves do not explicitly state how the islands have 
been dealt with, in contrast to the case law, which sets out reasoning explaining why 
islands have been dealt with in a particular way. What follows is a suggested analysis 
of the manner in which islands have been dealt with in the agreements and does so 
in the context of international law. 
 
a. Half-effect 
 
In Saudi Arabia-Iran 1968, Kharg, a large island near Iran appears to have been given 
half-effect in drawing the equidistance line. Giving the island half-effect entailed the 
drawing of two lines. Firstly, a line equidistant from the Saudi Arabian mainland and 
Kharg (giving Kharg full effect by considering it part of the Iranian mainland), and 
secondly a line equidistant from both the Saudi Arabian and Iranian mainlands 
(ignoring Kharg and giving it no effect).  The boundary line would then be the line 
half-way between these two lines. The area between both lines would then be divided 
equally. The agreement does not explicitly confirm that this was the approach 
used.637 However, as set out in Chapter 3 and according to Jaywardene, it is apparent 
that this is the method which was used.638 As has already been seen in Chapter 6, in 
this agreement, the Iranian island of Nakhilu and the Saudi Arabian island of Abu 
Ali were also given partial effect.  
                                                             
637 As recognized in Limits in the Seas, No. 94, “Continental Shelf Boundaries: The Persian Gulf” 
(Office of the Geographer, US, September 11, 1981), p. 7. 
638 H.W. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 1990), pp. 356-7. 
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It has been observed that this agreement was the first occurrence of the use of half-
effect.639 As such, this agreement has led the way in the application of this technique 
which is ostensibly done to produce an equitable result. It has also been observed that 
case law has cited this agreement as an example of giving islands partial or half-
effect, even though the agreement is only res inter alios acta.640 In this regard, it will 
be remembered that in the Anglo French Arbitration  (1977) the Tribunal gave only 
half-effect to the Scilly Isles in defining the equidistance line between the Parties in 
the Atlantic section of the boundary, apparently looking to the Saudi Arabia-Iran 
1968 agreement for inspiration. It stated: 
 
A number of examples are to be found in State practice of delimitations in which 
only partial effect has been given to offshore islands situated outside the 
territorial sea of the mainland...in one instance, at least, the method employed 
was to give half, instead of full, effect to the offshore island in delimiting the 
equidistance line.641 
 
The agreement was apparently also referred to by the ICJ in Tunisia v Libya (1982) 
where the Kerkennah islands off the Tunisian coast were also given half effect: 
 
The Court would recall...that a number of examples are to be found in State 
practice of delimitations in which only partial effect has been given to islands 
situated close to the coast.642 
 
Therefore, such case law has looked to Gulf State practice in the form of the Saudi 
Arabia-Iran 1968 agreement as an example of how to solve the issue of islands which 
were complicating the drawing of the continental shelf boundary before them and in 
order to reduce as much as possible the distorting effect of an island on the drawing 
                                                             
639 For example, see D. Bowett, “Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime 
Boundary Delimitations”, in Charney and Alexander Vol I (1993), pp. 131-151 at 140.  See also C.G. 
MacDonald, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Law of the Sea (London, Greenwood Press, 1980), who states 
at p. 140 that the Tribunal in the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977) “followed the precedent” of Iran 
and Saudi Arabia’s treatment of Kharg.. 
640 See, for example, MacDonald (1980), pp. 139-40. 
641 18 ILM 397, para. 251. 
642 [1982] ICJ Rep 18, para. 129. 
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of the boundary line.   It is possible therefore to go so far as to assert that Gulf State 
practice has had a significant influence on international case law in this respect. 
It should be noted also that the delimitation had ramifications in respect of the 
known oil resources in the disputed area. A true equidistance line would have meant 
that the entire Marjan-Feyerdoon oil deposits would be on Saudi Arabia’s side of that 
line. In the event the deposit was divided between both States, the part on Saudi-
Arabia’s side being Marjan, and that on Iran’s side being Fereydoon (re-named 
Frozan after the Iranian Islamic Revolution).  
 
b. Islands which are granted territorial seas by way of a semi-enclave 
  
As demonstrated by the international case law considered in Chapter 3, some islands 
may have no effect upon an equidistance line in the sense that they are not treated as 
relevant circumstances which causes it to be deflected. However, instead an arc is 
drawn around their territorial sea, that arc being part of the delimitation line.  It will 
be remembered that the method of enclaving was seen in the case law as early as the 
Anglo-French Arbitration (1977) and the Gulf States have utilised this method of 
delimitation in a number of their bilateral agreements. 
As referred to in Chapter 6, following the Sharjah–Umm al Qaywayn 1964 
agreement, in 1971 Abu Musa island was granted a 12nm territorial sea, and further 
in the Dubai/Sharjah Arbitration Award of 1981, Abu Musa was granted a 12nm 
territorial sea. The islands of Farsi and Al-‘Arabiyah, which are many miles from the 
mainlands of each State, were granted territorial seas of 12nm in the Saudi Arabia-
Iran 1968 agreement, but ignored for the purpose of drawing the line. Because the 
territorial sea of the each island overlaps with the other, an equidistance line separates 
each territorial sea. The island of Dayyinah was similarly treated in Qatar-UAE (Abu 
Dhabi) 1969, being granted a 3nm territorial sea (at the time both States adhered to 
this territorial sea measurement following the practice of Britain), so that the lateral 
equidistance line was diverted around the 3nm arc around Dayyinah. Similarly in 
Iran-Oman 1974, the Iranian island of Larak was granted a 12nm territorial sea. In 
Iran-Dubai 1974, a 12nm arc was drawn around the Iranian island of Sirri, which 
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enclaved its 3nm territorial sea. In general, therefore, the Gulf agreements show that 
islands which in are on or near the boundary line are granted territorial seas.  
 
c. Islands which are ignored as base points from which to draw the boundary and 
therefore given no effect 
 
In general in the Gulf delimitation agreements, it is the case that islands, especially 
those which straddle or are on the “wrong side” of what would be the equidistance 
line, are ignored as base points from which to draw the line. This is in order to prevent 
disproportionate apportionment of the continental shelf to each state party to the 
agreement. There are many examples in the agreements where such islands were 
ignored. 
In Bahrain-Saudi Arabia 1958, at points 1-4 and 7 of the line, small islands 
between the coasts of both States were not utilised to delimit the line. In Saudi 
Arabia-Iran 1968, the islands of Farsi and Al-‘Arabiyah which are many miles from 
the mainlands of each State, were apportioned their own 12nm territorial seas, but 
ignored for the purpose of drawing the line. Apart from the Iranian island of Kharg, 
a large island located near the mainland which was given half effect, all other islands 
and islets were totally ignored in the Saudi Arabia-Iran 1968 agreement.643 In Abu 
Dhabi-Qatar 1969 it is not at all clear that small islands on either side of the boundary 
were given any effect. The Abu Dhabi island of Dayyinah had an arc drawn around 
it, as referred to above, but did not in itself operate to modify an otherwise 
equidistance line.  In Iran-Qatar 1969 all islands were apparently disregarded for the 
purpose of drawing the line, and in Bahrain-Iran 1971 no effect was apparently given 
to islands situated on either side of the line, although as has been mentioned earlier, 
the line, based upon equidistance, seems to have utilised two base points, one on a 
Bahraini islet north of Jazirat al-Muharraq, and the other on the Iranian islet of 
                                                             
643 A.A. El-Hakim (1979) at p.95 states that “it is not clear either why the Saudi islands of Janah, al 
Jurayd, al Qurayyin, Qiran and Hurqus have had no effect whatever in delimiting the Saudi Arabia- 
Iran continental shelf boundary. These islands are so located that they are within twelve-miles of the 
Saudi coast and each other, and therefore may be considered as being within the Saudi Arabian 
baseline, in accordance with the Saudi decree on the territorial sea.” 
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Nakhilu.644 In Iran-Oman 1974, while effect was given to some islands in drawing 
the line, others were given no effect. In Iran-Dubai 1974, all islands were disregarded, 
with a 12nm arc drawn around the Iranian island of Sirri.645  
As stated in Chapter 6, the treatment of islands in the delimitation of the 
continental shelf in the Gulf has drawn on methods utilised in international case law. 
There is a significant consistency with international law, although in fact, in the case 
of the seemingly half-effect given to Kharg Island in Saudi Arabia – Iran 1968, an 
innovative approach was shown, as referred to in Chapter 6. However, the most 
significant innovation demonstrated in Gulf State practice is in respect of other 
revelant circumstances taken into account in delimitation, as set out below. 
 
ii. The existence of oil and gas fields in the continental shelf 
 
The delimitation agreements are a particularly significant source of state practice 
because the main motivation behind their inception was the presence or anticipated 
presence of natural resources existing in the sea bed and the need for certainty over 
the territory in which state’s continental shelf territory they were located. This in turn 
impacted upon the granting of oil concessions to oil companies.  Thus resources and 
economics were the driving force behind them, and were the essential reason for their 
existence. 
In four delimitation agreements, the presence of an oilfield caused a boundary 
line, which would otherwise be an equidistance line, to be modified, and as such it 
may be said that they were relevant circumstances for the purpose of Gulf State 
practice. Firstly, in the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia agreement 1958, the line drawn was 
based upon equidistance, but not where the line was in the vicinity of the Fasht Abu-
                                                             
644 Charney and Alexander, Vol II (1993), p. 1482, and Limits in the Seas No. 58, “Continental Shelf 
Boundary: Bahrain-Iran”, (Office of the Geographer, September 13, 1974), p. 4.   
645 An important question is whether there is any identifiable pattern, such as of size or level of 
habitation, in the islands which have been ignored and in those which have been given effect. This 
issue has been beyond the scope of this thesis which has focused on the Gulf national legislation and 
bilateral agreements.  Further research more strongly based on geography would be best placed to 
answer such a question. An examples of a thesis with its roots based in geography is F.M.J. Al-
Muwaled, Maritime Boundary Delimitation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A Study in Political 
Geography (PhD Thesis, University of Durham, 1993). 
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Sa’fah oilfield. At point 12 of that line, the boundary deviates north east towards 
Bahrain, so as to include the oilfield within Saudi Arabia’s territory, thus preserving 
its unity. A true equidistance line would have dissected the oilfield. Secondly, in the 
Abu Dhabi – Dubai 1968 agreement, the boundary was altered from that originally 
agreed in 1965 to grant to Dubai a greater maritime area, including the Fateh oil 
wells. Thirdly, in the Saudi Arabia-Iran agreement 1968, the line, from point D, 
deviates from the equidistance line to take into account the Marjan-Feyerdoon 
oilfield, and to split it between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  A true equidistance line would 
have caused the entire oilfield to be on Saudi Arabia’s side of the line. Fourthly, in 
the Qatar–Abu Dhabi 1969 agreement, the partly equidistant boundary line deviated 
from equidistance in the sense that point B of the line was fixed at the location of oil 
well No. 1 in the Al Bunduq oilfield in order to solve the dispute over it between the 
Parties.  
It will be remembered additionally that in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases (1969) the unity of a resource deposit was identified as one factor which would 
be balanced amongst others in coming to an equitable result, although it was not a 
relevant circumstance as such. The concept of the unity of a deposit was not adhered 
to in the Saudi Arabia-Iran 1968 and Qatar–Abu Dhabi 1969 agreements. It is 
apparent that whether or not the unity of a deposit was maintained was a matter of 
compromise in each individual case, and there is no suggestion in Gulf State practice 
that the preservation of the unity of a deposit is considered as an overriding principle 
or acts as a restraining factor in any way.  
However, as is clear from the above, oil and gas resources have quite openly 
been viewed as relevant circumstances modifying an equidistance line. This is hardly 
surprising considering the motivation behind most of the bilateral agreements being 
the need for certainty in establishing rights to explore and exploit such resources. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, the Gulf States, in permitting the existence of oil and gas 
resources to affect the placement of the equidistance line, have gone beyond the 
constraints put in place by international case law. This is a point of innovation in Gulf  
State practice when considered in the context of international law. 
 
  
 
 
261 
iii. Navigation 
 
Another area in which delimitation in the Gulf exhibits innovation, when placed within 
the context of international law, is the way in which the navigational interests of Saudi 
Arabia were relevant circumstances which were determinative in affecting the 
placement of the boundary line in Saudi Arabia – Qatar 2008 and Saudi Arabia – UAE 
1974.  As has has already been mentioned, Saudi Arabia’s concern with navigation 
has already appeared within a different context, namely in its legislation in respect of 
the contiguous zone , which, extending outside the parameters of TSCZ 1958 and 
LOSC 1958, stated that the purposes of its contiguous zone was to ensure the 
prevention of infringement of law relating to, inter alia, security and navigation. It is 
of note that both security and navigation are added to the provision on the contiguous 
zone. Similarly, in Iran’s response to US objection regarding the provision of safety 
zones in its EEZ, which also went beyond LOSC 1982 provisions, Iran stated that they 
were essential for the protection of installations for oil exploration, and also in order 
to protect navigation.  In light of the suggestion of both Saudi Arabia and Iran that 
both security and navigation are crucial interests in the Gulf which are interlinked, it 
may be asked at this point whether, as a result,  security factors may in due course also 
be considered relevant to delimitation in the Gulf in the future. 
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Chapter 8 
 
 
   Conclusions 
 
The significance of this study lies in the fact that it has conducted a comprehensive 
and up to date examination of Gulf national legislation as well as bilateral maritime 
boundary agreements, both of which constitute state practice, in order to identify 
trends and circumstances which have played a significant part in continental shelf 
boundary delimitation in the Gulf region. Since Razavi’s work in 1997, there have 
been a number of important developments in international case law, including the 
Qatar v Bahrain (2001) decision, as well as more recent legislation in the Gulf, and 
the relatively recent Saudi Arabia – Qatar 2008 delimitation.  
In answer to the research questions posed in Chapter 1, it is firstly contended 
that the findings of this thesis demonstrate that there are clearly identifiable trends in 
Gulf law and state practice in the field of delimitation of the continental shelf. The 
body of Gulf law and state practice which has been examined can be characterised 
by a significant degree of appreciation of, and consistency with, international law. It 
is quite apparent from this material that international law has operated as a restraint 
and also a guide to the Gulf States. The Gulf States have exhibited a desire to engage 
with the present rules of the international law of the sea and to utilize it to their 
advantage. Despite the fact that Iran and the UAE are the only Gulf States not to have 
yet ratified LOSC 1982, they have nevertheless exhibited on the whole the same 
tendency.  
 Having carried out an examination and analysis of Gulf legislation on 
baselines, maritime zones and delimitation, it is quite clear that in general there is a 
substantial degree of consistency with international law. National legislation of the 
Gulf States often explicitly refers to international law, and even to U.N. Conventions 
such as LOSC 1982.  Notable departures from the present basis of the rules of 
international law include the legislation regarding the straight baselines of Saudi 
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Arabia, Iran, the UAE and Oman and the legislation on the contiguous zone and EEZ 
of Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE with the wider powers claimed within these 
maritime zones.  This relationship between Gulf legislation and international law, 
whereby there is a recognition of international law and the benefits it affords, but also 
the willingness to extend beyond its confines, foreshadows the findings of the thesis 
in respect of the delimitation of the maritime boundaries in the Gulf. 
With regard to delimitation of boundaries in the Gulf, there is also a substantial 
degree of consistency with international law. As has been seen in Chapters 6 and 7 
of this thesis, the utilisation of the equidistance line in delimitation in the Gulf is 
generally in accordance with international law developments. Further, the many 
examples of the treatment of islands as relevant circumstances when drawing the 
equidistance line is also familiar from an international law perspective. However, it 
is important to note an important innovation with regard to the treatment of islands 
in that the Saudi Arabia-Iran 1968 agreement has been recognised as the first usage 
of half-effect which influenced subsequent international case law, and was therefore 
an important precedent for the region as well as for general international law. 
Aside from the above, this thesis contends, also in answer to the research 
questions posed in Chapter 1, that there are a number of highly significant innovative 
elements in Gulf law and state practice which may be said to offer useful lessons for 
the law of maritime boundary delimitation more generally. The findings of this 
research has uncovered emphases in practice which are fairly remarkable and go 
beyond the limitations which are quite apparent in international case law. The first 
innovation is that the presence of oil and gas fields have de facto been treated as 
relevant circumstances which have altered the path of an equidistance line delimiting 
the continental shelf boundary between states. It will be recalled from Chapter 3 of 
this thesis which reviews international case law, as well as Chapter 6 which deals 
with the ICJ Judgement of Qatar v Bahrain (2001), that it is extremely unlikely that 
mineral resources will be considered to be relevant circumstances by a court or 
tribunal. The second innovation is that the navigational interests of Saudi Arabia have 
been considered relevant enough to affect the placement of a boundary in Saudi 
Arabia – Qatar 2008 and Saudi Arabia – UAE 1974. Once more, in light of the case 
law, it is extremely unlikely that this would be the case before the ICJ or a tribunal. 
 
 
264 
The reasons for such innovations are clear. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis, the Gulf is a relatively small, overcrowded semi – enclosed sea bordered by 
eight states in which oil and gas fields abound throughout. In this relatively small 
area of competing interests the examples giving effect to navigational interests in 
delimitation in the Gulf is hardly surprising, in the same way that it is only to be 
expected that the existence of oil and gas resources would have an effect upon 
delimitation which would influence the use of the equidistance line. The 
delimitations in the Gulf are realistic solutions which, in their expediency, have 
allowed for a significant degree of agreement over contentious problems. What is of 
real interest is the explicit manner in which oil and gas resources and navigational 
interests are seen as relevant and taken into account accordingly. The resulting 
delimitation in the Gulf provides a good example of how delimitation can protect 
such interests in a useful and pragmatic way solving difficult problems of access to 
precious resources and navigation routes. What has been uncovered by this thesis is 
a series of delimitations in an area of sea which is subject to many competing 
interests in mineral resources, economic interests arising therefrom, and matters of 
navigational concerns. Boundary problems have been solved as a result of 
addressing the actual concerns which exist between states but within the overarching 
framework of international law. This brings into sharp relief the limitations of the 
case law in this area which has ignored matters important to parties such as oil and 
gas interests, navigation and also security interests when deciding on delimitation 
matters. Very often, international case law leaves the unsatisfactory impression that 
these factors have played a part in the judgments and decisions made, although 
remaining hidden and unquantifiable.  
This study also demonstrates the contribution of international law as a means 
of reaching amicable solutions in a small semi-enclosed sea bordered by a number of 
states with competing interests, in a strategically and economically vital part of the 
world. The States bordering the Gulf Sea, although all Muslim, have very different 
political viewpoints, which often puts Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example, at 
loggerheads, with each striving for hegemony in the Gulf region. The Gulf States 
have very varied histories, and display huge disparities in demographics and wealth. 
Territorial boundary disputes have often festered for many years, been a source of 
armed conflict, and in some cases still remain to be settled. It was therefore always 
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likely that disputes over maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf would prove just 
as difficult to resolve. Extraordinarily, this has not been the case. Although a 
determination not to escalate conflict to seaward areas must be one of the reasons for 
this, the rules of the international law of the sea and the flexibility they allow for has 
provided an arena for negotiation and compromise. This shows the continued vitality 
and importance of international law, and particularly the international law of the sea, 
as a guide and overarching framework for states to abide by but giving effect to their 
own regional proclivities and circumstances.   
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